-->moin,

ein paar interessante Gedanken zum möglichen Irakkrieg:

17-February-2003

<font size="4">IRAQ

Is The Widely Expected War On Iraq An Oil War?</font>

The following Energy Comment (February 2003) by Professor Robert Mabro, irector, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) is published on the OIES website www.oxfordenergy.org and is reprinted here with permission.

Many commentators, columnists, politicians and almost all those who oppose the war answer this question with a resounding yes. The question, as put in these general terms, is not very helpful. It fails to distinguish between motives that are responsible for a decision, factors that are taken into consideration by policy-makers but do not determine the decision, and the implications of the actions that implement the decision. A better understanding of the"war and oil" issue would be gained if we split the question into three. First, did the US and the UK decide to move onto the warpath because of oil? Secondly, does oil add to the political or strategic benefits that the US hopes to obtain from the war? Thirdly, does the war have implications for the oil market and industry and the geopolitics of energy?

For reasons presented here below, my answer to the first question is"no", to the second, that the issue is more a matter of perceptions than hard realities; and to the third, a"yes" burdened with qualifications.

The decision to threaten Iraq with war, and to launch a military invasion if the threats fail to cause a regime change, was made in the context of broad strategic objectives to respond to the dreadful 9/11 events. The 9/11 outrage is construed in America as an act of war to which the proper response cannot be but war. It opened deep wounds, and the US government was compelled to undertake
some actions that may help or hasten the healing process. The American psyche is wounded because nineteen civilians, apparently armed with nothing more than knives, succeeded in destroying the symbols of America?s financial might and in damaging part of the Pentagon, the nerve centre of the military behemoth. The US fought major wars during the 20th century and suffered indeed considerable casualties but nobody was hurt at home: no bombs fell on American cities, no battle was fought in the homeland, no enemy was ever able to invade any part of the country. Thanks to this historical experience the Americans developed a solid sense of security which was shattered when the horrors of 9/11 sank in.

Furthermore, the consciousness, and indeed the pride, of being a superpower without any rival, suffered from the aggression of people whose only power derives from a willingness to commit suicide in the name of a cause. The superpower found itself vulnerable, and had therefore to act to restore the image it had of itself and by the same token its image in the world.

The most immediate option was to launch a war against terrorism. This is certainly necessary to improve security in the short run and build it on solid foundations in the long run. Wars on terrorism, however, cannot by themselves heal the wounds. They have many weaknesses being essentially police and intelligence services affairs that drag on for long decades. They do not involve victories that catch the eyes of television viewers. They become quickly entangled in long drawn processes of law.

There was of course the war in Afghanistan, but this also did not fit the bill because the Taliban proved to be a pathetically weak enemy, and the US was robbed from the expected reward of victory: Bin Laden and Mullah 'Omar"dead or alive".

Hence the decision to launch a real war against a more substantial enemy than Afghanistan, a decision taken almost certainly at an early date notwithstanding several and oft repeated denials. Iraq, one of the three members of the axis of evil, was singled out as the most suitable candidate for a host of important political reasons specific to Iraq. Not because of weapons of mass destruction (North Korea, even Iran score higher on this count); not because of oil (Iran is also a major oil country); not because it is a danger to Israel (more concerned about Iran than Iraq). The main reasons are that Iraq is militarily an easier target than North Korea or Iran; its regime, and for good cause, is universally detested; has invaded neighbors, then flouted UN resolutions. And as the 9/11 hijackers were Arab it makes more sense to attack an Arab country than North Korea or Iran.

The US also need to remind Russia, China, Europe and Japan, and indeed all and sundry in the rest of the world, that we have recently entered an era where she is the sole Superpower. Remember Suez in 1956 when the US forced Britain and France to end their war against Egypt and to withdraw immediately their troops. This action was not undertaken out of love for Nasser, or sympathy for his revolutionary ideas, but to remind Britain and France that they were no longer the colonial superpowers of pre-World War II days.

Furthermore, the idea that the US should build its military might and reestablish its pre-eminence in the world, as President Reagan endeavored in the 1980s, was expressed with vigor by senior members of the current administration years before they came to power in January 2001. The threatened war on Iraq is better understood in this strategic/geopolitical context.

Paradoxically, the realization by both Britain and France of this same fact led these two countries to react in opposite ways to the US call for war. Britain recognizing that the US is affirming its status as sole superpower, a status that it will almost certainly retain for decades to come, decided to side with her. France recognizing that the US wants to affirm its preeminence as sole superpower decided to remind her that the world is not an empty desert but inhabited by other countries with views, interests, some power, a will
of their own and above all some dignity.

Oil is not the motive of a decision to go to war against Iraq even if it figures as a parameter in an equation dominated by two major factors (9/11 and the affirmation by the superpower of its identity). Those who believe that"it is all about oil" may be drawing misleading parallels between the current events and the 1990/91 Gulf war. The latter was about both oil and the security of Israel, both threatened by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. Saddam is not threatening oil supplies today as he is only too happy to supply the
world and particularly the US (the purchaser of the highest proportion of Iraq's oil exports) with up to 2mn b/d of crude; too happy also to negotiate production-sharing agreements with any foreign oil company willing to invest in Iraq after the lifting of sanctions.

But Iraq is an oil country with large reserves awaiting further exploration and development. A war in Iraq and the events that will follow the war have, of course, implications for oil.

The war will cause an immediate interruption of Iraqi oil production and exports, even if the first military move of the invading force is
to occupy the Iraqi oilfields. It will not be possible to secure within a few days all the relevant installations? from oilfields, pipelines, pumping stations, storage tanks to export terminals? that enable oil to be extracted, to flow and to be lifted by importers. While the hostilities are taking place, the world market will be deprived of about 2.0mn b/d. Prices will inevitably rise. This would not matter very much if the war is short as some analysts believe.

The extent of the price rise depends on the following factors:

(a) The war begins while Venezuelan production is short by 1.5mn b/d or more.

(b) The war begins while the levels of US commercial oil stocks are low as they happen to be at present.

(c) The Iraqis succeed in blowing up oil wells as they did in 1991 in Kuwait.

(d) The US does not release immediately oil from its strategic reserves relying on production increases in Saudi Arabia which do not
materialize very quickly.

(e) Iraq succeeds in launching missiles on oil installations in Kuwait and/or Saudi Arabia.

(f) Arab countries decide to impose an oil embargo on the US.

The probability attached to (f) is close to nil, and that related to (e) is extremely small. The probability of (a) and (b) is higher the earlier the start of the war (say, end of February/ beginning of March). Event (c) should not be heavily discounted as the probability of its occurrence may be as high as 50%. Finally, it is difficult to imagine that the US will fail to announce measures relating to stocks or safety nets as soon as the war begins in order to calm the petroleum market. These measures, unless supplemented by similar moves by the International Energy Agency, will not be sufficient to calm nerves in Japan, Europe and anywhere outside the US.
Sadly, the IEA?s track record in previous oil crises does not inspire confidence in its ability to agree the implementation of its well-designed emergency supply plans.

Let us now consider the medium- and long-term oil implications of the war.

The first task of a new Iraqi government will be to repair the damage caused to the oilfields and other oil installations by lack of investment funds, imported spare parts and equipment and insufficient maintenance. The war itself, even if the wells are not set ablaze, will destroy or damage some plants. If sabotage occurs dousing fires and repairing wellheads will take several months and
perhaps longer than a year.

The second task will be to negotiate with foreign oil companies the terms of production-sharing agreements for investments and operations in both new and old oilfields (and in some cases to renegotiate deals already discussed or signed by the current Iraqi government). Some commentators want us to believe that the new regime under the influence of the US will offer companies contracts with very favorable terms. This is very unlikely for three reasons. First, Iraq will be in dire need of revenues and will not be in a position to throw money away to foreign investors unnecessarily. Secondly, companies will be eagerly competing against each other for gaining access to Iraqi oil resources. Thirdly, oil production-sharing agreements have a long history and there are well-established criteria and conventions about terms and conditions. Furthermore, it will be difficult for a new regime to concede terms more favorable to the companies than those previously agreed by the present government. The terms of these agreements, although negotiated under duress because of the sanction regime, were not particularly lenient.

Would the ownership of Iraq's oil resources be transferred to the US? This is hardly credible. Will the US and UK oil companies get the lion?s share of new production-sharing agreements in the new Iraq? Most probably yes but only to the extent of their willingness to bid against more eager companies from other countries. Will Iraq leave OPEC causing the oil price to collapse? A new
government may well believe that abandoning OPEC is a rational policy but will quickly try to reestablish a relationship if a price fall deprives Iraq from billions of dollars of badly needed revenues.

Will the reliance on an increased volume of oil imports from Iraq free the US from its dependence on Saudi Arabia? To answer correctly this question it is essential to recall that US imports from Iraq ran at the rate of 1.2mn b/d in January 2003. Iraq therefore will have to export an additional 1.6mn b/d should the US wish to cease importing from Saudi Arabia. This will not be possible before a minimum of three years. Furthermore, this scenario implies a transfer of an increase in dependence on Saudi Arabia from the US to Europe and Japan.

To conclude: In contrast with the 1990/91 Gulf War the 2003 war on Iraq, should it take place, is not an oil war. The political and security benefits, which the US expects to derive from the war, do not involve oil in any major way. Some lobbies and commentators are indulging in wishful thinking, hoping that Iraq will bring about the demise of OPEC and a long era of low oil prices. They
conveniently forget that, with or without OPEC, the coalition of interests which is badly affected when oil prices fall to $10/B and which derives comfort from prices hovering in the $20-25/B zone is both wide and powerful. Moreover, it does not consist of oil exporters exclusively. The war and its aftermath will initially cause the oil price to rise and then become an additional cause of volatility. US and UK oil companies will be able to explore for, and develop oil resources in Iraq, and the US will increase its oil imports from that country. All that will not change significantly the structure or the familiar behavior of the oil industry or the world petroleum market.

The expected prize derives from the fact that Iraq is strategically located in a region where it borders Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, three major oil countries. It also borders Syria and Jordan, two Arab countries relevant to any solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the region is one where Russia and China would like to exercise some political influence, if not now, but perhaps in the future. Oil is part of the region and therefore part of the equation. But the assessment of its significance to the issues at hand has been suffering too much from insufficient knowledge, wishful thinking, and political prejudices.

Quelle: MEES

-->Hallo Cosa,

ich finde den Artikel interessant, weil er differenzierte Fragestellungen formuliert. Das ist ein Unterschied zu vielen Postings hier im board ( auch zu meinen Postings), in denen versucht wird, kurz und knapp eine bestimmte Einschätzung zu formulieren.
Allerdings greift Robert Mabro bei seinen Antworten zu den Motiven meiner Ansicht nach zu kurz, weil er den entscheidenden Ausgangspunkt für die Entscheidung zum Krieg in den Ereignissen des 11.9. sieht.
Soweit ich es beurteilen kann, ist die Entscheidung (zumindest für den Krieg gegen Afghanistan, vielleicht auch für einen Krieg gegen Irak) schon vor dem 11.9. gefällt worden, zumindest vorbereitet worden.
Belege dafür finden sich - jedenfalls was Afghanistan angeht - beispielsweise in dem Buch von Karl Grobe-Hagel: Krieg gegen Terror? - Al Qaeda, Afghanistan und der „Kreuzzug“ der USA. Köln 2002. (Der Autor ist bekannt für seine sorgfältigen Recherchen und seine fundierten außenpolitischen Analysen und arbeitet bei der Frankfurter Rundschau)
Weiterhin kritisiere ich an Robert Mabro, dass er die Motive für den Krieg geradezu auf den symbolischen Bereich reduziert:
< The superpower found itself vulnerable, and had therefore to act to restore the image it had of itself and by the same token its image in the world. >

Der Supermacht USA geht es wohl nicht nur um das „image“; der Status „Superpower“ ist zweifellos auch abhängig von Handfesterem, und dazu gehört wohl das Ã-l, die Rolle des Dollar als internationales Zahlungsmittel usw.
Was Afghanistan angeht, gibt es vielfältige Hinweise, dass hier schon das Ã-l eine entscheidende Rolle spielte.
Welche Rolle nun, beim Irak, das Ã-l in den Motiven der amerikanischen Administration spielt, ist bis ins Einzelne hinein sicherlich sehr schwer abzuschätzen. Es spielen auch innenpolitische Probleme eine Rolle, sicherlich auch die symbolischen Kämpfe, von denen Mabro spricht; aber wenn keiner dieser Politiker (die merkwürdigerweise zum großen Teil aus der Ã-lindustrie kommen) das Wort „Ã-l“ in den Mund nimmt und lieber von der „Achse des Bösen“ spricht, heißt das für mich noch lange nicht, dass es ihnen nicht auch ums Ã-l geht und um die Rolle des Dollar. Sie werden es uns auch nicht verraten. So dumm sind sie auch nicht.

Sicherlich bleibt es - wenn man nicht nur plakativ posten will, sondern sozusagen mit wissenschaftlichem Anspruch diese Probleme betrachtet - eine schwierige Frage, in welcher Weise die Motivation oder die Intention der Akteure zusammenhängt mit objektiven Strukturproblemen wie der Rolle des Dollar in der Welt oder der Abhängigkeit der industrialisierten Welt von den Ã-lressourcen. Dass Handeln der Akteure monokausal aufs Ã-l zurückzuführen, das ist sicherlich nicht angebracht. Aber Mabro sieht es einfach bloß andersrum, indem er das Handeln primär aus der Symbolik der „Supermacht“ erklären will.

Grüße

chiquito

-->Hi chiquito,

Nun, da hätte ich sicherlich mehr zu schreiben sollen; ich roll Dein Posting mal von hinten auf,

<ul>Dass Handeln der Akteure monokausal aufs Ã-l zurückzuführen, das ist sicherlich nicht angebracht. Aber Mabro sieht es einfach bloß andersrum, indem er das Handeln primär aus der Symbolik der?Supermacht? erklären will.</ul>

So habe ich Mabro nicht verstanden; Ursprung sind für ihn die Ereignisse des 11. Septembers, da übersieht er die von Dir zu recht angesprochene Ã-l-Lobby am US-amerikanischen Kabinettstisch. Aber er unterstreicht das psychische Trauma, dass die USA im Zusammenhang mit den Ereignissen erlitten haben. Wann wurde den USA zum einen mit so"einfachen" Mitteln und dann auf eigenem Boden schon jemals so ein Schaden zugefügt? Die Symbole der Finanz- und militärischen Macht wurden nicht nur angegriffen, sondern z.T. vernichtet. Aus einem massiv in Frage gestelltem Gefühl der Unversehrtheit kann m.E. eine gewaltige destruktive Gewalt wachsen.

Einer Bewertung enthalte ich mich. Was war letztendlich"gesteuert", da fehlt mir das Insiderwissen, aber aus dem Versuch heraus ein solches Trauma zu überwinden, kann ich mir eben schon vorstellen, dass ein schwacher Gegner (Irak) dem Volk als Opfer geboten wird. Bush' juniors privater Hintergrund bot den Irak als unerledigtes Aktionsfeld des Vaters geradezu an.
Mabro macht es sich zu einfach, indem die Herstellung des starken, unverwundbaren Bildes als Motivation sieht, zumindest eine alleinige Motivation ist es nicht, wenn auch das Selbstbild so vermeintlich restauriert wird.
Aber das ist eben nur die psychologische oder pseudopsychologische Ebene der Auseinandersetzung.

Für mich kann es bei dieser Auseinandersetzung nicht kurz- oder mittelfristig um das irakische Ã-l gehen; soweit ich weiss, sind die irakischen Ã-lförderanlagen defekt, veraltet und fördern nur noch ein Mindestmass. Eine Motivation sich den Irak einzuverleiben, lag für mich in der potentiellen Möglichkeit das OPEC-Kartell zerschlagen zu können. Allein die Forderung des Iraks die Förderanteile von 1990 wieder zu erlangen, würde für reichlich Unruhe innerhalb der OPEC sorgen. Sicherlich sind

Die innenpolitischen Aspekte kommen dann noch hinzu und vereinfachen das Bild nun wahrlich nicht ;-)

Die Feststellung es gehe den USA und Grossbritanien nur um den Besitz des irakischen Ã-ls halte ich für genauso falsch wie den Umkehrschluss. Mit Mabros Schlussfolgerungen stimme ich auch nicht überein, hast recht zu eindimensional, bin aber dankbar für jede weitere Facette.

Kurios ist übrigens, dass nach vorläufigen Zahlen, der Irak im Januar ca. 8% des US-amerikanischen Rohöls geliefert hat und einen Teil der Lieferausfälle aus Venezuela kompensiert hat *g*

viele Grüsse
Cosa



>Hallo Cosa,
>ich finde den Artikel interessant, weil er differenzierte Fragestellungen formuliert. Das ist ein Unterschied zu vielen Postings hier im board ( auch zu meinen Postings), in denen versucht wird, kurz und knapp eine bestimmte Einschätzung zu formulieren.
>Allerdings greift Robert Mabro bei seinen Antworten zu den Motiven meiner Ansicht nach zu kurz, weil er den entscheidenden Ausgangspunkt für die Entscheidung zum Krieg in den Ereignissen des 11.9. sieht.
>Soweit ich es beurteilen kann, ist die Entscheidung (zumindest für den Krieg gegen Afghanistan, vielleicht auch für einen Krieg gegen Irak) schon vor dem 11.9. gefällt worden, zumindest vorbereitet worden.
>Belege dafür finden sich? jedenfalls was Afghanistan angeht - beispielsweise in dem Buch von Karl Grobe-Hagel: Krieg gegen Terror?? Al Qaeda, Afghanistan und der?Kreuzzug? der USA. Köln 2002. (Der Autor ist bekannt für seine sorgfältigen Recherchen und seine fundierten außenpolitischen Analysen und arbeitet bei der Frankfurter Rundschau)
>Weiterhin kritisiere ich an Robert Mabro, dass er die Motive für den Krieg geradezu auf den symbolischen Bereich reduziert:
>< The superpower found itself vulnerable, and had therefore to act to restore the image it had of itself and by the same token its image in the world. >
>Der Supermacht USA geht es wohl nicht nur um das?image?; der Status?Superpower? ist zweifellos auch abhängig von Handfesterem, und dazu gehört wohl das Ã-l, die Rolle des Dollar als internationales Zahlungsmittel usw.
>Was Afghanistan angeht, gibt es vielfältige Hinweise, dass hier schon das Ã-l eine entscheidende Rolle spielte.
>Welche Rolle nun, beim Irak, das Ã-l in den Motiven der amerikanischen Administration spielt, ist bis ins Einzelne hinein sicherlich sehr schwer abzuschätzen. Es spielen auch innenpolitische Probleme eine Rolle, sicherlich auch die symbolischen Kämpfe, von denen Mabro spricht; aber wenn keiner dieser Politiker (die merkwürdigerweise zum großen Teil aus der Ã-lindustrie kommen) das Wort?Ã-l? in den Mund nimmt und lieber von der?Achse des Bösen? spricht, heißt das für mich noch lange nicht, dass es ihnen nicht auch ums Ã-l geht und um die Rolle des Dollar. Sie werden es uns auch nicht verraten. So dumm sind sie auch nicht.
>Sicherlich bleibt es? wenn man nicht nur plakativ posten will, sondern sozusagen mit wissenschaftlichem Anspruch diese Probleme betrachtet? eine schwierige Frage, in welcher Weise die Motivation oder die Intention der Akteure zusammenhängt mit objektiven Strukturproblemen wie der Rolle des Dollar in der Welt oder der Abhängigkeit der industrialisierten Welt von den Ã-lressourcen. Dass Handeln der Akteure monokausal aufs Ã-l zurückzuführen, das ist sicherlich nicht angebracht. Aber Mabro sieht es einfach bloß andersrum, indem er das Handeln primär aus der Symbolik der?Supermacht? erklären will.
>Grüße
>chiquito