Vielleicht wurde der schon gebracht, ich weiß es nicht.


Can a leopard change his spots...?

Following is a verbatim article published in the Wall Street Journal on September 1, 1981. Its author is Alan Greenspan, who at the time was a partner in Townsend-Greenspan & Co. - an economic consulting firm. It is relevant and very significant to also know that Greenspan was the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors from 1974 to 1977, a period witnessing dramatic changes in the price of gold.





CAN THE U.S. RETURN TO A GOLD STANDARD?


By Alan Greenspan

The growing disillusionment with politically controlled monetary policies has produced an increasing number of advocates for a return to the GOLD STANDARD - including at times president Reagan.

In years past a desire to return to a monetary system based on gold was perceived as nostalgia for an era when times were simpler, problems less complex and the world not threatened with nuclear annihilation. But after a decade of destabilizing inflation and economic stagnation, the restoration of a GOLD STANDARD has become an issue that is clearly rising on the economic policy agenda. A commission to study the issue, with strong support from President Reagan, is in place.

The increasingly numerous proponents of a GOLD STANDARD persuasively argue that budget deficits and large federal borrowings would be difficult to finance under such a standard. Heavy claims against paper dollars cause few technical problems, for the Treasury can legally borrow as many dollars as Congress authorizes.

But with unlimited dollar conversion into gold, the ability to issue dollar claims would be severely limited. Obviously if you cannot finance federal deficits, you cannot create them. Either taxes would then have to be raised and expenditures lowered. The restrictions of gold convertibility would therefore profoundly alter the politics of fiscal policy that have prevailed for half a century.


Disturbed by Alternatives

Even some of those who conclude a return to gold is infeasible remain deeply disturbed by the current alternatives. For example, William Fellner of the American Enterprise Institute in a forthcoming publication remarks"...I find it difficult not to be greatly impressed by the very large damage done to the economies of the industrialized world... by the monetary management that has followed the era of (gold) convertibility... It has placed the Western economies in acute danger."

Yet even those of us who are attracted to the prospect of gold convertibility are confronted with a seemingly impossible obstacle: the latest claims to gold represented by the huge world overhang of fiat currency, many dollars.

The immediate problem of restoring a GOLD STANDARD is fixing a gold price that is consistent with market forces. Obviously if the offering price by the Treasury is too low, or subsequently proves to be too low, heavy demand at the offering price could quickly deplete the total U.S. government stock of gold, as well as any gold borrowed to thwart the assault. At that point, with no additional gold available, the U.S. would be off the GOLD STANDARD and likely to remain off for decades.

Alternatively, if the gold price is initially set too high, or subsequently becomes too high, the Treasury would be inundated with gold offerings. The payments the gold drawn on the Treasury's account at the Federal Reserve would add substantially to commercial bank reserves and probably act, at least temporarily, to expand the money supply with all the inflationary implications thereof.

Monetary offsets to neutralize or"earmark" gold are, of course, possible in the short run. But as the West Germany authorities soon learned from their past endeavors to support the dollar, there are limits to monetary countermeasures.

The only seeming solution is for the U.S. to create a fiscal and monetary environment which in effect makes the dollar as good as gold, i.e., stabilizes the general price level and by inference the dollar price of gold bullion itself. Then a modest reserve of bullion could reduce the narrow gold price fluctuations effectively to zero, allowing any changes in gold supply and demand to be absorbed in fluctuations in the Treasury's inventory.

What the above suggests is that a necessary condition of returning to a GOLD STANDARD is the financial environment which the GOLD STANDARD itself is presumed to create. But, if we restored financial stability, what purpose is then served by return to a GOLD STANDARD?

Certainly a gold-based monetary system will necessarily prevent fiscal imprudence, as 20th Century history clearly demonstrates. Nonetheless, once achieved, the discipline of the GOLD STANDARD would surely reinforce anti-inflation policies, and make it far more difficult to resume financial profligacy. The redemption of dollars for gold in response to excess federal government-induced credit creation would be a strong political signal. Even after inflation is brought under control the extraordinary political sensitivity to inflation will remain.

Concrete actions to install a GOLD STANDARD are premature. Nonetheless, there are certain preparatory policy actions that could test the eventual feasibility of returning to a GOLD STANDARD, that would have positive short-term anti-inflation benefits and little cost if they fail.

The major roadblock to restoring the GOLD STANDARD is the problem of re-entry. With the vast quantity of dollars worldwide laying claims to the U.S. Treasury's 264 million ounces of gold, an overnight transition to gold convertibility would create a major discontinuity for the U.S. financial system. But there is no need for the whole block of current dollar obligations to become an immediate claim.

Convertibility can be instituted gradually by, in effect, creating a dual currency with a limited issue of dollars convertible into gold. Initially they could be deferred claims to gold, for example, five-year Treasury Notes with interest and principal payable in grams or ounces of gold.

With the passage of time and several issues of these notes we would have a series of"new monies" in terms of gold and eventually, demand claims on gold. The degree of success of restoring long-term fiscal confidence will show up clearly in the yield spreads between gold and fiat dollar obligations of the same maturities. Full convertibility would require that the yield spread for all maturities virtually disappear. If they do not, convertibility will be very difficult, probably impossible, to implement.

A second advantage of gold notes is that they are likely to reduce current budget deficits. Treasury gold notes in today's markets could be sold at interest rates at approximately 2% or less. In fact from today's markets one can construct the equivalent of a 22-month gold note yielding 1%, by arbitraging regular Treasury note yields for June 1983 maturities (17%) and the forward delivery premiums of gold (16% annual rate) inferred from June 1983 futures contracts. Presumably five-year note issues would reflect a similar relationship.


A Risk of Exchange Loss

The exchange risk of the Treasury gold notes, of course, is the same as that associated with our foreign currency Treasury note series. The U.S. Treasury has, over the years, sold significant quantities of both German mark - and Swiss franc denominated issues, and both made and lost money in terms of dollars as exchange rates have fluctuated. And indeed there is a risk of exchange rate loss with gold notes.

However, unless the price of gold doubles over a five-year period (16% compounded annually), interest payments on the gold notes in terms of dollars will be less than conventional financing requires. The run-up to $875 per ounce in early 1980 was surely an aberration, reflecting certain circumstances in the Middle East which are unlikely to be repeated in the near future. Hence, anything close to doubling of gold prices in the next five years appears improbable. On the other hand, if gold prices remain stable or rise moderately, the savings could be large: Each $10 billion in equivalent gold notes outstanding would, under stable gold prices, save $1.5 billion per year in interest outlays.

A possible further side benefit of the existence of gold notes is that they could set a standard in terms of prices and interest rates that could put additional political pressure on the administration and Congress to move expeditiously toward non-inflationary policies. Gold notes could be a case of reversing Gresham's Law. Good money would drive out bad.

Those who advocate a return to a GOLD STANDARD should be aware that returning our monetary system to gold convertibility is no mere technical, financial restructuring. It is a basic change in our economic processes. However, considering where the policies of the last 50 years have eventually led us, perhaps there are lessons to be learned from our more distant GOLD STANDARD past.




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<ul> ~ Quelle: gold-eagle</ul>
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Greenspan: Still Going for the Gold
by Judy Shelton
May 15, 1997



If patience is a virtue, Alan Greenspan is a saint. For more than three decades he has endeavored to guide the nation toward sound money -- first as a radical intellectual, then as an business economist and presidential adviser, and currently as chairman of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. His critics on the left seem unable to comprehend the destructive consequences of irresponsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary policy. His critics on the right simply cannot appreciate the long-term perspective of Greenspan, a man who argued powerfully in the 1960s that"gold and economic freedom are inseparable" and who has steadfastly, albeit slowly, continued to pursue the realization of his intellectual ideals in the economic sphere. Arbitrary and capricious, he is not.

The benefits of a balanced budget

Instead of taking potshots at Greenspan reinforcing the claims of those who maliciously accuse him of waging a war against workers, advocates of sound money should be working with the Fed chairman toward the ultimate goal of price stability and restoration of a gold-based monetary system. It ain't gonna happen overnight; that is the fundamental lesson to be drawn from Greenspan's languorous pace. But with the achievement of a balanced budget agreement, we are making real progress.

Balancing the budget is a moral imperative because it means the government cannot indulge in excessive spending and then abuse its sovereign monetary authority by financing chronic deficits with increasing levels of federal debt -- a practice that results in inflation. Supply-siders who minimize the importance of a balanced budget do not show proper respect for the teachings of economist Ludwig von Mises, who observed:


Inflation is a policy. And a policy can be changed. Therefore, there is no reason to give in to inflation. If one regards inflation as an evil, then one has to stop inflating. One has to balance the budget of the government. Of course, public opinion must support this; the intellectuals must help the people to understand. Given the support of public opinion, it is certainly possible for the people's elected representatives to abandon the policy of inflation.
Greenspan: A closet Keynesian?

So the people's elected representatives have finally resolved to abandon the policy of inflation and phase out the budget deficit. Politicians on both sides are displeased with the compromise agreement forged earlier this month, but that is the nature of the process; it's messy but it's democracy. And as Washington journalist Bob Woodward chronicled in The Agenda, it's also the culmination of a personal campaign by Greenspan to convince government officials of all stripes that when they fund excess budget expenditures through the crafty means of government borrowing -- rather than the more straightforward approach of raising taxes -- they undermine not only the integrity of the nation's currency, but democracy itself."Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the 'hidden' confiscation of wealth," Greenspan stated in The Objectivist some 30 years ago, noting:"Gold stands in the way of this insidious process."

His reasoning remains valid on both counts. If, under democratic capitalism, people freely choose to redistribute national income for purposes of social equity, defense, education or other communal objectives -- so be it. The necessary tax revenues should be collected and allocated accordingly. What is unacceptable is for Washington officials to shirk from demonstrating the political courage necessary to defend their spending decisions and instead obtain funds by issuing government bonds that eventually swell the money supply with unwarranted credit. No less a liberal luminary than economist John Maynard Keynes, in his Tract on Monetary Reform, recognized the folly of deficit financing:


It is common to speak as though, when a Government pays its way by inflation, the people of the country avoid taxation. We have seen that this is not so. What is raised by printing notes is just as much taken from the public as is a beer-duty or an income-tax. What a Government spends the public pay for. There is no such thing as an uncovered deficit.
The golden years?

Now that we are approaching that point where monetary policy can be isolated from fiscal policy, it is time to move purposefully toward the final objective of sound money based on gold convertibility. In a 1981 op-ed article entitled"Can the U.S. Return to a Gold Standard?", published in The Wall Street Journal, Greenspan wrote that the prerequisite for successfully restoring a gold standard was"for the U.S. to create a fiscal and monetary environment which in effect makes the dollar as good as gold, i.e., stabilizes the general price level and by inference the dollar price of gold bullion itself." Once such financial stability was achieved, he explained, returning to a gold standard would provide a vital safeguard against future budgetary malfeasance:


... (T)he discipline of the gold standard would surely reinforce anti-inflation policies, and make it far more difficult to resume financial profligacy. The redemption of dollars for gold in response to excess federal government-induced credit creation would be a strong political signal.
Sound money advocates should take heart these days and realize that Greenspan is following a game plan laid out long ago. Now is not the time to break faith with the man who has done so much to usher in the financial and political conditions that will permit us to make the dollar as good as gold -- on a permanent basis.

Judy Shelton, an economist, is the author of 'Money Meltdown: Restoring Order to the Global Currency System' (Free Press, 1994).





Source: IntellectualCapital.com





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Zitat:


The immediate problem of restoring a GOLD STANDARD is fixing a gold price that is consistent with market forces. Obviously if the offering price by the Treasury is too low, or subsequently proves to be too low, heavy demand at the offering price could quickly deplete the total U.S. government stock of gold, as well as any gold borrowed to thwart the assault. At that point, with no additional gold available, the U.S. would be off the GOLD STANDARD and likely to remain off for decades.

Alternatively, if the gold price is initially set too high, or subsequently becomes too high, the Treasury would be inundated with gold offerings. The payments the gold drawn on the Treasury's account at the Federal Reserve would add substantially to commercial bank reserves and probably act, at least temporarily, to expand the money supply with all the inflationary implications thereof.


Man sollte ihm Dottores Krisenschaukel empfehlen.




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>Man sollte ihm Dottores Krisenschaukel empfehlen.

Nich nur das. Kennt nicht den Unterschied zwischen Geld und Kredit und faselt von"Setting goldprices". So ein Quatschkopf. Und das darf der Welt mächtigster ZBler sein. Was Wunder, wenn er die US-Wirtschaft an die Wand gefahren hat.

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>>Man sollte ihm Dottores Krisenschaukel empfehlen.
>Nich nur das. Kennt nicht den Unterschied zwischen Geld und Kredit und faselt von"Setting goldprices". So ein Quatschkopf. Und das darf der Welt mächtigster ZBler sein. Was Wunder, wenn er die US-Wirtschaft an die Wand gefahren hat.

Hallo Diogenes,

Greenspan sind die Unterschiede natürlich klar. 1966 vertrat er seine Überzeugungen, mit dem anderen Artikel biederte er sich an.

Den"harten" Dollar hat er geschaffen, indem er die Geldströme in den Aktienmarkt umlenkte. Die stecken in keinem Warenkorb, erscheinen also nicht in der Inflationsstatistik. Ganz im Gegenteil, man ließ sich von der Aktienpreisinflation blenden.

In einen korrekten Warenkorb gehören also nicht nur Güter des täglich Gebrauchs, sondern auch der Aspekt"Was kostet mich eine Investition in ein wertaufbewahrendes Gut".

Daß es sich bei den Aktienpreisen tatsächlich um Inflation handelt, sieht man ja an den ausbleibenden Dividenden. Was für eine Trivialität.

Gruß,

Theo


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Das Erscheinungsdatum scheint die These auf's Beste zu bestätigen, dass Notenbanken zumindest in diesem Bereich Spätzykliker sind. Nach dem Ende der bis Dato größten Goldhausse macht sich Greenspan diese Gedanken. Andererseits verkaufte die Bank of England einen Gutteil ihres Goldes in der Endphase einer 20jährigen Baisse zu Tiefstkursen. Angesichts dieser Umstände sollte man sich schon gut überlegen, ob man sich von angedachten Goldverkäufen der Notenbanken tatsächlich ins Bockshorn jagen lassen will.

Schönen Tag

JLL

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