-->Hallo,

wenn wir davon ausgehen das es wirklich um 2006/2007 dazu kommt, dass die mögliche Fördermenge des Ã-ls drastisch fällt, weil die Ã-lfelder schon maximal ausgebeutet sind welche Anlagenmöglichkeiten gäbe es dann? Ersetzt Ã-l dann Gold? Und wie partizipiere ich dann an dieser Tatsache.

Gruß

Ebony

-->A0CM64 und 3-Liter Auto ;-)

-->>A0CM64

Das ist ein Turbo, der heuer ausläuft. Wer echt langfristig drauf spekulieren will, würde wohl einen Mini Future der ABN nehmen. Aber Contrarian Investing ist das dann wirklich nicht. Da würde ich lieber Rücksetzer abwarten.
<ul> ~ Brent Mini Future</ul>

-->>Hallo,
>wenn wir davon ausgehen das es wirklich um 2006/2007 dazu kommt, dass die mögliche Fördermenge des Ã-ls drastisch fällt, weil die Ã-lfelder schon maximal ausgebeutet sind welche Anlagenmöglichkeiten gäbe es dann? Ersetzt Ã-l dann Gold? Und wie partizipiere ich dann an dieser Tatsache.
>Gruß
>Ebony

Hallo,
also zuerst mal wegen den Anlagemöglichkeiten, ich schlage vor:

- Aktien von Ã-l-und Gas-Eplorern, die sich auf"kleine" Vorkommen spezialisiert haben, die heute noch unter der Rentabilitätsschwelle liegen
- Hersteller von regnerativen Energien
- Rüstungsaktien oder 1,2 Hektar Wald kaufen

Aber anscheinend hast du die Dimensionen noch nicht ganz verstanden, Peak Oil heisst nicht, daß da was eben mal ein wenig teurer wird und man nur kurz den Gürtel enger schnallt und ansonsten die Party weiter geht! Das wollte mir, wie ich mich das erste Mal mit dem Thema beschäftigt hatte, zuerst auch nicht in den Kopf, aber:

Zuerst wird nur der Energiepreis hochgehen während infolgedessen der Energieverbrauch auf immer mehr Gebieten zurückgeht, solange bis auch die letzten es merken werden, daß unsere gesamte heutige Zivilisation auf der Basis von BILLIGEN, FOSSILEN Brennstoffen beruht:

Von der Chemie,Textilien, Alltags"erleichterungen" (Aufzüge,Waschmaschine, Computer) über das Transportwesen bis hin zu einem ganz wesentlichen Punkt, der als so selbstverständlich hingenommen wird, daß es kaum jemand noch zur Kenntnis nimmt:
<font color="#ff0000">
Die Nahrungsversorgung für über 6 Milliarden Menschen! Das Überleben dieser Menge kann nur durch die Verfügbarkeit von billiger fossiler Energie gesichert werden! </font>Im 18. Jhrdt.- vor der Industriellen Revotluion- waren es weit unter 1 Milliarded, d.h. bei einer Energieintensität wie damals könnten heute über 5/6 der Menschheit nicht existieren.

Als kurzen <a href ="http://fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/100303_eating_oil_summary.html">Anhaltspunkt:
</a>


1. In the United States, 400 gallons of oil equivalents are expended annually to feed each American (as of data provided in 1994).7 Agricultural energy consumption is broken down as follows:

· 31% for the manufacture of inorganic fertilizer (excluding feedstock)

· 19% for the operation of field machinery

· 16% for transportation

· 13% for irrigation

· 08% for raising livestock (not including livestock feed)

· 05% for crop drying

· 05% for pesticide production

· 08% miscellaneous8

2. To give the reader an idea of the energy intensiveness of modern agriculture, production of one kilogram of nitrogen for fertilizer requires the energy equivalent of from 1.4 to 1.8 liters of diesel fuel. This is not considering the natural gas feedstock.9 According to The Fertilizer Institute (http://www.tfi.org), in the year from June 30 2001 until June 30 2002 the United States used 12,009,300 short tons of nitrogen fertilizer.10 Using the low figure of 1.4 liters diesel equivalent per kilogram of nitrogen, this equates to the energy content of 15.3 billion liters of diesel fuel, or 96.2 million barrels.

3. Between 1945 and 1994, energy input to agriculture increased 4-fold while crop yields only increased 3-fold.11 Since then, energy input has continued to increase without a corresponding increase in crop yield. We have reached the point of marginal returns. Yet, due to soil degradation, increased demands of pest management and increasing energy costs for irrigation (all of which is examined below), modern agriculture must continue increasing its energy expenditures simply to maintain current crop yields.

4. The U.S. food system consumes ten times more energy than it produces in food energy. This disparity is made possible by nonrenewable fossil fuel stocks.

5. Unfortunately, if you remove fossil fuels from the equation, the daily diet will require 111 hours of endosomatic labor per capita; that is, the current U.S. daily diet would require nearly three weeks of labor per capita to produce.


Schön erklärt wird der ganze Zusammenhang auch hier, es empfiehlt sich sehr, im Original weiter zu lesen.


This paper will argue that populations exhibit a behaviour that could be described as punctuated equilibrium[1]. That is, populations generally exhibit long-term homeostasis. During brief and rare periods in history, population pressures lead to the commercialisation of a new source of energy - particularly a higher quality energy source - which in turn will raise the population ceiling, or the number of people the earth can support. At this stage, populations will grow quickly to approach the newly raised ceiling, then growth will slow and a new homeostasis will develop.



The planet could not support the six billion people that exist today without first the commercialisation of coal, then of oil and gas. If these energy sources were necessary for the historically rare and unprecedented population growth that has occurred over the last three hundred years, then this growth might be correlated (and modelled), in some way, after the pattern of consumption of these energy sources.





In 1750, the world’s population was approximately 720 million people. Over the previous 1000 years, this population had been growing very slowly at an average rate of about 0.13%. At this rate population doubles every 500 years and it would have taken over 1500 more years (sometime near the year 3250) to reach our current population of 6 billion people. But sometime in the 18th century, circumstances changed and population began growing rapidly.



The most common explanation for this change in circumstances is that a mortality revolution reduced the rate at which people died and that this mortality revolution was brought about by the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution changed everything. It was an economic revolution, which spawned revolutions in science, technology, transportation, communication and agriculture. As a consequence, humanity began to experience improvements in health, nutrition, food variety, medicine and quality of life. More people survived infancy and childhood and they carried on to live longer lives. Because people were dying less quickly, populations grew more quickly.



Large and sustained population growth is thus a contemporary phenomenon: until historically recent times it was rare to non-existent. Preindustrial populations grew when times were good (favourable climatic, agricultural, political and economic conditions) and shrank when times were bad (droughts, famines, wars, plagues, bad weather). Population growth was at all times restricted by the amount of land and food available. Land was needed to grow food for humans, fodder for animals and trees for building and fuel. As populations grew and occupied prime land, people were forced onto less productive land and the competing interests of food, fodder and fuel grew stronger.



This pressure on land led to a number of different consequences: rising prices, under-nourishment, hunger; migration, territorial expansion through aggression and war and internal revolt. Populations became more susceptible to famine, disease, plague and death. Thomas Malthus referred to these consequences as positive checks on population growth. Population pressure also lead to what Malthus referred to as preventive checks. Preventive checks consisted of celibacy, reducing fertility within marriage and through increased age at first marriage (i.e. marrying later). These observations - as populations grew survival became more difficult (populations experienced declining marginal returns), leading to positive or preventive checks on population growth - lead to Malthus’ famous Essay on Population (1798).



So according to Malthus, an initial population starts with few people. It then grows in an approximately exponential manner towards demographic saturation[2]. This exponential growth then slows as the limit to population size, or the population ceiling, is reached. It is at this point that populations become homeostatic. This ceiling results when most available land has been used, and most productivity gains have been realised. Any further expansions into less productive land, or further productivity gains, suffer from declining marginal returns.
...


Each commercialisation of a new source of energy, particularly if higher quality than the then dominant source, raises the population ceiling.


But contrarily, each new step up the energy ladder raises productivity per capita (assuming productivity growth can outpace population growth) and income levels. This tends to slow population growth through several negative effects on fertility rates.
...
If Biomass Population growth from 800 to 1850 were extrapolated to the year 2000, the value would be 1.09 billion people. This may or may not be an indication of how many people the planet would now be supporting if coal, oil and gas were never commercialised, assuming there were still frontiers to expand into.
...
Oil also plays a significant part in the so-called Green Revolution that has led to growth in agricultural output that has managed to keep up with or even exceed the number of mouths that require feeding. Green Revolution agriculture relies on large amounts of pesticides and fertilisers, products highly dependent on oil and gas. Intensification of agriculture leads to surplus production, enabling greater increases in population which in turn lead to still greater demands for food.


Water for agriculture is also highly dependent on fossil fuels. Pumping of aquifers and groundwater for irrigation “is a phenomenon of the late twentieth century, made possible by the availability of electricity and cheap pumps.”


Daß eine Reduzierung der Erdbevölkerung innerhalb einiger Jahrzehnte um 5/6 ohne Hauen und stechen abgeht, wird wohl selbst der größte Optimist nicht behaupten wollen...
<ul> ~ Quelle</ul>

-->>>A0CM64
>Das ist ein Turbo, der heuer ausläuft. Wer echt langfristig drauf spekulieren will, würde wohl einen Mini Future der ABN nehmen. Aber Contrarian Investing ist das dann wirklich nicht. Da würde ich lieber Rücksetzer abwarten.

-->Running Out of Oil -- and Time
Panic will strike if we're not prepared with new technologies

SEATTLE — The news last month that the vast Saudi oil fields are in decline is a far bigger story than most in the media, or the United States, seem to realize. We may begrudge the Saudis their 30-year stranglehold on the world economy. But even the possibility that the lords of oil have less of the stuff than advertised raises troubling questions. How long will the world's long-term oil supplies last? As important, what will the big importing nations, like the U.S., do the day world oil production hits its inevitable peak?

For more than a century, Western governments have been relentlessly upbeat about the long-term outlook for oil. Whenever pessimists claimed that supplies were running low — as they have many times — oil companies always seemed to discover huge new fields. It's now an article of faith among oil optimists, including those in the U.S. government, that global oil reserves won't run out for at least four decades, which seems like enough time to devise a whole suite of alternative energy technologies to smoothly and seamlessly replace oil.

But such oil optimism, always questionable, is now more suspect than ever. True, we won't"run out" of oil tomorrow, or even 10 years from now. But the long-term picture is grim. In the first place, it's not a matter of running out of oil but of hitting a production peak. Since 1900, world oil production — that is, the number of barrels we can pump from the ground — has risen in near-perfect step with world oil demand. Today, demand stands at about 29 billion barrels of oil a year, and so does production. By 2020, demand may well be 45 billion barrels a year, by which time, we hope, oil companies will have upped production accordingly.

At some point, however, production simply won't be able to match demand. Oil is an exhaustible resource: The more you produce, the less remains in the ground, and the harder it is to bring up that remainder. We won't be"out of oil"; a vast amount will still be flowing — just not quickly enough to satisfy demand. And as any economist can tell you, when supply falls behind demand, bad things happen.

During the 1979 Iranian revolution, the last time oil production fell off significantly, world oil prices hit the modern equivalent of $80 a barrel. And that, keep in mind, was a temporary decline. If world oil production were to truly peak and begin a permanent decline, the effect would be staggering: Prices would not come back down. Any part of the global economy dependent on cheap energy — which is to say, pretty much everything these days — would be changed forever.

And that's the good news. The term"peak" tends to suggest a nice, neat curve, with production rising slowly to a halfway point, then tapering off gradually to zero — as if, since it took a century to reach a peak, it ought to take another 100 years to reach the end. But in the real world, the landing will not be soft. As we hit the peak, soaring prices — $70, $80, even $100 a barrel — will encourage oil companies and oil states to scour the planet for oil. For a time, they will succeed, finding enough crude to keep production flat, thus stretching out the peak into a kind of plateau and perhaps temporarily easing fears. But in reality, this manic, post-peak production will deplete remaining reserves all the more quickly, thus ensuring that the eventual decline is far steeper and far more sudden. As one U.S. government geologist put it to me recently,"the edge of a plateau looks a lot like a cliff."

As production falls off this cliff, prices won't simply increase; they will fly. If our oil dependence hasn't lessened drastically by then, the global economy is likely to slip into a recession so severe that the Great Depression will look like a dress rehearsal. Oil will cease to be viable as a fuel — hardly an encouraging scenario in a world where oil currently provides 40% of all energy and nearly 90% of all transportation fuel. Political reaction would be desperate. Industrial economies, hungry for energy, would begin making it from any source available — most likely coal — regardless of the ecological consequences. Worse, competition for remaining oil supplies would intensify, potentially leading to a new kind of political conflict: the energy war.

Thus, when we peak becomes a rather pressing question. Some pessimists tell us the peak has already come, and that calamity is imminent. That's unlikely. But the optimists' forecast — that we don't peak until around 2035 — is almost as hard to believe. First, oil demand is climbing faster than optimists had hoped, mainly because China and India, the sleeping giants, are waking up to embrace a Western-style high-energy industrialism that includes tens of millions of new cars. Second, even as oil demand is rising, oil discovery rates are falling. Oil can't be produced without first being found, and the rate at which oil companies are locating new oil fields is in serious decline. The peak for world discoveries was around 1960; today, despite astonishing advances in exploration and production technology, the industry is finding just 12 billion new barrels of oil each year — less than half of what we use. This is one reason that oil prices, which had averaged $20 a barrel since the 1970s, have been hovering at $30 for nearly a year.

Oil companies, not surprisingly, are getting anxious. Despite the fact that the current high oil prices are yielding massive company profits, companies are finding it harder and harder to replace the oil they sell with newly discovered barrels. On average, for every 10 barrels an oil company sells, its exploration teams find just four new barrels — a trend that can go on only so long. Indeed, most Western oil firms now say the only way to halt this slide is to get back into the Middle East, which kicked them out during the OPEC nationalizations of the 1960s and '70s. This has, in fact, become the mantra of the oil industry: Get us back into the Middle East or be prepared for trouble. And the Bush administration seems to have taken the message to heart.

Now, of course, the Middle East is looking less and less like the Promised Land. Western analysts have long feared that the Saudis and other oil-state leaders are too corrupt, unstable and bankrupt to step up their oil production fast enough to meet surging world demand. Last week's revelations, in which some Saudis themselves expressed doubt over future production increases, have only heightened such concerns.

Put another way, we may not be able to pinpoint exactly when a peak is coming, but recent events suggest that it will be sooner than the optimists have been telling us — perhaps by 2020, or even 2015 if Asian demand picks up as fast as some analysts now expect. What this means is that we can no longer sit back and hope that an alternative to oil will come along in time. Such complacency all but ensures that, when the peak does arrive, our response will be defensive, costly and hugely disruptive. Instead, we must begin now, with every tool at our disposal, to find ways to get"beyond petroleum" if we are to have any hope of controlling the shift from oil to whatever comes next.

<ul> ~ Quelle: (Registrierung erforderlich!)</ul>