an den Aktienmärkten verschärfen? aufhalten? eine Trendumkehr einleiten?

Hat Sie Mittel dazu? 0,5 Basispunkte wie erwartet? mehr oder weniger?

Ich glaube die Notenbank und alan Greenspan hat viele Möglichkeiten die Märkte zumindestens kurzfristig psychologisch dahin zu bekommen wo er sie hinhaben will. Langfristig wird seine Entscheidung wieder von weiteren Faktoren überlagert.

Ich tippe darauf, das er min. Stabilität, vielleicht sogar eine Entlastung der Stimmung von den Finanzmärkten herbeiführen will.

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ich. Eher Stabilisierung auf tiefem Niveau. Morgen mindestens 50bp. Alles andere wäre ein Disaster. Greenspan mag keine Desaster ---> min. 50bp

Mehr? - glaube nicht

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Von aussen droht der USA als einziger Supermacht wohl keine Gefahr, von innen wohl ebenfalls nicht, bleibt die Frage welches Scenario für wen wünschenswert bzw. gefährlich ist und wen die FED im Ergebnis begünstigen möchte. Bislang hatte Greenspan eigentlich immer bedingungslos zu seinesgleichen gehalten.

Was meint ihr.. Gruss Jagg

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>Ich tippe darauf, das er min. Stabilität, vielleicht sogar eine Entlastung der Stimmung von den Finanzmärkten herbeiführen will.

Ach was... Es geht nicht darum, was er WILL!

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gern auch Deine Hilfe an.

Gruß Aldi

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>Von aussen droht der USA als einziger Supermacht wohl keine Gefahr, von innen wohl ebenfalls nicht, bleibt die Frage welches Scenario für wen wünschenswert bzw. gefährlich ist und wen die FED im Ergebnis begünstigen möchte. Bislang hatte Greenspan eigentlich immer bedingungslos zu seinesgleichen gehalten.
>Was meint ihr.. Gruss Jagg

Hi Jagg,

Von innen nicht?

Du hast wohl Los Angeles usw. nicht mit erlebt. Gerade unangefochtene Weltmächte haben die Hosen am vollsten.

Die Fed wird die Zinsen um 200 bps senken m ü s s e n, um möglichst schnell an die Schwelle des Nicht-Mehr-Attentismus von Investoren und Konsumenten zu kommen. Aber das wird sie nicht tun.

Also wird's ein Verrecken auf Raten.

Mit 500 bps geschieht gaaaar nix. Die einen werden sich freuen, weil's das ist, was in die"richtige Richtung" weist. Die anderen werden sich sagen: Bis 2 % ist noch lange hin. Und?

U N D?

Es geht weiter abwärts. Und die Märkte werden dahin siechen. Wie im Casino, wenn dauernd Zahlen kommen, die nix bringen.

Du bist wie viele hier der Ansicht, das die Wirtschaft ein Mechanismus sei, wo man nur die richtigen Knöpfe drücken müsse, und alles wird so schön wie vordem. Dem ist aber nicht so!

Wirtschaften heißt immer: In die Zukunft schauen. Und in die Zukunft schauen, heißt Angst oder Gier aufbauen. Und wenn sich da nix tut - kommt auch nix. Nix mehr.

Und Greenspan hält zu"seinesgleichen"? Was soll denn das?

Stünde er irgendwo bei"seinesgleichen" auf der Payroll, würde ich meinen alten Freund ja noch bewundern. Aber so ist er nichts anderes als ein dröger, dummer Tropf.

Als"hell" habe ich ihn auch nicht in Erinnerung. Er war immer bloß ein Number Cruncher und Statistik-Rechthaber. Ayn Rand selig ist meien Zeugin!

Gruß

d.

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Vorab, ich hatte nur das Augenmerk auf den Begriff"gefährlich"
lenken wollen...

>>Von aussen droht der USA als einziger Supermacht wohl keine Gefahr, von innen wohl ebenfalls nicht, bleibt die Frage welches Scenario für wen wünschenswert bzw. gefährlich ist und wen die FED im Ergebnis begünstigen möchte. Bislang hatte Greenspan eigentlich immer bedingungslos zu seinesgleichen gehalten.
>>Was meint ihr.. Gruss Jagg
>Hi Jagg,
>Von innen nicht?
>Du hast wohl Los Angeles usw. nicht mit erlebt. Gerade unangefochtene Weltmächte haben die Hosen am vollsten.

Möglich, in"jüngster Zeit" gab es jedoch kein Beispiel für eine von aussen absolut unantastbare Monopol-Welt-Macht und so ist es schwer Schlüsse aus Beisielen der Vergangenheit zu schliessen. Klar ist natürlich, dass sich Regierungspartei und Opposition nichts"schenken".

>Die Fed wird die Zinsen um 200 bps senken m ü s s e n, um möglichst schnell an die Schwelle des Nicht-Mehr-Attentismus von Investoren und Konsumenten zu kommen. Aber das wird sie nicht tun.
>Also wird's ein Verrecken auf Raten.
>Mit 500 bps geschieht gaaaar nix. Die einen werden sich freuen, weil's das ist, was in die"richtige Richtung" weist. Die anderen werden sich sagen: Bis 2 % ist noch lange hin. Und?

Ganz deiner Meinung (mit obigen 500 bps waren 50 gemeint).

>U N D?
>Es geht weiter abwärts. Und die Märkte werden dahin siechen. Wie im Casino, wenn dauernd Zahlen kommen, die nix bringen.
>Du bist wie viele hier der Ansicht, das die Wirtschaft ein Mechanismus sei, wo man nur die richtigen Knöpfe drücken müsse, und alles wird so schön wie vordem. Dem ist aber nicht so!

NEIN, im Gegenteil! Die"Logik" dieser (womöglich und hoffentlich jetzt zu Ende gehenden) nicht enden wollenden"Hausse" hat mich schon vor Jahren zur Verzweiflung gebracht.

>Wirtschaften heißt immer: In die Zukunft schauen. Und in die Zukunft schauen, heißt Angst oder Gier aufbauen. Und wenn sich da nix tut - kommt auch nix. Nix mehr.
>Und Greenspan hält zu"seinesgleichen"? Was soll denn das?

Das heisst dass er eine Marionette ist. (Ich suche mal ein Beispiel dafür wie er zu 'seinesgleichen' hält heraus (bitte ein wenig Geduld) aber etwas das auch jetzt schon unmittelbar selbsteinleuchtend ist ist dass er ins Schwarze damit getroffen hatte seinen Job zu bekommen und weshalb sollte er den jemals aufs Spile setzen wollen).

>Stünde er irgendwo bei"seinesgleichen" auf der Payroll, würde ich meinen alten Freund ja noch bewundern. Aber so ist er nichts anderes als ein dröger, dummer Tropf.
>Als"hell" habe ich ihn auch nicht in Erinnerung. Er war immer bloß ein Number Cruncher und Statistik-Rechthaber. Ayn Rand selig ist meien Zeugin!
>Gruß
>d.

Greenspan ist ein Pragmatiker, er hat keine Ahnung.

Gruss - jagg

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Zitiert aus 2tfme13 von Vern Lyon,
http://www.aros.net/~vlyon/ bzw.
ftp://ftp.aros.net/pub/users/vlyon/2tfme12.txt

...
There is one economist, however, that has attained enormous
prestige, and this economist is Alan Greenspan. The respect for
Greenspan, however, is not quite universal. There are still some
individuals who prefer to get their economics tutoring from
sources other than journalists. Victor Niederhoffer, Ph.D.,
perhaps because he ignores all journalists except those who write
for the National Enquirer has not become swayed of Greenspan's
greatness. In some barbed comments in reference to the Fed's role
as a modern Delphic Oracle, Niederhoffer in his insightful recent
book, The Education of a Speculator (1997), says the following:

No discussion of Delphic utterances would be complete without
an analysis of the Federal Reserve, the institution that most
clearly rivals Delphi in its prestige and influence.
...
The only problem in analyzing the Fed is that to analyze the
correspondences, the divergences, and the underlying principles
adequately would require a Ph.D. dissertation, or at least an
all-but-dissertation, the modal degree of the Fed staff -- a
status"Dr." Alan Greenspan mysteriously graduated from when he
assumed the chairmanship at the age of 62. As far as I know, no
one has ever seen or read Greenspan's dissertation [pp. 66-67].

Maybe the ambiguity about Greenspan's academic credentials is the
reason the Nobel awards committee has overlooked Greenspan in
awarding the most prestigious award a scientist can receive.
Since this award is not awarded posthumously, they had better
hurry up.

I have on several occasion in TFME expressed my opinion that the
prestige Greenspan enjoys is not so much from his personal
qualities, and certainly not from his intellect, but from the
power that comes with his job. Faith in Alan Greenspan or the Fed
in general depends on the power that it has to plug the leaks
that are bound to occur from time to time in the highly
leveraged, and hence vulnerable, financial system. The source of
this power and prestige can best be understood if we play police
detective and follow the money.
...


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Zitiert aus 2tfme13 von Vern Lyon,
http://www.aros.net/~vlyon/ bzw.
ftp://ftp.aros.net/pub/users/vlyon/2tfme12.txt

...
Leo Melamed, who was chairman of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
at the time, in his Escape to the Futures (1996) relates how
just before midnight on the day of the Stock Market crash on
October 19, 1987 he received many phone calls from Washington
politicians and officials. One of these calls was from Fed
chairman Alan Greenspan. Later reflecting on this Washington
attention Melamed understood it to mean that the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange had attained respectability and was
considered a major player on the American financial scene.
Melamed describes his conversation with Greenspan as follows:

With sweating hands, I returned Greenspan's call first. We had
known each other many years, ever since he supported my plans
to introduce Treasury bill futures in 1976. He knew I had great
admiration for him because just before hid Fed appointment as
chairman, I had invited him to sit as a director of the Merc.
Alas, he had bigger things in mind. during the course of
October 19, on more than one occasion, I silently thanked the
Lord that he was in charge at the Fed rather than a director at
the CME. I had little doubt that someone of lesser competence
might not have been up to the challenge at this critical moment
in our nation's history. Greenspan's voice was calm, conveying
to me the impression that things would be all right. His first
question, however, revealed the true danger of the situation.

"Will you open tomorrow morning?" he asked, both of us
understanding that this was the most crucial question [p. 359].

Whether the Merc could open depended on whether at this hectic
time the variation margin from the losers, in this case the
longs, would be deposited with the Merc's clearinghouse to pay
the shorts in time for the nest mornings scheduled opening. If
not the Merc could not open, and that would have been a
frightening event to the world's financial community. So what the
calm Mr. Greenspan was implying is that he would do what he
could, which being the chairman of a very profitable institution,
amounted to plenty, to ensure that the Merc would be able to
open.

There are many reason's why the Merc's accounts would not be
settled in time. Everything from massive bankruptcies to over
loaded wire transfer facilities. This last possibility can be
used to illustrate how knowledge of futures market practice can
shed light on economic theory -- specifically the quantity
theory.
...

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Zitiert aus 2tfme23 von Vern Lyon,
http://www.aros.net/~vlyon/ bzw.
ftp://ftp.aros.net/pub/users/vlyon/2tfme12.txt
...
III. Failed Forecaster Finally Gets it Right

I have previously mentioned in TFME that if one can manipulate
the market then one can predict it. I did this in the context of
discussing the role of competition and the Efficient market
Hypothesis by using the example of the attempt to manipulate the
copper market by a Mr. Hamanaka of the Sumitomo Corporation of
Japan. Unfortunately for Sumitomo Mr. Copper, as he was known in
the copper trade failed big time in his manipulation of the
copper market and ended up costing his firm many millions of
dollars as the forces of competition were too much for Sumitomo's
highly leveraged copper positions to withstand a significant
adverse move.

What is interesting is that there is another big operator in the
financial markets whose prestige is more like that of Mr. God,
rather than Mr. Copper. This individual is considered to be such
a wizard with the numbers that even when he, to quote Murray
Rothbard,"is a nerd with the charisma of a wet mackerel, [and
when he speaks he] drones on in an uninspired monotone," he is
considered an economic genius. This individual is none other than
Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.

Interestingly it turns out that when Greenspan was trying to make
it in the competitive private sector that he was a failure and as
many economists before him have done he decided to go into the
political business, of which he has been an amazing success.

I remember when he had an economic consulting firm, but the only
reason I knew this is that his political success brought him to
my attention, and reporters would often refer to him as a
principle in the prestigious Wall Street consulting firm of
Townsend-Greenspan. However, the firm might have been
prestigious, it was a failure as far as providing competent
economic forecasts. The late Professor Murray Rothbard, who knew
Greenspan over 30 years ago when they were both members of Ayn
Rand's cult in New York City wrote the following, which is
consistent with what I remember from my following Greenspan's
career as just an interested economist. Rothbard wrote this in
1987 upon Greenspan's being appointed chairman of the Fed.

The press is resounding with acclaim for the accession to Power
of Alan Greenspan as chairman of the Fed; economists from
right, left, and center weigh in with hosannas for Alan's
greatness, acumen, and unparalleled insights into the
"numbers."
...
The astute observer might feel that anyone accorded such
unanimous applause from the Establishment couldn't be all good,
and in this case he would be right on the mark. I knew Alan
thirty years ago, and have followed his career with interest
ever since.

I found particularly remarkable the recent statements in the
press that Greenspan's economic consulting firm of Townsend-
Greenspan might go under, because it turns out that what the
firm REALLY sells is not its econometric forecasting models, or
its famous numbers, but Greenspan himself, and his gift for
saying absolutely nothing at great length and in a rococo
syntax with no clearcut position of any kind.

As to his emergence as a forecaster, he ruefully admitted that
a pension-fund managing firm he founded a few years ago just
folded for lack of ability to apply the forecasting where it
counted: when investment funds were on the line. [p. 293,
Making Economic Sense, Auburn, Alabama, 1995].

Now that Greenspan is Fed chairman he has the help of innumerable
Fed economists is"divining" the numbers, but when Nobel
laureates, such as Milton Friedman, are unable to accurately
predict future economic conditions, it is more likely that
Greenspan's great competence lies in another area, and in fact
might have more to do with being Fed chairman than in being Alan
Greenspan, although the fact that Greenspan takes himself
seriously as a forecaster certainly adds to his"usefulness."
However, it is the fact that the Fed is the monopoly supplier of
(high powered) money into the market system that makes Greenspan
such a powerful individual.

IV, Politics and Central Banking

Having a central (monopoly) bank control the supply of money,
however, is not the only way to"run" a market economy. Today
there is even significant academic discussion of what is called
"Free Banking," where banking is treated like any other business,
and while the United States' monetary history shows many periods
of monetary instability this did not prevent the US from
achieving great economic success prior to the formation of the
Fed in 1913.
...

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findet man in 1tfme29 von Vern Lyon,
ftp://ftp.aros.net/pub/users/vlyon/1tfme29.txt

( http://www.aros.net/~vlyon/ )


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Zitiert aus 2tfme13 von Vern Lyon,
http://www.aros.net/~vlyon/ bzw.
ftp://ftp.aros.net/pub/users/vlyon/2tfme25.txt

....
In a previous issue of TFME
<ftp://ftp.aros.net/pub/users/vlyon/2tfme13.txt> in an essay,
'Buying Prestige', I mentioned how Leo Melamed, who was chairman
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange at the time of the 1987 stock
market crash took it as sign that financial futures and the Merc
by implication had"arrived" (i.e., no longer considered gambling
instruments) as being recognized as socially useful institutions
when Fed chairman Alan Greenspan called Melamed and offered the
Fed's help during a period of chaos in the stock index futures
market.

Contrast this with the hypothetical situation where Steve Wynn,
the CEO of the Mirage Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, calls up
Greenspan and announces that his company is experiencing a
liquidity crisis and because of this they will not be able to
meet their upcoming payroll because some computer nerds from
California came into his casinos with computers in their shoes
and commenced to clean up on the roulette tables (See note
below). Well, I doubt that Greenspan would offer aid to Wynn, or
if he did you would never hear about it. The reason of course is
that the"gamblers" in Chicago must be bailed out because if not
the whole financial system will allegedly fall apart, the
"speculators" in Las Vegas must pay for their sins.
-----------------------------

Note:

A fun book by Thomas A. Bass, The Eudaemonic Pie (1985),
supposedly documents the adventures of some graduate students in
physics and others from the University of California at Santa
Cruz in the attempts to beat the game of roulette by using
computers concealed in their shoes at the casinos in Las Vegas. I
enjoyed the book. It reminded me of gonzo journalist Hunter S.
Thompson's (recently of Rolling Stone Magazine) Fear and Loathing
in Las Vegas except rather than doing Vegas with gin in the belly
and acid in the head the nerds did it with batteries strapped to
their bellies and computers in their shoes. However, I found
their claim that they had a 5 percent edge in roulette
incredulous. A 5 percent edge given that one play probably takes
less than a minute translates into an astronomical annualized
rate of return as the casinos are open 24 hours a day 365 days a
year. Since none of the principles involved became a permanent
resident of Las Vegas, but went on to pursue taxpayer's money
through grants I rest my case.
----------------------------
....

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Zitiert aus 4tfme03 von Vern Lyon,
http://www.aros.net/~vlyon/

...
V. Conclusion
The first draft of this essay contained a section elaborating on some of the arguments I presented in TFME in the essay, The Money Factory. I decided to omit it because of the simple fact that, as the quotation from Ludwig von Mises at the head this essay indicates, it doesn't much matter what the economists say. As long as there are individuals who have power, and who benefit from an increase in the money supply, it will increase. If"Dr." Greenspan didn't go along, he would be replaced. It is as simple as that. Only under the most drastic conditions, no IMF, Fed, or other governmental agency to provide the money cure, do statesmen (?) turn to the hard choice of practicing economy. Normally practicing economy is for suckers and those who advocate it, such as non-Keynesian economists. Power exists! Live with it!
...

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