und zugleich ein kleines Versöhnungsgeschenk für dottore (habe das Gefühl, Du hast Dich etwas geärgert über mich) Der folgende brisante Text wird Dir gefallen.

Letter No. 289
August 13th, 2001

The Mystery of the Disappearing SDR Certificates

by James Turk

Copyright 2001 © by The Freemarket Gold & Money Report.

Here’s a mystery for you. It ranks high with any of the great thrillers solved by Sherlock Holmes,
but this one is not fiction.

I have been arguing that the US Treasury and possibly the IMF have been selling gold, and that
their actions have depressed the gold price. But if I am right, then why has the reported weight of
the US Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF remained unchanged?

The easiest answer to this question is also the most unlikely. This low probability answer is that the
US Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF are not being accurately reported.

I dismiss this answer, almost completely but maybe not entirely because one never knows what
could be happening. A deliberately reported inaccurate weight of gold would mean fraud, and I don’t
see that deception to be a highly probable outcome. No, I think there has to be another answer.

I touched upon the possible solution to this mystery earlier this year. I wrote (Letter No. 283,
"Behind Closed Doors") that the portion of the US Gold Reserve stored at the depository in West
Point, New York had been swapped with gold owned by the Bundesbank, and that the gold in the
German central bank had been sold. So far, nothing I have seen refutes this contention, and
correspondence from the Bundesbank has wrapped much of its gold policy in a cloak of
confidentiality, adding credence to my conclusion. After all, if my supposition weren’t true, why not
just disclose the facts to convincingly refute it?

Be that as it may, there were some loose ends that in my mind needed to be tidied up in order to add
more substance to my contention that much of the US Gold Reserve was swapped and then sold. And
first among those loose ends was the accounting. How were all of these gold transactions being
accounted for? How could all of this gold be put into play even while the reported weight of the US
Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF remained unchanged? And perhaps most importantly,
why didn’t these transactions result in any apparent change on the balance sheet of the main
perpetrators of this scheme, the Federal Reserve and the Exchange Stabilization Fund? There has to
be some kind of accounting trail, doesn’t there?

I’ve thought long and hard about these questions, but have been unable to answer them to my
satisfaction - until now. And in this regard, I would like to thank David Walker, a tireless
researcher who has an uncanny ability to read between the lines of tedious and dull government
reports to get at the truth. Dave’s terrific work provided me with the motivation to continue
researching an area that until recently had been largely unfruitful for me. And what is that area? A
monetary instrument emitted by the International Monetary Fund called the SDR, an acronym for
Special Drawing Rights a.k.a. ‘paper gold’.

My intuitive sense for some time had been that SDR’s were the key necessary to unlock the door.
By understanding the SDR, I expected that one could understand what was happening to the US Gold
Reserve as well as put together a consistent accounting and the legal framework for the gold
transactions that I contend have been taking place. But even though I thought SDR’s would provide
the much sought after answer I was seeking, I was having trouble with a few things, mainly related
to the accounting.

For example, SDRs are so-called"paper gold", so this financial asset has to have a corresponding
liability just like any other ‘paper’ money, right? But I couldn't find who or what is actually liable
for the SDRs.

After digging away in the IMF archives, I found the following in an IMF accounting manual called
the Manual on Monetary and Financial Statistics, in a section entitled"Definition of Financial
Assets: http://www.imf.org/external/indexlst.htm

"Monetary gold and SDRs issued by the IMF are financial assets for which there are no
corresponding financial liabilities."

How about that? No wonder I couldn't reconcile the accounting. Here's a purely financial asset with
no corresponding liability!?! SDR’s issued by the IMF are accounted in the same way that the IMF
accounts for its stock of gold. I thought that only tangible assets like gold, houses and land had no
liabilities. I never dreamed that a financial asset would not have a corresponding liability, but after
this realization, one thing led to another and everything slowly but surely started falling into place.

In"Behind Closed Doors" I included the following quote from the transcript of the January 31st,
1995 FOMC meeting:

MR. TRUMAN. The legislation governing the objectives of the ESF was changed, I think for the
most part in the mid- to late-1970s. The changes included the language that the government of the
United States and the International Monetary Fund have the obligation to promote orderly
exchange rate arrangements leading to a stable system of exchange rates.

Since first reading this candid comment I have always been struck by it. Truman is relying upon this
1970's legislation to provide the legal justification to use the ESF to bail-out Mexico. It therefore
seemed clear to me that if I could figure out what was implemented in the 1970’s, I could then come
to more precisely understand how the US Gold Reserve was being put into play.

I had been unsuccessful, however, in trying to figure out what was the legislation to which Truman
was referring. Well, I now think that he was referring at least in part to what is called the Second
Amendment of the IMF.

By way of background, when the gold crisis in the 1960's was in full swing, the original IMF articles
were amended. This First Amendment to the IMF created SDRs. Then here’s what the Second
Amendment did.

http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gold.htm

What changed under the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF? The
Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, which came into effect in April
1978, eliminated the use of gold as the common denominator of the par value system and as
the basis of the value of the SDR. The Amendment also abolished the official price of gold and
abrogated the obligatory uses of gold in transactions between the IMF and its members…
Under the Amendment, members undertook to collaborate with the IMF and other members
with respect to reserve assets to promote better international surveillance of international
liquidity.

I draw your attention to the last sentence. I think this statement explains what Ted Truman was
referring to. The term"international liquidity" is a euphemism I think that gives a carte blanche to
do whatever the various IMF members want to do, using assets that are at hand or whatever assets
that they create out of thin air, to intervene and manipulate any market anyway they want under
the guise of"international liquidity" - which really means to let the banks create credit out of thin
air for no other purpose but to keep the present system afloat so they can preserve their position of
privilege and keep lining their pockets.

The following quote is from the"User's Guide to the SDR" published by the IMF.

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/FT/usrgsdr/usersc01.htm#3

3. Improvements in the SDR after the Second Amendment:

One of the major objectives of the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, which
became effective on April 1, 1978, is to make the SDR the principal reserve asset of the
international monetary system. To this end, the Fund’s Executive Board has taken a number of
decisions to improve the yield on the SDR and its liquidity and usability. At the same time, certain
obligations arising from participation have been eliminated.

"Improvements" to you and me may sound innocuous, but in reality these 'improvements' have
only one objective - to keep the present system afloat by providing more power to governments
working hand-in-hand with the banking cartel. So far I’m not sure of all the ways the SDR became
more usable, nor have I yet discovered all the obligations that were eliminated when the Second
Amendment"improved" the SDR. But I have learned enough about the SDR to conclude why the
accounting of the US Gold Reserve does not appear to have changed. This mystery can be solved by
first solving a second mystery, the case of the disappearing SDR Certificates.

To begin, it is necessary to provide some background information gleaned from more hours of
studying arcane IMF accounting than I care to admit, but I’ll keep it simple. And the way to do that
is to show how ‘real gold’ and Gold Certificates are accounted, because I have learned that ‘paper
gold’ and SDR Certificates are accounted essentially the same way.

The US Gold Reserve does double-duty. It sits in the vaults at Fort Knox and the other depositories,
but the US Treasury has issued Gold Certificates against it. The Federal Reserve owns these Gold
Certificates, giving the Fed a claim to the 261.6 million ounces in the US Gold Reserve. Simple
enough, and the same transaction is used for ‘paper gold’ - the SDR’s - with just one small
difference. The US Treasury has transferred its SDR’s to the ESF, so the ESF and not the US
Treasury issued the SDR Certificates now owned by the Federal Reserve.

Importantly, these SDR Certificates are being accounted for much the same way as the Gold
Certificates. Both are carried at book value, which is much less than their market value. The Gold
Certificates are carried on the Federal Reserve’s books at $11,046 million, which doesn’t sound like
much. However, when you consider that these Gold Certificates are being valued at only $42.22 per
ounce, this asset represents the entire 261.6 million ounces in the US Gold Reserve. And the SDR
Certificates are being valued at - well, here is where it starts to get interesting. And here is where
the mystery of the disappearing SDR Certificates comes into play. Look at the decline in the SDR
Certificates in the accompanying table.

Exchange Stabization Fund
Federal Reserve
(Assets)
(Liabilities)
(Assets)
(in millions)
(in millions)
SDR
SDR
SDR
SDR
Gold
Holdings
Certificates
Allocations
Certificates
Certificates
Dec-98
10,603
9,200
6,899
9,200
11,046
Mar-99
9,682
8,200
6,653
8,200
11,049
Jun-99
9,719
8,200
6,545
8,200
11,046
Sep-99
10,284
7,200
6,799
7,200
11,047
Dec-99
10,336
6,200
6,717
6,200
11,048
Mar-00
10,335
6,200
6,599
6,200
11,048
Jun-00
10,444
4,200
6,552
4,200
11,046
Sep-00
10,316
3,200
6,359
3,200
11,046
Dec-00
10,539
2,200
6,384
2,200
11,046
Mar-01
N/a
n/a
n/a
2,200
11,046


The above table presents the SDR assets and liabilities of the ESF and the Fed. Though recent
figures for the ESF are not available, as of August 9th the Fed still owns only 2,200 million of SDR
Certificates, so presumably the SDR entries on the ESF balance sheet have not changed much since
December 2000. To understand why the SDR Certificates are disappearing as well as where they are
going, more background information is necessary.

The US, like each IMF Member, owns SDR’s but is also responsible for the value of the SDR. Note
#4 of the ESF’s financial statement for 1999 explains it thus:"Its [the SDR’s] value as a reserve asset
derives, essentially, from the commitments of participants to hold and accept SDR’s and to honor various
obligations connected with its proper functioning as a reserve asset."

As of December 1998, the ESF owned 10,603 million SDR’s, but it had a liability for 6,899 million
SDR’s. What does this liability represent? Here’s what Schedule B of the Articles of Agreement of
the IMF says:"…0.888671 gram of fine gold shall be equivalent to one special drawing right." That
means 35 SDR’s equals one ounce of gold. So the US has the potential obligation as of December
2000 - if required to make good on SDR’s issued - to pay to the IMF or its members 182.4 million
ounces of gold, some 69.7% of the US Gold Reserve.

That huge liability is pretty scary, but it is only a potential liability. Who knows whether the US will
ever be required to make good on it, or if it does, whether the US will default just like it defaulted in
1933 on its obligation to pay US government bonds in gold and in 1971 on its obligation to redeem 35
dollars for one ounce of gold. Those are problems to worry about in the future. Of more immediate
concern is the decline in the SDR Certificates. What is that all about? To answer this question and
to solve this mystery of the disappearing SDR Certificates, we have to once again go back to basics.

Why are the SDR Certificates declining? The basic answer is quite simple. The SDR Certificates
MUST BE reduced if the ESF intends to use its SDR’s for any purpose, such as market intervention
or swaps. In other words, the SDR Certificates are a claim against the SDR’s, so the SDR
Certificate must be cancelled to remove any claims on the SDR before the SDR can be used by the
ESF. But the amount of SDR’s owned by the ESF hasn’t changed except briefly in early 1999, so it
seems that the SDR’s are not being used for any purpose.

So what I think has happened is that the SDR Certificates are themselves being used by the ESF.
Here’s what the IMF says about the use of SDR’s in swaps:"In accordance with Article XIX, Section
2(c), the Fund prescribes that...a participant, by agreement with another participant, may engage in an
operation by which (a) one of the parties transfers [i.e., swaps] to the other party SDRs in exchange for
an equivalent amount of currency or another monetary asset, other than gold."

Thus, SDR’s cannot be swapped for gold, but there is no IMF regulation that prohibits the swapping of
SDR Certificates for gold. So let’s take this observation to its logical conclusion, namely, that the ESF
and/or the Federal Reserve has been swapping SDR Certificates issued by the ESF for gold owned by
the Bundesbank, and presumably other central banks as well because we noted above that the
Second Amendment states that"members undertook to collaborate with the IMF and other
members" for the sake of international liquidity. So presumably, all IMF members are committed to
undertake any scheme that the US government may hatch.

This interpretation may also explain the strange response to Alan Greenspan by the Fed’s General
Counsel, Virgil Mattingly, who has"no clear recollection of exactly" what he said during the
January 31st, 1995 FOMC meeting, even though it seems most likely that the transcript accurately
records him as saying"gold swaps". In his June 8, 2001 note to Greenspan, Mattingly states:"I can
confirm that I have no knowledge of any ‘gold swaps’ by either the Federal Reserve or the ESF." Is
Mattingly being truthful? Yes, I think so, at least in regard to the precise choice of terms used in his
note.

Remember President Clinton’s exegesis on the definition of the word is? Lawyer Mattingly I think is
playing the same game. By this line of thinking, neither the Federal Reserve nor the ESF do ‘gold
swaps’. Instead, these transactions are probably called"SDR Certificate Swaps" or some other
similar term, although the FOMC participants may use the unofficial term"gold swaps" as a
short-hand moniker that is not only easier to say than the official name of the transaction, but also
has the added advantage of clearly communicating the net result of the transaction.

There is another important piece of corroborating evidence that SDR Certificates are being used by
the ESF to hide its gold transactions. When several months ago I first read the audited financial
statement of the ESF, I was struck by a peculiar phrase in footnote #4, which in addition to
considerable explanatory text also provided a table of SDR purchases and sales during the year. The
text stated that these purchases and sales were"equivalent of SDR’s". Therefore, I concluded that
if they were"equivalent of SDR’s", SDR’s were not actually being used in the transaction. But I
wondered, if they weren’t SDR’s, then what were they? We don’t know for sure what they are, but
they are probably SDR Certificate transactions - not SDR’s, but only their"equivalent".

Let’s put the size of these transactions into perspective. As of December 2000, the ESF owned 10,539
million SDR’s, against which it has issued 2,200 million SDR Certificates. Therefore, 8,338 million
SDR’s are potentially ‘in play’, but we can refine this number given that it is the SDR Certificates
and not the SDR’s that are important.

The ESF by law cannot issue more SDR Certificates than it has SDR’s. The largest amount of SDR
Certificates outstanding was 10,168 million in December 1995, a significant date because I have
contended all along that government actions that have depressed the gold price began in 1996, which
is the same year that the SDR Certificates began to decline. From this peak to the present, the SDR
Certificates have been reduced by 7,968 million. Given that there are 35 SDR per ounce of gold, this
reduction in the SDR Certificate account equates to 227.7 million ounces, or 87% of the US Gold
Reserve. Does this mean that 87% of the US Gold Reserve has already been swapped? I don’t have
the answer to that question, but I would like to make four important observations that do in fact
suggest that substantially all of the US Gold Reserve has been put into play.

First, note on the accompanying table the dates when the SDR Certificates began to decline rapidly.
From 10,168 million in December 1995, the SDR Certificate account declined to 8,200 million by
June 1999, or 19% over 3½ years. Now look at the decline beginning in the third quarter of 1999,
which corresponds with the Washington Agreement signed in September of that year. In only 18
months the SDR Certificate account declined by 73%. Was there a panic to get gold into the market
after the Washington Agreement to keep the gold price from rising? This evidence sure does
support that conclusion.

Second, readers will recall how the US Treasury changed in September 2000 the classification of that
portion of the US Gold Reserve in West Point to"Custodial Gold". It is interesting and probably
meaningful to note that this change occurred in the fiscal year ending September 30th in which
there was a substantial decline in the SDR Certificates.

In"Behind Closed Doors" I speculated that the reason for this reclassification was that the Mint’s
accountants or its new director realized that it was misleading to continue calling this swapped metal
as"Gold Bullion Reserve". This logic may also explain why more recently, the entire US Gold
Reserve was reclassified as"Deep Storage Gold". If 87% of the US Gold Reserve has indeed been
swapped, it may have been too obvious an admission by the US Treasury to reclassify nearly the
entire US Gold Reserve as"Custodial Gold". Therefore, to give some semblance of proper
accounting while not totally divulging the truth, the Treasury came up with the half-baked term
"Deep Storage Gold". Further, it was my thinking that the Treasury, taking a lesson from lawyers
Clinton and Mattingly, probably defined this term in some obscure Treasury accounting manual.

What was a speculation on my part is now supported by a letter dated August 7, 2001, to Richard
May from John P. Mitchell, Deputy Director of the US Mint. Mitchell states:"The gold in West
Point was not reclassified - it was renamed to better conform to our audited financial statements."
Despite providing five pages of supporting material with his letter, Mitchell does not explain how this
‘renaming’ enables the Treasury to"better conform to [its] audited financial statements." The
logical conclusion is that this better conformation arises because the strict application of prudent
accounting principles no longer allows the Treasury to use the term"US Gold Reserves" because
more than half - and possibly 87% of it - has been swapped. Given that the Treasury does not want
to use the more accurate but alarming term"Custodial Gold", the US Gold Reserve has therefore
instead become"Deep Storage Gold", allowing the Treasury to remain within the letter if not the
spirit of the principle of full disclosure.

The third observation takes the above changes and explains them in weights of gold. The 6,000
million drop in SDR Certificates from June 1999 to December 2000 represents 171.4 million ounces,
or 28.6 million ounces (888.7 tonnes) per quarter. That’s a supply of about 3500 tonnes per year,
which added to 2500 tonnes new mine production implies an annual demand of 6000 tonnes for the
period of time after the Washington Agreement. Is this number reasonable?

In my opinion it is reasonable. Noted gold analyst Frank Veneroso contends that annual gold
demand has been running about 5000 tonnes, but this number reflects normal market conditions.
After the Washington Agreement and the price spike, the market was anything but normal. Even
though fabrication demand fell during that period, investment and monetary demand for gold
soared. So it is not unreasonable to expect that more than 1000 tonnes of newly supplied gold from
government dishoarding was needed in the months after the Washington Agreement to turn the
price back from the +$320 level reached at that time.

The fourth and final observation relates to a point I made in the last newsletter. I noted how
earmarked gold has been shipped from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at a rate of at least
40 tonnes per month beginning in September 2000, while also stating this new"dishoarding from the
NY Fed smacks of desperation". The above table confirms this conclusion.

The SDR Certificate account has not changed since the 4th quarter of 2000. With only 2,200 million
remaining, the SDR Certificate account, while not depleted, is near rock bottom and one must ask
how much more gold the US government is willing to throw at the market? I don’t think the answer
to that question is"all of it", so essentially there is no more US gold available for swapping.
Consequently, with these SDR Certificate swaps eliminated as a source of supply, another source of
gold had to be located to fill the gap between supply and demand.

In the last newsletter I suggested that the IMF is this new source. That’s just a supposition on my
part, but it seems logical that IMF gold is being shipped out of the FRB of NY. The quantities being
shipped are so large, the gold must be coming from a large hoard, and the IMF has, on paper at
least, one of the world’s largest. But regardless of whose it is, this gold is being shipped at a rate
greater than gold is being mined each month in South Africa, the world’s largest producer. That volume
of shipments smacks of desperation to get gold into the market, and the reason is clear. Because the
SDR Certificate swaps have ended, a new source of gold supply is needed to keep the gold price from
exploding upward.

In conclusion, it is becoming very obvious that the US government has put itself in an incredible
pickle. But we’ve seen this happen before.

In the 1960’s the US government dishoarded over 9000 tonnes of gold rather than admit that the
dollar had been debased and was no longer worth only $35 per ounce. Now it appears that perhaps as
much as 7,000 tonnes (227.7 million ounces) has been swapped for essentially the same purpose - to
intervene in the market to fight the truth, rather than admit that the dollar has again become very
debased relative to gold. ¤

jamesturk@goldmoney.com

<center>

<HR>

</center>

<ul> ~ Text mit besser lesbarer Tabelle</ul>
<center>

<HR>

</center>

Hi Reinhard,

das mit Gold und SDRs ist doch kein Argument, wenn beides als"nur ein Mal verbucht" dargestellt wird.

Selbstverständlich wird auch das Gold zwei mal verbucht: Aktiv: Gold, passiv gegen das Gold beim Goldkauf ausgegebene Banknoten. Sollte Gold als Kapital eingebracht worden sein, ergibt sich: Aktiv: Gold, passiv: Kapital.

Special Drawing Rights werden selbstverständlich auch doppelt verbucht. Beim IWF erscheinen sie als Forderungen und bei jeder Institution, die sie in Anspruch nimmt (daher ja"drawing" = also sie - oder auf sie - zieht, engl. to draw = ziehen, wie beim Wechsel) erscheinen sie passiv.

Ich würde es begrüßen, wenn Du mit Deinen Schlüssen ("Böse Schlappe...") etwas sorgfältiger umgingest.

Jetzt ein ausführlicher Analyse-Versuch zum Text selbst:

>und zugleich ein kleines Versöhnungsgeschenk für dottore (habe das Gefühl, Du hast Dich etwas geärgert über mich).

Ja, ich ärgere mich über Deine vorschnellen Schlüsse. Du könntest solche Sachen zunächst ein Mal in Frageform kleiden.

>Der folgende brisante Text wird Dir gefallen.

Von solchen versteckten Zynismen bitte ich in Zukunft Abstand zu nehmen!

>Letter No. 289
> August 13th, 2001
> The Mystery of the Disappearing SDR Certificates
> by James Turk
> Copyright 2001 © by The Freemarket Gold & Money Report.
> Here’s a mystery for you. It ranks high with any of the great thrillers solved by Sherlock Holmes,
> but this one is not fiction.
> I have been arguing that the US Treasury and possibly the IMF have been selling gold,

Dafür gibt es nicht den Schatten eines hieb- und stichfesten Beweises!

Selbst wenn sie Gold verkauft hätten, müssten sie einen anderen Posten dafür buchen bzw. ausweisen. US Treasury bucht nicht, aber muss den aktuellen Goldbestand jedes Jahr dem Kongress zu leiten (Anhang zum Haushalt). Es sind konstant ca. 8150 Tonnen.

Der IMF bucht ganz normal, wie jedes andere Unternehmen auch. Sollte der IMF Gold verkauft haben, dann müsste er auf der Aktivseite einen anderen Posten ausweisen. Falls der IMF Gold verschenkt hat (Aktivseitenverkürzung), muss die Passivseite entsprechend berichtigt werden. So einfach ist es also nicht.

and that
> their actions have depressed the gold price. But if I am right, then why has the reported weight of
> the US Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF remained unchanged?

"If I am right" sagt wohl schon alles. Entweder das Gewicht bleibt gleich, dann kann es zu keinem Verkauf gekommen sein - wie denn? US Treasury wird vom Haushaltsausschuss von House and Senate geprüft und der IMF von renommierten WPs.

> The easiest answer to this question is also the most unlikely. This low probability answer is that the
> US Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF are not being accurately reported.

Das ist doch kindisch. Falls tatsächlich Durchstechereien vorlägen, bleibe das unmöglich geheim. Nichts ist schneller zu recherchieren als Gewichts- bzw. Bilanzbetrug. Letzterer bei einer Institution, die Tausende von Mitarbeitern hat! Die Story ließe sich kein Journalist jemals entgehen. Es käme zum größten Staatsskandal aller Zeiten, dagegen wäre Watergate ein Säuseln.

Der Mann stellt eine Behauptung in den Raum, die er mit nichts beweisen kann. Könnte er es, würden NYT oder Washington Post jeden Betrag bezahlen, um die Story zu bringen. Schlagzeile: Blattbreit und in 20 Cicero großen Lettern!

> I dismiss this answer, almost completely but maybe not entirely because one never knows what
> could be happening. A deliberately reported inaccurate weight of gold would mean fraud, and I don’t
> see that deception to be a highly probable outcome. No, I think there has to be another answer.

Schon geht er also freiwillig wieder von seiner Betrugsgeschichte ab.

> I touched upon the possible solution to this mystery earlier this year. I wrote (Letter No. 283,
>"Behind Closed Doors") that the portion of the US Gold Reserve stored at the depository in West
> Point, New York

Dass Gold in West Point liegen soll, wird mit nichts belegt. West Point soll suggerieren, dass da militärische Schweinereien ablaufen. Die Vorstellung ist absolut krank, da irgendwelche Goldgeschichten nicht unter militärische Geheimnisse fallen. Es würde sofort publik, in West Point arbeiten nicht nur 3-Sterne-Generäle.

>had been swapped with gold owned by the Bundesbank, and that the gold in the
> German central bank had been sold.

Das stimmt definitiv nicht. Das Gold der Buba liegt entweder dort bzw. bei der Fed in NY, bzw. die Goldforderungen, die die Buba bucht (Gold und Goldforderungen übrigens seit 1999 zum aktuellen Marktpries mit entsprechendem Korrekturposten passiv, um die Realisierugn der Stillen Reserven nicht an den Bund ausschütten zu müssen - das Waigel-Problem!) richten sich gegen internationale Organisationen, zuletzt vor allem gegen die EZB.

Der Geschäftsbericht der Buba ist von WPs testiert, die unter keinen Umständen ein Verschwinden eines Aktivpostens"übersehen" würden. Die Buba hat mehr als 15.000 Mitarbeiter. Die Goldposition wird in der Inventur sorgfältigst gecheckt. Jeder, der da betrügen würde, macht sich strafbar.

<font color="FF0000">Die Deutsche Bundesbank ist nicht Flowtex!</font>

>So far, nothing I have seen refutes this contention, and
> correspondence from the Bundesbank has wrapped much of its gold policy in a cloak of
> confidentiality,

Solche Spinnereien gehören in einen Mantel-und-Degen-Film. Wir sind hier nicht im Kino!

>adding credence to my conclusion. After all, if my supposition weren’t true, why not
> just disclose the facts to convincingly refute it?

Die Facts werden - wie beschrieben - jedes Jahr ermittelt und dargestellt.

> Be that as it may, there were some loose ends that in my mind needed to be tidied up in order to add
> more substance to my contention that much of the US Gold Reserve was swapped and then sold. And
> first among those loose ends was the accounting. How were all of these gold transactions being
> accounted for? How could all of this gold be put into play even while the reported weight of the US
> Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF remained unchanged? And perhaps most importantly,
> why didn’t these transactions result in any apparent change on the balance sheet of the main
> perpetrators of this scheme, the Federal Reserve and the Exchange Stabilization Fund?

Dieser Fonds, eingerichtet unter Roosevelt, hat einen kleinen Teil der Goldreserven der USA. Völlig unbedeutende Bestände, siehe Greenspan-Rede.

>There has to
> be some kind of accounting trail, doesn’t there?
> I’ve thought long and hard about these questions,

Aha, er hat"gedacht" (thought). Warum ist er nicht selbst hingefahren und hat alles recherchiert? Ich habe bei der EZB auch alles vor Ort recherchiert, was ich wissen wollte.

>but have been unable to answer them to my
> satisfaction - until now. And in this regard, I would like to thank David Walker, a tireless
> researcher who has an uncanny ability to read between the lines

Zwischen den Zeilen lesen - was für ein Unfug!

>of tedious and dull government
> reports to get at the truth. Dave’s terrific work provided me with the motivation to continue
> researching an area that until recently had been largely unfruitful for me. And what is that area? A
> monetary instrument emitted by the International Monetary Fund called the SDR, an acronym for
> Special Drawing Rights a.k.a. ‘paper gold’.
> My intuitive sense for some time had been that SDR’s were the key necessary to unlock the door.
> By understanding the SDR, I expected that one could understand what was happening to the US Gold
> Reserve as well as put together a consistent accounting and the legal framework for the gold
> transactions that I contend have been taking place. But even though I thought SDR’s would provide
> the much sought after answer I was seeking, I was having trouble with a few things, mainly related
> to the accounting.
> For example, SDRs are so-called"paper gold", so this financial asset has to have a corresponding
> liability just like any other ‘paper’ money, right? But I couldn't find who or what is actually liable
> for the SDRs.

Der Mann sollte einen Buchungskurs absolvieren. Die SDRs sind bei denen, die sie in Anspruch genommen haben, selbstverständlich verbucht - passiv!

> After digging away in the IMF archives, I found the following in an IMF accounting manual called
> the Manual on Monetary and Financial Statistics, in a section entitled"Definition of Financial
> Assets: http://www.imf.org/external/indexlst.htm
>"Monetary gold and SDRs issued by the IMF are financial assets for which there are no
> corresponding financial liabilities."

Vollständiger Unsinn. Der IMF hat selbst kein Gold, das ihm vom Himmel zugefallen ist, sondern er hat es von den IMF-Members erhalten. Diese verbuchen dies als Forderung gegenüber dem IMF und der IMF hat seinerseits einen entsprechenden Passivposten. Hier werden"financial liabilities mit"liabilities" verwechselt. Die Forderung auf Gold ist kein"financial asset" in den IMF-Teilnehmer-Bilanzen, aber ein"asset"!

Genauso gut könnte man sagen, ein Grundstück, das ein Unternehmen zu Eigen hat, sei kein"financial asset", aber es ist dennoch als"asset" aktiv verbucht und hat einen Passivposten (zumeist Kapital).

> How about that? No wonder I couldn't reconcile the accounting. Here's a purely financial asset with
> no corresponding liability!?! SDR’s issued by the IMF are accounted in the same way that the IMF
> accounts for its stock of gold. I thought that only tangible assets like gold, houses and land had no
> liabilities.

Enttarnt! Der Mann kann nicht buchen. Selbstverständlich werden Häuser, Gold und Land in jeder Bilanz der Welt mit einem Passivposten gegen gebucht. Der Mann sollte sich mal einen Grundkurs über die Struktur von Passivseiten reinziehen. Kapital - Rücklagen - Rückstellungen - Verbindlichkeiten nach Fälligkeit - Gewinn, usw.

>I never dreamed that a financial asset would not have a corresponding liability,

Er verwechselt wieder"assets" (wie Sachanlagen) mit"financial assets" (wie Forderungen). Und entsprechend"capital" als"liabilities" mit"financial liabilities" (Verbindlichkeiten).

>but after
> this realization, one thing led to another and everything slowly but surely started falling into place.
> In"Behind Closed Doors" I included the following quote from the transcript of the January 31st,
> 1995 FOMC meeting:
> MR. TRUMAN. The legislation governing the objectives of the ESF was changed, I think for the
> most part in the mid- to late-1970s. The changes included the language that the government of the
> United States and the International Monetary Fund have the obligation to promote orderly
> exchange rate arrangements leading to a stable system of exchange rates.
> Since first reading this candid comment I have always been struck by it. Truman is relying upon this
> 1970's legislation to provide the legal justification to use the ESF to bail-out Mexico. It therefore
> seemed clear to me that if I could figure out what was implemented in the 1970’s, I could then come
> to more precisely understand how the US Gold Reserve was being put into play.
> I had been unsuccessful, however, in trying to figure out what was the legislation to which Truman
> was referring. Well, I now think that he was referring at least in part to what is called the Second
> Amendment of the IMF.
> By way of background, when the gold crisis in the 1960's was in full swing, the original IMF articles
> were amended. This First Amendment to the IMF created SDRs. Then here’s what the Second
> Amendment did.
> http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gold.htm
> What changed under the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF? The
> Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, which came into effect in April
> 1978, eliminated the use of gold as the common denominator of the par value system and as
> the basis of the value of the SDR. The Amendment also abolished the official price of gold and
> abrogated the obligatory uses of gold in transactions between the IMF and its members…
> Under the Amendment, members undertook to collaborate with the IMF and other members
> with respect to reserve assets to promote better international surveillance of international
> liquidity.
> I draw your attention to the last sentence. I think this statement explains what Ted Truman was
> referring to. The term"international liquidity" is a euphemism I think that gives a carte blanche to
> do whatever the various IMF members want to do, using assets that are at hand or whatever assets
> that they create out of thin air, to intervene and manipulate any market anyway they want under
> the guise of"international liquidity" - which really means to let the banks create credit out of thin
> air for no other purpose but to keep the present system afloat so they can preserve their position of
> privilege and keep lining their pockets.

Vom Kreditgeschäft versteht er auch nichts. Jeder Kredit entsteht selbstverständlich nicht nur"out of thin air", sondern"out of nothing".

> The following quote is from the"User's Guide to the SDR" published by the IMF.
> http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/FT/usrgsdr/usersc01.htm#3
> 3. Improvements in the SDR after the Second Amendment:
> One of the major objectives of the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, which
> became effective on April 1, 1978, is to make the SDR the principal reserve asset of the
> international monetary system.

Dieses"reserve asset" existiert nicht netto. Es ist selbstverständlich als"liability" in den Institutionen verbucht, die SDRs in Anspruch genommen haben. Ein ganz normaler Kreditvorgang (wenn auch de facto ein Hochbuchungsvorgang, aber auch beim Hochbuchen bzw. Aufschulden wird immer doppelt gebucht).

>To this end, the Fund’s Executive Board has taken a number of
> decisions to improve the yield on the SDR and its liquidity and usability. At the same time, certain
> obligations arising from participation have been eliminated.
>"Improvements" to you and me may sound innocuous, but in reality these 'improvements' have
> only one objective - to keep the present system afloat by providing more power to governments
> working hand-in-hand with the banking cartel.

"Power"? Es geht ausschließlich darum, die SDRs zu erhalten (also auf den IMF zu ziehen). Und sofort wird doppelt gebucht. Beim IMF verlängert sich die Bilanz, da dort jetzt mehr SDRs stehen, und bei den Institutionen (staatlichen zumeist), die die SDRs in Anspruch genommen haben, verlängert sich deren Passivseite entsprechend, also ebenfalls Bilanzverlängerung.

>So far I’m not sure of all the ways the SDR became
> more usable, nor have I yet discovered all the obligations that were eliminated when the Second
> Amendment"improved" the SDR. But I have learned enough about the SDR to conclude why the
> accounting of the US Gold Reserve does not appear to have changed. This mystery can be solved by
> first solving a second mystery, the case of the disappearing SDR Certificates.

Die SDRs sind nicht zertifiziert im Sinne von marktfähigen Titeln. Es sind ausschließlich Buchungen.

> To begin, it is necessary to provide some background information gleaned from more hours of
> studying arcane IMF accounting than I care to admit, but I’ll keep it simple. And the way to do that
> is to show how ‘real gold’ and Gold Certificates are accounted, because I have learned that ‘paper
> gold’ and SDR Certificates are accounted essentially the same way.

Richtig. Aber egal, ob ich als IMF Gold, Paper Gold oder SDRs aktiv verbuche oder auch gegenseitig von einem ins andere wechsle - ich habe immer eine entsprechend hohe Passivseite.

> The US Gold Reserve does double-duty. It sits in the vaults at Fort Knox and the other depositories,
> but the US Treasury has issued Gold Certificates against it. The Federal Reserve owns these Gold
> Certificates, giving the Fed a claim to the 261.6 million ounces in the US Gold Reserve. Simple
> enough, and the same transaction is used for ‘paper gold’ - the SDR’s - with just one small
> difference. The US Treasury has transferred its SDR’s to the ESF, so the ESF and not the US
> Treasury issued the SDR Certificates now owned by the Federal Reserve.
> Importantly, these SDR Certificates are being accounted for much the same way as the Gold
> Certificates. Both are carried at book value, which is much less than their market value. The Gold
> Certificates are carried on the Federal Reserve’s books at $11,046 million, which doesn’t sound like
> much. However, when you consider that these Gold Certificates are being valued at only $42.22 per
> ounce, this asset represents the entire 261.6 million ounces in the US Gold Reserve. And the SDR
> Certificates are being valued at - well, here is where it starts to get interesting. And here is where
> the mystery of the disappearing SDR Certificates comes into play. Look at the decline in the SDR
> Certificates in the accompanying table.
> Exchange Stabization Fund
> Federal Reserve
> (Assets)
> (Liabilities)
> (Assets)
> (in millions)
> (in millions)
> SDR
> SDR
> SDR
> SDR
> Gold
> Holdings
> Certificates
> Allocations
> Certificates
> Certificates
> Dec-98
> 10,603
> 9,200
> 6,899
> 9,200
> 11,046
> Mar-99
> 9,682
> 8,200
> 6,653
> 8,200
> 11,049
> Jun-99
> 9,719
> 8,200
> 6,545
> 8,200
> 11,046
> Sep-99
> 10,284
> 7,200
> 6,799
> 7,200
> 11,047
> Dec-99
> 10,336
> 6,200
> 6,717
> 6,200
> 11,048
> Mar-00
> 10,335
> 6,200
> 6,599
> 6,200
> 11,048
> Jun-00
> 10,444
> 4,200
> 6,552
> 4,200
> 11,046
> Sep-00
> 10,316
> 3,200
> 6,359
> 3,200
> 11,046
> Dec-00
> 10,539
> 2,200
> 6,384
> 2,200
> 11,046
> Mar-01
> N/a
> n/a
> n/a
> 2,200
> 11,046
>
> The above table presents the SDR assets and liabilities of the ESF and the Fed. Though recent
> figures for the ESF are not available, as of August 9th the Fed still owns only 2,200 million of SDR
> Certificates, so presumably the SDR entries on the ESF balance sheet have not changed much since
> December 2000. To understand why the SDR Certificates are disappearing as well as where they are
> going, more background information is necessary.

Zunächst mal können SDRs selbstverständlich verschwinden, sobald sie zurückgezahlt werden, und da lautend auf US-$ eben in US-Dollar.

> The US, like each IMF Member, owns SDR’s

Die USA als Staat besitzen keine SDRs direkt, weil sie noch nie auf den IMF gezogen haben, sondern sie besitzen sie nur indirekt, anteilig über ihre Beteiligung am IMF. Von"owns" kann keinerlei Rede sein. Außerdem sind SDRs Forderungen und auch deshalb ist der Begriff"owns" bei Forderungen (auch indirekten) etwas ganz anderes als ein"owns" von Sachen. Der Mann wirft dauernd Sachanlagen mit Finanzanlagen durcheinander.

>but is also responsible for the value of the SDR. Note
> #4 of the ESF’s financial statement for 1999 explains it thus:"Its [the SDR’s] value as a reserve asset
> derives, essentially, from the commitments of participants to hold and accept SDR’s and to honor various
> obligations connected with its proper functioning as a reserve asset."
> As of December 1998, the ESF owned 10,603 million SDR’s, but it had a liability for 6,899 million
> SDR’s. What does this liability represent? Here’s what Schedule B of the Articles of Agreement of
> the IMF says:"…0.888671 gram of fine gold shall be equivalent to one special drawing right." That
> means 35 SDR’s equals one ounce of gold. So the US has the potential obligation as of December
> 2000 - if required to make good on SDR’s issued - to pay to the IMF or its members 182.4 million
> ounces of gold, some 69.7% of the US Gold Reserve.

Da die ESF genauso funktioniert wie der IMF oder ähnlich auch die BIZ (als eine Art lender of last ressort im internationalen Geschäft) ist dies weiter kein Wunder.

> That huge liability is pretty scary, but it is only a potential liability. Who knows whether the US will
> ever be required to make good on it, or if it does, whether the US will default just like it defaulted in
> 1933 on its obligation to pay US government bonds in gold and in 1971 on its obligation to redeem 35
> dollars for one ounce of gold. Those are problems to worry about in the future.

Diese Einschätzung teile ich auch. Aber sie hat überhaupt nichts mit einer nicht doppelten Verbuchung zu tun, sondern damit, dass auch ziemlich große"financial entities", in diesem Fall US Government stracks auf den Bankrott zu steuern. So ein großer Staatsbankrott ist ja geradezu das Schmankerl des Debitismus.

>Of more immediate
> concern is the decline in the SDR Certificates. What is that all about? To answer this question and
> to solve this mystery of the disappearing SDR Certificates, we have to once again go back to basics.
> Why are the SDR Certificates declining? The basic answer is quite simple. The SDR Certificates
> MUST BE reduced if the ESF intends to use its SDR’s for any purpose, such as market intervention
> or swaps. In other words, the SDR Certificates are a claim against the SDR’s, so the SDR
> Certificate must be cancelled to remove any claims on the SDR before the SDR can be used by the
> ESF. But the amount of SDR’s owned by the ESF hasn’t changed except briefly in early 1999, so it
> seems that the SDR’s are not being used for any purpose.

SDRs werden nicht für irgendwelche Zwecke gebraucht, sozuagen als netto vorhandenen Größe, sondern sie wurden gebraucht, eben um einen Bail-out für irgendwelche Staaten zu veranstalten.

> So what I think has happened is that the SDR Certificates are themselves being used by the ESF.
> Here’s what the IMF says about the use of SDR’s in swaps:"In accordance with Article XIX, Section
> 2(c), the Fund prescribes that...a participant, by agreement with another participant, may engage in an
> operation by which (a) one of the parties transfers [i.e., swaps] to the other party SDRs in exchange for
> an equivalent amount of currency or another monetary asset, other than gold."
> Thus, SDR’s cannot be swapped for gold,

So ist es.

>but there is no IMF regulation that prohibits the swapping of
> SDR Certificates for gold.

Das endlich ist ein Punkt, ein sehr wichtiger sogar. Die SDR certificates (Klartext: Buchungen, keine marktfähigen Titel) können zum alten Goldpreis eingefordert werden. Allerdings - siehe oben, von ihm selbst dargestellt - bei US Treasury.

Was passiert dann also? Das Gold, das US Treasury (100 % Eigentum von US Government) hält, ändert nur seinen Standort: Es wandert an die ESF (100 % Eigentum von US Government). Und das war's.

>So let’s take this observation to its logical conclusion, namely, that the ESF
> and/or the Federal Reserve has been swapping SDR Certificates issued by the ESF for gold owned by
> the Bundesbank,

Dann hätte die ESF Gold bei der Bundesbank zum alten Kurs abholen müssen. Wäre dies geschehen, hätte die Bundesbank Gold zum alten Kurs abgegeben. Dass dies nicht der Fall gewesen sein kann, zeigt der Ausweis der Buba, wo die Goldposition stark aufgewertet wurde (siehe oben), was unmöglich gewesen wäre, wenn die ESF bei der Bundesbank Gold (physisch) zum alten Kurs abgeholt und in die USA transferiert hätte.

>and presumably other central banks as well because we noted above that the
> Second Amendment states that"members undertook to collaborate with the IMF and other
> members" for the sake of international liquidity. So presumably, all IMF members are committed to
> undertake any scheme that the US government may hatch.

Nein. Denn die SDR certificates - siehe oben - können nur von US Treasury bedient werden. Die USA können nur mit sich selbst tricksen. Allerdings könnte die Möglichkeit, sofern sie angedeutet wurde, dass die ESF Gold zum alten Kurs bei anderen ZBs abzuholen versuchen wird, dazu geführt haben, dass viele ZBs ihr Gold lieber am freien Markt verkauft haben, damit die ESF mit Sicherheit ins Leere griffe.

> This interpretation may also explain the strange response to Alan Greenspan by the Fed’s General
> Counsel, Virgil Mattingly, who has"no clear recollection of exactly" what he said during the
> January 31st, 1995 FOMC meeting, even though it seems most likely that the transcript accurately
> records him as saying"gold swaps". In his June 8, 2001 note to Greenspan, Mattingly states:"I can
> confirm that I have no knowledge of any ‘gold swaps’ by either the Federal Reserve or the ESF." Is
> Mattingly being truthful? Yes, I think so, at least in regard to the precise choice of terms used in his
> note.
> Remember President Clinton’s exegesis on the definition of the word is? Lawyer Mattingly I think is
> playing the same game. By this line of thinking, neither the Federal Reserve nor the ESF do ‘gold
> swaps’. Instead, these transactions are probably called"SDR Certificate Swaps" or some other
> similar term, although the FOMC participants may use the unofficial term"gold swaps" as a
> short-hand moniker that is not only easier to say than the official name of the transaction, but also
> has the added advantage of clearly communicating the net result of the transaction.
> There is another important piece of corroborating evidence that SDR Certificates are being used by
> the ESF to hide its gold transactions. ´

Goldtransaktionen, wenn überhaupt, nur mit US Treasury, was aber den Goldbestand der USA um kein Gramm verändert, was allerdings - und dass ist nun wirklich ein zentraler Punkt! - dazu führen kann, das die ESF die Stelle ist, die - nachdem sie die ca. 70 % Gold von US Treasury abgeholt hat, siehe oben - das Gold selbst völlig neu bewerten kann.

US Treasury kann das nicht, da an die 42,22 $-Klausel gebunden.

<font color="FF0000">Dann hätten wir also die ESF als Institution, die insgeheim eine kommende Extrem-Goldaufwertung vorbereiten und veranstalten könnte, mit all den Folgen und Möglichkeiten, die hier oft genug gepostet wurden.</font>

>When several months ago I first read the audited financial
> statement of the ESF, I was struck by a peculiar phrase in footnote #4, which in addition to
> considerable explanatory text also provided a table of SDR purchases and sales during the year. The
> text stated that these purchases and sales were"equivalent of SDR’s". Therefore, I concluded that
> if they were"equivalent of SDR’s", SDR’s were not actually being used in the transaction. But I
> wondered, if they weren’t SDR’s, then what were they? We don’t know for sure what they are, but
> they are probably SDR Certificate transactions - not SDR’s, but only their"equivalent".
> Let’s put the size of these transactions into perspective. As of December 2000, the ESF owned 10,539
> million SDR’s, against which it has issued 2,200 million SDR Certificates. Therefore, 8,338 million
> SDR’s are potentially ‘in play’, but we can refine this number given that it is the SDR Certificates
> and not the SDR’s that are important.
> The ESF by law cannot issue more SDR Certificates than it has SDR’s. The largest amount of SDR
> Certificates outstanding was 10,168 million in December 1995, a significant date because I have
> contended all along that government actions that have depressed the gold price began in 1996, which
> is the same year that the SDR Certificates began to decline. From this peak to the present, the SDR
> Certificates have been reduced by 7,968 million. Given that there are 35 SDR per ounce of gold, this
> reduction in the SDR Certificate account equates to 227.7 million ounces, or 87% of the US Gold
> Reserve.

Also 87 %. Und hier wird's endlich interessant!

>Does this mean that 87% of the US Gold Reserve has already been swapped? I don’t have
> the answer to that question, but I would like to make four important observations that do in fact
> suggest that substantially all of the US Gold Reserve has been put into play.
> First, note on the accompanying table the dates when the SDR Certificates began to decline rapidly.
> From 10,168 million in December 1995, the SDR Certificate account declined to 8,200 million by
> June 1999, or 19% over 3½ years. Now look at the decline beginning in the third quarter of 1999,
> which corresponds with the Washington Agreement signed in September of that year. In only 18
> months the SDR Certificate account declined by 73%. Was there a panic to get gold into the market
> after the Washington Agreement to keep the gold price from rising?

Das mit der Manipulation des Goldmarktes muss man völlig rauslassen, weil es zum Kern der Sache selbst nichts beiträgt. Denn wenn die ESF ohnehin weltweit ihre SDR Certificates in Gold zu 42,22 $ tauschen kann bzw. hätte tauschen können (siehe oben), muss niemand den Goldpreis nach unten manipulieren. Es wäre sogar kontraproduktiv, da der Spielraum einer Höherbewertung des dann bei der ESF liegenden ehemaligen Treasury-Goldes im Rahmen einer (Teil-)-Sanierung des US-Staates beschränkt würde.

Die Vermutung, dass einzelne"schwächere" (oder schlauere) ZBs ihr Gold gegeben haben, was unstreitig der Fall war, direkt - und ohne Hintenrum-Mätzchen à la swaps - könnte (siehe oben) ganz schlicht diese sein: Die ZBs haben ihr Gold gegeben, um einer Abforderung ("politischer Druck" aus Washington?) durch die ESF zuvor zu kommen.

Anderseits können die Notenbanken, die ihr Gold behalten haben, ihrerseits auf der Lauer liegen und warten, was die ESF machen wird (Goldaufwertung). Um dann mitzuiehen. Die Bundesbank könnte dann ihren Gold-Passivposten auflösen und direkt als"zusätzlichen Gewinn" an den Bund ausschütten, um diesem behilflich zu sein.

>This evidence sure does
> support that conclusion.
> Second, readers will recall how the US Treasury changed in September 2000 the classification of that
> portion of the US Gold Reserve in West Point to"Custodial Gold". It is interesting and probably
> meaningful to note that this change occurred in the fiscal year ending September 30th in which
> there was a substantial decline in the SDR Certificates.
> In"Behind Closed Doors" I speculated that the reason for this reclassification was that the Mint’s
> accountants or its new director realized that it was misleading to continue calling this swapped metal
> as"Gold Bullion Reserve". This logic may also explain why more recently, the entire US Gold
> Reserve was reclassified as"Deep Storage Gold". If 87% of the US Gold Reserve has indeed been
> swapped, it may have been too obvious an admission by the US Treasury to reclassify nearly the
> entire US Gold Reserve as"Custodial Gold". Therefore, to give some semblance of proper
> accounting while not totally divulging the truth, the Treasury came up with the half-baked term
>"Deep Storage Gold". Further, it was my thinking that the Treasury, taking a lesson from lawyers
> Clinton and Mattingly, probably defined this term in some obscure Treasury accounting manual.

Dies liefe nach wie vor darauf hinaus, dass entweder US Treasury oder die ESF das Gold physisch halten. Die ESF kann es nur leichter aufwerten, was der Treasury verwehrt ist.

> What was a speculation on my part is now supported by a letter dated August 7, 2001, to Richard
> May from John P. Mitchell, Deputy Director of the US Mint. Mitchell states:"The gold in West
> Point was not reclassified - it was renamed to better conform to our audited financial statements."
> Despite providing five pages of supporting material with his letter, Mitchell does not explain how this
> ‘renaming’ enables the Treasury to"better conform to [its] audited financial statements." The
> logical conclusion is that this better conformation arises because the strict application of prudent
> accounting principles no longer allows the Treasury to use the term"US Gold Reserves" because
> more than half - and possibly 87% of it - has been swapped.

Swaps hin oder her - es läuft letztlich immer darauf hinaus, dass das US Gold bei der ESF landet und diese dann die"große Nummer" starten kann - das muss allerdings über Nacht geschehen.

>Given that the Treasury does not want
> to use the more accurate but alarming term"Custodial Gold", the US Gold Reserve has therefore
> instead become"Deep Storage Gold", allowing the Treasury to remain within the letter if not the
> spirit of the principle of full disclosure.
> The third observation takes the above changes and explains them in weights of gold. The 6,000
> million drop in SDR Certificates from June 1999 to December 2000 represents 171.4 million ounces,
> or 28.6 million ounces (888.7 tonnes) per quarter. That’s a supply of about 3500 tonnes per year,
> which added to 2500 tonnes new mine production implies an annual demand of 6000 tonnes for the
> period of time after the Washington Agreement. Is this number reasonable?

Dies setzt voraus, dass die ESF zunächst sich SDRs besorgt, in welcher Form auch immer und dann darauf die SDR certificates ausstellt und diese dann in Gold zum alten Kurs bei US Treasury abholt. Die natürliche Grenze des Erwerbs, womit auch immer, von SDRs liegt im Gesamtgoldbestand von US Treasury, der bei den bekannten ca. 8150 t liegt. Mehr SDRs zu erwerben, um sie zu zertifizieren, macht keinen Sinn - es sei denn die ESF könnte Gold auch bei anderen ZBs abholen.

> In my opinion it is reasonable. Noted gold analyst Frank Veneroso contends that annual gold
> demand has been running about 5000 tonnes, but this number reflects normal market conditions.
> After the Washington Agreement and the price spike, the market was anything but normal. Even
> though fabrication demand fell during that period, investment and monetary demand for gold
> soared. So it is not unreasonable to expect that more than 1000 tonnes of newly supplied gold from
> government dishoarding was needed in the months after the Washington Agreement to turn the
> price back from the +$320 level reached at that time.

Das Ganze hat mit"neuem Gold" nichts zu tun, das die SDR certificates nicht bei den Minen zum alten Kurs in Gold abgeholt werden können.

> The fourth and final observation relates to a point I made in the last newsletter. I noted how
> earmarked gold has been shipped from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at a rate of at least
> 40 tonnes per month beginning in September 2000, while also stating this new"dishoarding from the
> NY Fed smacks of desperation". The above table confirms this conclusion.
> The SDR Certificate account has not changed since the 4th quarter of 2000. With only 2,200 million
> remaining, the SDR Certificate account, while not depleted, is near rock bottom and one must ask
> how much more gold the US government is willing to throw at the market?

Das ist alles Kokolores. Warum sollte US Government Gold auf den Markt werfen - jetzt US Treasury Gold? Erstens würde damit der Spielraum (Volumen) für eine Goldaufwertung begrenzt und zweitens wäre das Gold dann schnell in privaten Horten verschwunden, wo es nur schwer aufzutreiben ist. Schließlich bekäme US Government für sein Gold ohnehin nur Dollar, die es sich leichter durch zusätzliche Verschuldung besorgen kann - auch wenn das Zinsverpflichtungen nach sich zieht.

>I don’t think the answer
> to that question is"all of it", so essentially there is no more US gold available for swapping.
> Consequently, with these SDR Certificate swaps eliminated as a source of supply, another source of
> gold had to be located to fill the gap between supply and demand.

Dann müsste US Treasury seinerseits nicht Gold verkaufen, sondern kaufen! Dies, damit möglichst viel Gold letztlich bei der ESF landet, um der (möglicherweise) kommenden Goldaufwertung noch mehr Volumen zu geben.

> In the last newsletter I suggested that the IMF is this new source. That’s just a supposition on my
> part, but it seems logical that IMF gold is being shipped out of the FRB of NY. The quantities being
> shipped are so large, the gold must be coming from a large hoard, and the IMF has, on paper at
> least, one of the world’s largest. But regardless of whose it is, this gold is being shipped at a rate
> greater than gold is being mined each month in South Africa, the world’s largest producer. That volume
> of shipments smacks of desperation to get gold into the market, and the reason is clear. Because the
> SDR Certificate swaps have ended, a new source of gold supply is needed to keep the gold price from
> exploding upward.

Das eine hat mit dem anderen überhaupt nichts zu tun. Wenn ich Gold aufwerten will (und was sollten die ESF-Aktionen sonst für einen Sinn machen, falls es es überhaupt einen Sinn hinter dem Ganzen gibt?), dann ist es völlig egal, von welchem Kurs aus.

> In conclusion, it is becoming very obvious that the US government has put itself in an incredible
> pickle. But we’ve seen this happen before.
> In the 1960’s the US government dishoarded over 9000 tonnes of gold rather than admit that the
> dollar had been debased and was no longer worth only $35 per ounce. Now it appears that perhaps as
> much as 7,000 tonnes (227.7 million ounces) has been swapped for essentially the same purpose - to
> intervene in the market to fight the truth,

Nein, ganz und gar nicht. Wenn ich keine Parität mehr halten muss, ist es völlig egal, was der Preis am freien Markt macht. Die Vorstellung, man wolle Gold"klein" halten, damit nur ja niemand auf die Idee komme, die"großen" Forderungen wären oder würden wackelig, hat mir noch nie eingeleuchtet.

Was mir aber einleuchten würde, ist ein Grand Design mit Hilfe der ESF. Dazu hat der Artikel interessante Hinweise gegeben. Der Rest sind Guessings und das mit der"Nichtverbuchung" ist Schrott.

>rather than admit that the dollar has again become very
> debased relative to gold. ¤
> jamesturk@goldmoney.com

Schade, Reinhard, dass Du Dir nicht die Mühe gemacht hast, den Beitrag so (oder gern auch anders) zu analysieren. Vom reinen Reinstellen von Texten hat hier im Forum kein Mensch was. Hinweise auf Links und Links zu Links bringen keinen einzigen von uns weiter.

Was uns weiter bringt, sind Diskussionen und durchdachte Analysen des Gebotenen, egal wie gut das Durchdenken selbst dann war. Aber das kann dann eben weiter diskutiert werden.

Ich bin dem Forum sehr dankbar für viele Beiträge. Aber mal eben schnell einen Tritt austeilen und sich dann argumentativ zu verabschieden ist keinerlei konstruktives Mitarbeiten hier.

Ein schwer enttäuschter

d.




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>Was uns weiter bringt, sind Diskussionen und durchdachte Analysen des Gebotenen, egal wie gut das Durchdenken selbst dann war. Aber das kann dann eben weiter diskutiert werden.
>Ich bin dem Forum sehr dankbar für viele Beiträge. Aber mal eben schnell einen Tritt austeilen und sich dann argumentativ zu verabschieden ist keinerlei konstruktives Mitarbeiten hier.
>Ein schwer enttäuschter
>d.

Und ein noch dankbarerer JüKü, wegen der Analyse und Kommentierung.
Ihre Bitte kann ich nur unterstützen. Oft ist es aber wahrscheinlich so, dass kaum jemand solche Analysen überhaupt vornehmen kann. Um so größer meine Anerkennung!


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>Hi Reinhard,
>das mit Gold und SDRs ist doch kein Argument, wenn beides als"nur ein Mal verbucht" dargestellt wird.
>Selbstverständlich wird auch das Gold zwei mal verbucht: Aktiv: Gold, passiv gegen das Gold beim Goldkauf ausgegebene Banknoten. Sollte Gold als Kapital eingebracht worden sein, ergibt sich: Aktiv: Gold, passiv: Kapital.
>Special Drawing Rights werden selbstverständlich auch doppelt verbucht. Beim IWF erscheinen sie als Forderungen und bei jeder Institution, die sie in Anspruch nimmt (daher ja"drawing" = also sie - oder auf sie - zieht, engl. to draw = ziehen, wie beim Wechsel) erscheinen sie passiv.
>Ich würde es begrüßen, wenn Du mit Deinen Schlüssen ("Böse Schlappe...") etwas sorgfältiger umgingest.
>Jetzt ein ausführlicher Analyse-Versuch zum Text selbst:
>>und zugleich ein kleines Versöhnungsgeschenk für dottore (habe das Gefühl, Du hast Dich etwas geärgert über mich).
>Ja, ich ärgere mich über Deine vorschnellen Schlüsse. Du könntest solche Sachen zunächst ein Mal in Frageform kleiden.
>>Der folgende brisante Text wird Dir gefallen.
>Von solchen versteckten Zynismen bitte ich in Zukunft Abstand zu nehmen!
>>Letter No. 289
>> August 13th, 2001
>> The Mystery of the Disappearing SDR Certificates
>> by James Turk
>> Copyright 2001 © by The Freemarket Gold & Money Report.
>> Here’s a mystery for you. It ranks high with any of the great thrillers solved by Sherlock Holmes,
>> but this one is not fiction.
>> I have been arguing that the US Treasury and possibly the IMF have been selling gold,
>Dafür gibt es nicht den Schatten eines hieb- und stichfesten Beweises!
>Selbst wenn sie Gold verkauft hätten, müssten sie einen anderen Posten dafür buchen bzw. ausweisen. US Treasury bucht nicht, aber muss den aktuellen Goldbestand jedes Jahr dem Kongress zu leiten (Anhang zum Haushalt). Es sind konstant ca. 8150 Tonnen.
>Der IMF bucht ganz normal, wie jedes andere Unternehmen auch. Sollte der IMF Gold verkauft haben, dann müsste er auf der Aktivseite einen anderen Posten ausweisen. Falls der IMF Gold verschenkt hat (Aktivseitenverkürzung), muss die Passivseite entsprechend berichtigt werden. So einfach ist es also nicht.
>and that
>> their actions have depressed the gold price. But if I am right, then why has the reported weight of
>> the US Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF remained unchanged?
>"If I am right" sagt wohl schon alles. Entweder das Gewicht bleibt gleich, dann kann es zu keinem Verkauf gekommen sein - wie denn? US Treasury wird vom Haushaltsausschuss von House and Senate geprüft und der IMF von renommierten WPs.
>> The easiest answer to this question is also the most unlikely. This low probability answer is that the
>> US Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF are not being accurately reported.
>Das ist doch kindisch. Falls tatsächlich Durchstechereien vorlägen, bleibe das unmöglich geheim. Nichts ist schneller zu recherchieren als Gewichts- bzw. Bilanzbetrug. Letzterer bei einer Institution, die Tausende von Mitarbeitern hat! Die Story ließe sich kein Journalist jemals entgehen. Es käme zum größten Staatsskandal aller Zeiten, dagegen wäre Watergate ein Säuseln.
>Der Mann stellt eine Behauptung in den Raum, die er mit nichts beweisen kann. Könnte er es, würden NYT oder Washington Post jeden Betrag bezahlen, um die Story zu bringen. Schlagzeile: Blattbreit und in 20 Cicero großen Lettern!
>> I dismiss this answer, almost completely but maybe not entirely because one never knows what
>> could be happening. A deliberately reported inaccurate weight of gold would mean fraud, and I don’t
>> see that deception to be a highly probable outcome. No, I think there has to be another answer.
>Schon geht er also freiwillig wieder von seiner Betrugsgeschichte ab.
>> I touched upon the possible solution to this mystery earlier this year. I wrote (Letter No. 283,
>>"Behind Closed Doors") that the portion of the US Gold Reserve stored at the depository in West
>> Point, New York
>Dass Gold in West Point liegen soll, wird mit nichts belegt. West Point soll suggerieren, dass da militärische Schweinereien ablaufen. Die Vorstellung ist absolut krank, da irgendwelche Goldgeschichten nicht unter militärische Geheimnisse fallen. Es würde sofort publik, in West Point arbeiten nicht nur 3-Sterne-Generäle.
>>had been swapped with gold owned by the Bundesbank, and that the gold in the
>> German central bank had been sold.
>Das stimmt definitiv nicht. Das Gold der Buba liegt entweder dort bzw. bei der Fed in NY, bzw. die Goldforderungen, die die Buba bucht (Gold und Goldforderungen übrigens seit 1999 zum aktuellen Marktpries mit entsprechendem Korrekturposten passiv, um die Realisierugn der Stillen Reserven nicht an den Bund ausschütten zu müssen - das Waigel-Problem!) richten sich gegen internationale Organisationen, zuletzt vor allem gegen die EZB.
>Der Geschäftsbericht der Buba ist von WPs testiert, die unter keinen Umständen ein Verschwinden eines Aktivpostens"übersehen" würden. Die Buba hat mehr als 15.000 Mitarbeiter. Die Goldposition wird in der Inventur sorgfältigst gecheckt. Jeder, der da betrügen würde, macht sich strafbar.
><font color="FF0000">Die Deutsche Bundesbank ist nicht Flowtex!</font>
>>So far, nothing I have seen refutes this contention, and
>> correspondence from the Bundesbank has wrapped much of its gold policy in a cloak of
>> confidentiality,
> Solche Spinnereien gehören in einen Mantel-und-Degen-Film. Wir sind hier nicht im Kino!
>>adding credence to my conclusion. After all, if my supposition weren’t true, why not
>> just disclose the facts to convincingly refute it?
>Die Facts werden - wie beschrieben - jedes Jahr ermittelt und dargestellt.
>> Be that as it may, there were some loose ends that in my mind needed to be tidied up in order to add
>> more substance to my contention that much of the US Gold Reserve was swapped and then sold. And
>> first among those loose ends was the accounting. How were all of these gold transactions being
>> accounted for? How could all of this gold be put into play even while the reported weight of the US
>> Gold Reserve and the gold stock of the IMF remained unchanged? And perhaps most importantly,
>> why didn’t these transactions result in any apparent change on the balance sheet of the main
>> perpetrators of this scheme, the Federal Reserve and the Exchange Stabilization Fund?
>Dieser Fonds, eingerichtet unter Roosevelt, hat einen kleinen Teil der Goldreserven der USA. Völlig unbedeutende Bestände, siehe Greenspan-Rede.
>>There has to
>> be some kind of accounting trail, doesn’t there?
>> I’ve thought long and hard about these questions,
>Aha, er hat"gedacht" (thought). Warum ist er nicht selbst hingefahren und hat alles recherchiert? Ich habe bei der EZB auch alles vor Ort recherchiert, was ich wissen wollte.
>>but have been unable to answer them to my
>> satisfaction - until now. And in this regard, I would like to thank David Walker, a tireless
>> researcher who has an uncanny ability to read between the lines
>Zwischen den Zeilen lesen - was für ein Unfug!
>>of tedious and dull government
>> reports to get at the truth. Dave’s terrific work provided me with the motivation to continue
>> researching an area that until recently had been largely unfruitful for me. And what is that area? A
>> monetary instrument emitted by the International Monetary Fund called the SDR, an acronym for
>> Special Drawing Rights a.k.a. ‘paper gold’.
>> My intuitive sense for some time had been that SDR’s were the key necessary to unlock the door.
>> By understanding the SDR, I expected that one could understand what was happening to the US Gold
>> Reserve as well as put together a consistent accounting and the legal framework for the gold
>> transactions that I contend have been taking place. But even though I thought SDR’s would provide
>> the much sought after answer I was seeking, I was having trouble with a few things, mainly related
>> to the accounting.
>> For example, SDRs are so-called"paper gold", so this financial asset has to have a corresponding
>> liability just like any other ‘paper’ money, right? But I couldn't find who or what is actually liable
>> for the SDRs.
>Der Mann sollte einen Buchungskurs absolvieren. Die SDRs sind bei denen, die sie in Anspruch genommen haben, selbstverständlich verbucht - passiv!
>> After digging away in the IMF archives, I found the following in an IMF accounting manual called
>> the Manual on Monetary and Financial Statistics, in a section entitled"Definition of Financial
>> Assets: http://www.imf.org/external/indexlst.htm
>>"Monetary gold and SDRs issued by the IMF are financial assets for which there are no
>> corresponding financial liabilities."
>Vollständiger Unsinn. Der IMF hat selbst kein Gold, das ihm vom Himmel zugefallen ist, sondern er hat es von den IMF-Members erhalten. Diese verbuchen dies als Forderung gegenüber dem IMF und der IMF hat seinerseits einen entsprechenden Passivposten. Hier werden"financial liabilities mit"liabilities" verwechselt. Die Forderung auf Gold ist kein"financial asset" in den IMF-Teilnehmer-Bilanzen, aber ein"asset"!
>Genauso gut könnte man sagen, ein Grundstück, das ein Unternehmen zu Eigen hat, sei kein"financial asset", aber es ist dennoch als"asset" aktiv verbucht und hat einen Passivposten (zumeist Kapital).
>> How about that? No wonder I couldn't reconcile the accounting. Here's a purely financial asset with
>> no corresponding liability!?! SDR’s issued by the IMF are accounted in the same way that the IMF
>> accounts for its stock of gold. I thought that only tangible assets like gold, houses and land had no
>> liabilities.
>Enttarnt! Der Mann kann nicht buchen. Selbstverständlich werden Häuser, Gold und Land in jeder Bilanz der Welt mit einem Passivposten gegen gebucht. Der Mann sollte sich mal einen Grundkurs über die Struktur von Passivseiten reinziehen. Kapital - Rücklagen - Rückstellungen - Verbindlichkeiten nach Fälligkeit - Gewinn, usw.
>>I never dreamed that a financial asset would not have a corresponding liability,
>Er verwechselt wieder"assets" (wie Sachanlagen) mit"financial assets" (wie Forderungen). Und entsprechend"capital" als"liabilities" mit"financial liabilities" (Verbindlichkeiten).
>>but after
>> this realization, one thing led to another and everything slowly but surely started falling into place.
>> In"Behind Closed Doors" I included the following quote from the transcript of the January 31st,
>> 1995 FOMC meeting:
>> MR. TRUMAN. The legislation governing the objectives of the ESF was changed, I think for the
>> most part in the mid- to late-1970s. The changes included the language that the government of the
>> United States and the International Monetary Fund have the obligation to promote orderly
>> exchange rate arrangements leading to a stable system of exchange rates.
>> Since first reading this candid comment I have always been struck by it. Truman is relying upon this
>> 1970's legislation to provide the legal justification to use the ESF to bail-out Mexico. It therefore
>> seemed clear to me that if I could figure out what was implemented in the 1970’s, I could then come
>> to more precisely understand how the US Gold Reserve was being put into play.
>> I had been unsuccessful, however, in trying to figure out what was the legislation to which Truman
>> was referring. Well, I now think that he was referring at least in part to what is called the Second
>> Amendment of the IMF.
>> By way of background, when the gold crisis in the 1960's was in full swing, the original IMF articles
>> were amended. This First Amendment to the IMF created SDRs. Then here’s what the Second
>> Amendment did.
>> http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gold.htm
>> What changed under the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF? The
>> Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, which came into effect in April
>> 1978, eliminated the use of gold as the common denominator of the par value system and as
>> the basis of the value of the SDR. The Amendment also abolished the official price of gold and
>> abrogated the obligatory uses of gold in transactions between the IMF and its members…
>> Under the Amendment, members undertook to collaborate with the IMF and other members
>> with respect to reserve assets to promote better international surveillance of international
>> liquidity.
>> I draw your attention to the last sentence. I think this statement explains what Ted Truman was
>> referring to. The term"international liquidity" is a euphemism I think that gives a carte blanche to
>> do whatever the various IMF members want to do, using assets that are at hand or whatever assets
>> that they create out of thin air, to intervene and manipulate any market anyway they want under
>> the guise of"international liquidity" - which really means to let the banks create credit out of thin
>> air for no other purpose but to keep the present system afloat so they can preserve their position of
>> privilege and keep lining their pockets.
>Vom Kreditgeschäft versteht er auch nichts. Jeder Kredit entsteht selbstverständlich nicht nur"out of thin air", sondern"out of nothing".
>> The following quote is from the"User's Guide to the SDR" published by the IMF.
>> http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/FT/usrgsdr/usersc01.htm#3
>> 3. Improvements in the SDR after the Second Amendment:
>> One of the major objectives of the Second Amendment of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, which
>> became effective on April 1, 1978, is to make the SDR the principal reserve asset of the
>> international monetary system.
>Dieses"reserve asset" existiert nicht netto. Es ist selbstverständlich als"liability" in den Institutionen verbucht, die SDRs in Anspruch genommen haben. Ein ganz normaler Kreditvorgang (wenn auch de facto ein Hochbuchungsvorgang, aber auch beim Hochbuchen bzw. Aufschulden wird immer doppelt gebucht).
>>To this end, the Fund’s Executive Board has taken a number of
>> decisions to improve the yield on the SDR and its liquidity and usability. At the same time, certain
>> obligations arising from participation have been eliminated.
>>"Improvements" to you and me may sound innocuous, but in reality these 'improvements' have
>> only one objective - to keep the present system afloat by providing more power to governments
>> working hand-in-hand with the banking cartel.
>"Power"? Es geht ausschließlich darum, die SDRs zu erhalten (also auf den IMF zu ziehen). Und sofort wird doppelt gebucht. Beim IMF verlängert sich die Bilanz, da dort jetzt mehr SDRs stehen, und bei den Institutionen (staatlichen zumeist), die die SDRs in Anspruch genommen haben, verlängert sich deren Passivseite entsprechend, also ebenfalls Bilanzverlängerung.
>>So far I’m not sure of all the ways the SDR became
>> more usable, nor have I yet discovered all the obligations that were eliminated when the Second
>> Amendment"improved" the SDR. But I have learned enough about the SDR to conclude why the
>> accounting of the US Gold Reserve does not appear to have changed. This mystery can be solved by
>> first solving a second mystery, the case of the disappearing SDR Certificates.
>Die SDRs sind nicht zertifiziert im Sinne von marktfähigen Titeln. Es sind ausschließlich Buchungen.
>> To begin, it is necessary to provide some background information gleaned from more hours of
>> studying arcane IMF accounting than I care to admit, but I’ll keep it simple. And the way to do that
>> is to show how ‘real gold’ and Gold Certificates are accounted, because I have learned that ‘paper
>> gold’ and SDR Certificates are accounted essentially the same way.
>Richtig. Aber egal, ob ich als IMF Gold, Paper Gold oder SDRs aktiv verbuche oder auch gegenseitig von einem ins andere wechsle - ich habe immer eine entsprechend hohe Passivseite.
>> The US Gold Reserve does double-duty. It sits in the vaults at Fort Knox and the other depositories,
>> but the US Treasury has issued Gold Certificates against it. The Federal Reserve owns these Gold
>> Certificates, giving the Fed a claim to the 261.6 million ounces in the US Gold Reserve. Simple
>> enough, and the same transaction is used for ‘paper gold’ - the SDR’s - with just one small
>> difference. The US Treasury has transferred its SDR’s to the ESF, so the ESF and not the US
>> Treasury issued the SDR Certificates now owned by the Federal Reserve.
>> Importantly, these SDR Certificates are being accounted for much the same way as the Gold
>> Certificates. Both are carried at book value, which is much less than their market value. The Gold
>> Certificates are carried on the Federal Reserve’s books at $11,046 million, which doesn’t sound like
>> much. However, when you consider that these Gold Certificates are being valued at only $42.22 per
>> ounce, this asset represents the entire 261.6 million ounces in the US Gold Reserve. And the SDR
>> Certificates are being valued at - well, here is where it starts to get interesting. And here is where
>> the mystery of the disappearing SDR Certificates comes into play. Look at the decline in the SDR
>> Certificates in the accompanying table.
>> Exchange Stabization Fund
>> Federal Reserve
>> (Assets)
>> (Liabilities)
>> (Assets)
>> (in millions)
>> (in millions)
>> SDR
>> SDR
>> SDR
>> SDR
>> Gold
>> Holdings
>> Certificates
>> Allocations
>> Certificates
>> Certificates
>> Dec-98
>> 10,603
>> 9,200
>> 6,899
>> 9,200
>> 11,046
>> Mar-99
>> 9,682
>> 8,200
>> 6,653
>> 8,200
>> 11,049
>> Jun-99
>> 9,719
>> 8,200
>> 6,545
>> 8,200
>> 11,046
>> Sep-99
>> 10,284
>> 7,200
>> 6,799
>> 7,200
>> 11,047
>> Dec-99
>> 10,336
>> 6,200
>> 6,717
>> 6,200
>> 11,048
>> Mar-00
>> 10,335
>> 6,200
>> 6,599
>> 6,200
>> 11,048
>> Jun-00
>> 10,444
>> 4,200
>> 6,552
>> 4,200
>> 11,046
>> Sep-00
>> 10,316
>> 3,200
>> 6,359
>> 3,200
>> 11,046
>> Dec-00
>> 10,539
>> 2,200
>> 6,384
>> 2,200
>> 11,046
>> Mar-01
>> N/a
>> n/a
>> n/a
>> 2,200
>> 11,046
>>
>> The above table presents the SDR assets and liabilities of the ESF and the Fed. Though recent
>> figures for the ESF are not available, as of August 9th the Fed still owns only 2,200 million of SDR
>> Certificates, so presumably the SDR entries on the ESF balance sheet have not changed much since
>> December 2000. To understand why the SDR Certificates are disappearing as well as where they are
>> going, more background information is necessary.
>Zunächst mal können SDRs selbstverständlich verschwinden, sobald sie zurückgezahlt werden, und da lautend auf US-$ eben in US-Dollar.
>> The US, like each IMF Member, owns SDR’s
>Die USA als Staat besitzen keine SDRs direkt, weil sie noch nie auf den IMF gezogen haben, sondern sie besitzen sie nur indirekt, anteilig über ihre Beteiligung am IMF. Von"owns" kann keinerlei Rede sein. Außerdem sind SDRs Forderungen und auch deshalb ist der Begriff"owns" bei Forderungen (auch indirekten) etwas ganz anderes als ein"owns" von Sachen. Der Mann wirft dauernd Sachanlagen mit Finanzanlagen durcheinander.
>>but is also responsible for the value of the SDR. Note
>> #4 of the ESF’s financial statement for 1999 explains it thus:"Its [the SDR’s] value as a reserve asset
>> derives, essentially, from the commitments of participants to hold and accept SDR’s and to honor various
>> obligations connected with its proper functioning as a reserve asset."
>> As of December 1998, the ESF owned 10,603 million SDR’s, but it had a liability for 6,899 million
>> SDR’s. What does this liability represent? Here’s what Schedule B of the Articles of Agreement of
>> the IMF says:"…0.888671 gram of fine gold shall be equivalent to one special drawing right." That
>> means 35 SDR’s equals one ounce of gold. So the US has the potential obligation as of December
>> 2000 - if required to make good on SDR’s issued - to pay to the IMF or its members 182.4 million
>> ounces of gold, some 69.7% of the US Gold Reserve.
>Da die ESF genauso funktioniert wie der IMF oder ähnlich auch die BIZ (als eine Art lender of last ressort im internationalen Geschäft) ist dies weiter kein Wunder.
>> That huge liability is pretty scary, but it is only a potential liability. Who knows whether the US will
>> ever be required to make good on it, or if it does, whether the US will default just like it defaulted in
>> 1933 on its obligation to pay US government bonds in gold and in 1971 on its obligation to redeem 35
>> dollars for one ounce of gold. Those are problems to worry about in the future.
>Diese Einschätzung teile ich auch. Aber sie hat überhaupt nichts mit einer nicht doppelten Verbuchung zu tun, sondern damit, dass auch ziemlich große"financial entities", in diesem Fall US Government stracks auf den Bankrott zu steuern. So ein großer Staatsbankrott ist ja geradezu das Schmankerl des Debitismus.
>>Of more immediate
>> concern is the decline in the SDR Certificates. What is that all about? To answer this question and
>> to solve this mystery of the disappearing SDR Certificates, we have to once again go back to basics.
>> Why are the SDR Certificates declining? The basic answer is quite simple. The SDR Certificates
>> MUST BE reduced if the ESF intends to use its SDR’s for any purpose, such as market intervention
>> or swaps. In other words, the SDR Certificates are a claim against the SDR’s, so the SDR
>> Certificate must be cancelled to remove any claims on the SDR before the SDR can be used by the
>> ESF. But the amount of SDR’s owned by the ESF hasn’t changed except briefly in early 1999, so it
>> seems that the SDR’s are not being used for any purpose.
>SDRs werden nicht für irgendwelche Zwecke gebraucht, sozuagen als netto vorhandenen Größe, sondern sie wurden gebraucht, eben um einen Bail-out für irgendwelche Staaten zu veranstalten.
>> So what I think has happened is that the SDR Certificates are themselves being used by the ESF.
>> Here’s what the IMF says about the use of SDR’s in swaps:"In accordance with Article XIX, Section
>> 2(c), the Fund prescribes that...a participant, by agreement with another participant, may engage in an
>> operation by which (a) one of the parties transfers [i.e., swaps] to the other party SDRs in exchange for
>> an equivalent amount of currency or another monetary asset, other than gold."
>> Thus, SDR’s cannot be swapped for gold,
>So ist es.
>>but there is no IMF regulation that prohibits the swapping of
>> SDR Certificates for gold.
>Das endlich ist ein Punkt, ein sehr wichtiger sogar. Die SDR certificates (Klartext: Buchungen, keine marktfähigen Titel) können zum alten Goldpreis eingefordert werden. Allerdings - siehe oben, von ihm selbst dargestellt - bei US Treasury.
>Was passiert dann also? Das Gold, das US Treasury (100 % Eigentum von US Government) hält, ändert nur seinen Standort: Es wandert an die ESF (100 % Eigentum von US Government). Und das war's.
>>So let’s take this observation to its logical conclusion, namely, that the ESF
>> and/or the Federal Reserve has been swapping SDR Certificates issued by the ESF for gold owned by
>> the Bundesbank,
>Dann hätte die ESF Gold bei der Bundesbank zum alten Kurs abholen müssen. Wäre dies geschehen, hätte die Bundesbank Gold zum alten Kurs abgegeben. Dass dies nicht der Fall gewesen sein kann, zeigt der Ausweis der Buba, wo die Goldposition stark aufgewertet wurde (siehe oben), was unmöglich gewesen wäre, wenn die ESF bei der Bundesbank Gold (physisch) zum alten Kurs abgeholt und in die USA transferiert hätte.
>>and presumably other central banks as well because we noted above that the
>> Second Amendment states that"members undertook to collaborate with the IMF and other
>> members" for the sake of international liquidity. So presumably, all IMF members are committed to
>> undertake any scheme that the US government may hatch.
>Nein. Denn die SDR certificates - siehe oben - können nur von US Treasury bedient werden. Die USA können nur mit sich selbst tricksen. Allerdings könnte die Möglichkeit, sofern sie angedeutet wurde, dass die ESF Gold zum alten Kurs bei anderen ZBs abzuholen versuchen wird, dazu geführt haben, dass viele ZBs ihr Gold lieber am freien Markt verkauft haben, damit die ESF mit Sicherheit ins Leere griffe.
>> This interpretation may also explain the strange response to Alan Greenspan by the Fed’s General
>> Counsel, Virgil Mattingly, who has"no clear recollection of exactly" what he said during the
>> January 31st, 1995 FOMC meeting, even though it seems most likely that the transcript accurately
>> records him as saying"gold swaps". In his June 8, 2001 note to Greenspan, Mattingly states:"I can
>> confirm that I have no knowledge of any ‘gold swaps’ by either the Federal Reserve or the ESF." Is
>> Mattingly being truthful? Yes, I think so, at least in regard to the precise choice of terms used in his
>> note.
>> Remember President Clinton’s exegesis on the definition of the word is? Lawyer Mattingly I think is
>> playing the same game. By this line of thinking, neither the Federal Reserve nor the ESF do ‘gold
>> swaps’. Instead, these transactions are probably called"SDR Certificate Swaps" or some other
>> similar term, although the FOMC participants may use the unofficial term"gold swaps" as a
>> short-hand moniker that is not only easier to say than the official name of the transaction, but also
>> has the added advantage of clearly communicating the net result of the transaction.
>> There is another important piece of corroborating evidence that SDR Certificates are being used by
>> the ESF to hide its gold transactions. ´
>Goldtransaktionen, wenn überhaupt, nur mit US Treasury, was aber den Goldbestand der USA um kein Gramm verändert, was allerdings - und dass ist nun wirklich ein zentraler Punkt! - dazu führen kann, das die ESF die Stelle ist, die - nachdem sie die ca. 70 % Gold von US Treasury abgeholt hat, siehe oben - das Gold selbst völlig neu bewerten kann.
>US Treasury kann das nicht, da an die 42,22 $-Klausel gebunden.
><font color="FF0000">Dann hätten wir also die ESF als Institution, die insgeheim eine kommende Extrem-Goldaufwertung vorbereiten und veranstalten könnte, mit all den Folgen und Möglichkeiten, die hier oft genug gepostet wurden.</font>
>>When several months ago I first read the audited financial
>> statement of the ESF, I was struck by a peculiar phrase in footnote #4, which in addition to
>> considerable explanatory text also provided a table of SDR purchases and sales during the year. The
>> text stated that these purchases and sales were"equivalent of SDR’s". Therefore, I concluded that
>> if they were"equivalent of SDR’s", SDR’s were not actually being used in the transaction. But I
>> wondered, if they weren’t SDR’s, then what were they? We don’t know for sure what they are, but
>> they are probably SDR Certificate transactions - not SDR’s, but only their"equivalent".
>> Let’s put the size of these transactions into perspective. As of December 2000, the ESF owned 10,539
>> million SDR’s, against which it has issued 2,200 million SDR Certificates. Therefore, 8,338 million
>> SDR’s are potentially ‘in play’, but we can refine this number given that it is the SDR Certificates
>> and not the SDR’s that are important.
>> The ESF by law cannot issue more SDR Certificates than it has SDR’s. The largest amount of SDR
>> Certificates outstanding was 10,168 million in December 1995, a significant date because I have
>> contended all along that government actions that have depressed the gold price began in 1996, which
>> is the same year that the SDR Certificates began to decline. From this peak to the present, the SDR
>> Certificates have been reduced by 7,968 million. Given that there are 35 SDR per ounce of gold, this
>> reduction in the SDR Certificate account equates to 227.7 million ounces, or 87% of the US Gold
>> Reserve.
>Also 87 %. Und hier wird's endlich interessant!
>>Does this mean that 87% of the US Gold Reserve has already been swapped? I don’t have
>> the answer to that question, but I would like to make four important observations that do in fact
>> suggest that substantially all of the US Gold Reserve has been put into play.
>> First, note on the accompanying table the dates when the SDR Certificates began to decline rapidly.
>> From 10,168 million in December 1995, the SDR Certificate account declined to 8,200 million by
>> June 1999, or 19% over 3½ years. Now look at the decline beginning in the third quarter of 1999,
>> which corresponds with the Washington Agreement signed in September of that year. In only 18
>> months the SDR Certificate account declined by 73%. Was there a panic to get gold into the market
>> after the Washington Agreement to keep the gold price from rising?
>Das mit der Manipulation des Goldmarktes muss man völlig rauslassen, weil es zum Kern der Sache selbst nichts beiträgt. Denn wenn die ESF ohnehin weltweit ihre SDR Certificates in Gold zu 42,22 $ tauschen kann bzw. hätte tauschen können (siehe oben), muss niemand den Goldpreis nach unten manipulieren. Es wäre sogar kontraproduktiv, da der Spielraum einer Höherbewertung des dann bei der ESF liegenden ehemaligen Treasury-Goldes im Rahmen einer (Teil-)-Sanierung des US-Staates beschränkt würde.
>Die Vermutung, dass einzelne"schwächere" (oder schlauere) ZBs ihr Gold gegeben haben, was unstreitig der Fall war, direkt - und ohne Hintenrum-Mätzchen à la swaps - könnte (siehe oben) ganz schlicht diese sein: Die ZBs haben ihr Gold gegeben, um einer Abforderung ("politischer Druck" aus Washington?) durch die ESF zuvor zu kommen.
>Anderseits können die Notenbanken, die ihr Gold behalten haben, ihrerseits auf der Lauer liegen und warten, was die ESF machen wird (Goldaufwertung). Um dann mitzuiehen. Die Bundesbank könnte dann ihren Gold-Passivposten auflösen und direkt als"zusätzlichen Gewinn" an den Bund ausschütten, um diesem behilflich zu sein.
>>This evidence sure does
>> support that conclusion.
>> Second, readers will recall how the US Treasury changed in September 2000 the classification of that
>> portion of the US Gold Reserve in West Point to"Custodial Gold". It is interesting and probably
>> meaningful to note that this change occurred in the fiscal year ending September 30th in which
>> there was a substantial decline in the SDR Certificates.
>> In"Behind Closed Doors" I speculated that the reason for this reclassification was that the Mint’s
>> accountants or its new director realized that it was misleading to continue calling this swapped metal
>> as"Gold Bullion Reserve". This logic may also explain why more recently, the entire US Gold
>> Reserve was reclassified as"Deep Storage Gold". If 87% of the US Gold Reserve has indeed been
>> swapped, it may have been too obvious an admission by the US Treasury to reclassify nearly the
>> entire US Gold Reserve as"Custodial Gold". Therefore, to give some semblance of proper
>> accounting while not totally divulging the truth, the Treasury came up with the half-baked term
>>"Deep Storage Gold". Further, it was my thinking that the Treasury, taking a lesson from lawyers
>> Clinton and Mattingly, probably defined this term in some obscure Treasury accounting manual.
>Dies liefe nach wie vor darauf hinaus, dass entweder US Treasury oder die ESF das Gold physisch halten. Die ESF kann es nur leichter aufwerten, was der Treasury verwehrt ist.
>> What was a speculation on my part is now supported by a letter dated August 7, 2001, to Richard
>> May from John P. Mitchell, Deputy Director of the US Mint. Mitchell states:"The gold in West
>> Point was not reclassified - it was renamed to better conform to our audited financial statements."
>> Despite providing five pages of supporting material with his letter, Mitchell does not explain how this
>> ‘renaming’ enables the Treasury to"better conform to [its] audited financial statements." The
>> logical conclusion is that this better conformation arises because the strict application of prudent
>> accounting principles no longer allows the Treasury to use the term"US Gold Reserves" because
>> more than half - and possibly 87% of it - has been swapped.
>Swaps hin oder her - es läuft letztlich immer darauf hinaus, dass das US Gold bei der ESF landet und diese dann die"große Nummer" starten kann - das muss allerdings über Nacht geschehen.
>>Given that the Treasury does not want
>> to use the more accurate but alarming term"Custodial Gold", the US Gold Reserve has therefore
>> instead become"Deep Storage Gold", allowing the Treasury to remain within the letter if not the
>> spirit of the principle of full disclosure.
>> The third observation takes the above changes and explains them in weights of gold. The 6,000
>> million drop in SDR Certificates from June 1999 to December 2000 represents 171.4 million ounces,
>> or 28.6 million ounces (888.7 tonnes) per quarter. That’s a supply of about 3500 tonnes per year,
>> which added to 2500 tonnes new mine production implies an annual demand of 6000 tonnes for the
>> period of time after the Washington Agreement. Is this number reasonable?
>Dies setzt voraus, dass die ESF zunächst sich SDRs besorgt, in welcher Form auch immer und dann darauf die SDR certificates ausstellt und diese dann in Gold zum alten Kurs bei US Treasury abholt. Die natürliche Grenze des Erwerbs, womit auch immer, von SDRs liegt im Gesamtgoldbestand von US Treasury, der bei den bekannten ca. 8150 t liegt. Mehr SDRs zu erwerben, um sie zu zertifizieren, macht keinen Sinn - es sei denn die ESF könnte Gold auch bei anderen ZBs abholen.
>> In my opinion it is reasonable. Noted gold analyst Frank Veneroso contends that annual gold
>> demand has been running about 5000 tonnes, but this number reflects normal market conditions.
>> After the Washington Agreement and the price spike, the market was anything but normal. Even
>> though fabrication demand fell during that period, investment and monetary demand for gold
>> soared. So it is not unreasonable to expect that more than 1000 tonnes of newly supplied gold from
>> government dishoarding was needed in the months after the Washington Agreement to turn the
>> price back from the +$320 level reached at that time.
>Das Ganze hat mit"neuem Gold" nichts zu tun, das die SDR certificates nicht bei den Minen zum alten Kurs in Gold abgeholt werden können.
>> The fourth and final observation relates to a point I made in the last newsletter. I noted how
>> earmarked gold has been shipped from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at a rate of at least
>> 40 tonnes per month beginning in September 2000, while also stating this new"dishoarding from the
>> NY Fed smacks of desperation". The above table confirms this conclusion.
>> The SDR Certificate account has not changed since the 4th quarter of 2000. With only 2,200 million
>> remaining, the SDR Certificate account, while not depleted, is near rock bottom and one must ask
>> how much more gold the US government is willing to throw at the market?
>Das ist alles Kokolores. Warum sollte US Government Gold auf den Markt werfen - jetzt US Treasury Gold? Erstens würde damit der Spielraum (Volumen) für eine Goldaufwertung begrenzt und zweitens wäre das Gold dann schnell in privaten Horten verschwunden, wo es nur schwer aufzutreiben ist. Schließlich bekäme US Government für sein Gold ohnehin nur Dollar, die es sich leichter durch zusätzliche Verschuldung besorgen kann - auch wenn das Zinsverpflichtungen nach sich zieht.
>>I don’t think the answer
>> to that question is"all of it", so essentially there is no more US gold available for swapping.
>> Consequently, with these SDR Certificate swaps eliminated as a source of supply, another source of
>> gold had to be located to fill the gap between supply and demand.
>Dann müsste US Treasury seinerseits nicht Gold verkaufen, sondern kaufen! Dies, damit möglichst viel Gold letztlich bei der ESF landet, um der (möglicherweise) kommenden Goldaufwertung noch mehr Volumen zu geben.
>> In the last newsletter I suggested that the IMF is this new source. That’s just a supposition on my
>> part, but it seems logical that IMF gold is being shipped out of the FRB of NY. The quantities being
>> shipped are so large, the gold must be coming from a large hoard, and the IMF has, on paper at
>> least, one of the world’s largest. But regardless of whose it is, this gold is being shipped at a rate
>> greater than gold is being mined each month in South Africa, the world’s largest producer. That volume
>> of shipments smacks of desperation to get gold into the market, and the reason is clear. Because the
>> SDR Certificate swaps have ended, a new source of gold supply is needed to keep the gold price from
>> exploding upward.
>Das eine hat mit dem anderen überhaupt nichts zu tun. Wenn ich Gold aufwerten will (und was sollten die ESF-Aktionen sonst für einen Sinn machen, falls es es überhaupt einen Sinn hinter dem Ganzen gibt?), dann ist es völlig egal, von welchem Kurs aus.
>> In conclusion, it is becoming very obvious that the US government has put itself in an incredible
>> pickle. But we’ve seen this happen before.
>> In the 1960’s the US government dishoarded over 9000 tonnes of gold rather than admit that the
>> dollar had been debased and was no longer worth only $35 per ounce. Now it appears that perhaps as
>> much as 7,000 tonnes (227.7 million ounces) has been swapped for essentially the same purpose - to
>> intervene in the market to fight the truth,
>Nein, ganz und gar nicht. Wenn ich keine Parität mehr halten muss, ist es völlig egal, was der Preis am freien Markt macht. Die Vorstellung, man wolle Gold"klein" halten, damit nur ja niemand auf die Idee komme, die"großen" Forderungen wären oder würden wackelig, hat mir noch nie eingeleuchtet.
>Was mir aber einleuchten würde, ist ein Grand Design mit Hilfe der ESF. Dazu hat der Artikel interessante Hinweise gegeben. Der Rest sind Guessings und das mit der"Nichtverbuchung" ist Schrott.
>>rather than admit that the dollar has again become very
>> debased relative to gold. ¤
>> jamesturk@goldmoney.com
>Schade, Reinhard, dass Du Dir nicht die Mühe gemacht hast, den Beitrag so (oder gern auch anders) zu analysieren. Vom reinen Reinstellen von Texten hat hier im Forum kein Mensch was. Hinweise auf Links und Links zu Links bringen keinen einzigen von uns weiter.
>Was uns weiter bringt, sind Diskussionen und durchdachte Analysen des Gebotenen, egal wie gut das Durchdenken selbst dann war. Aber das kann dann eben weiter diskutiert werden.
>Ich bin dem Forum sehr dankbar für viele Beiträge. Aber mal eben schnell einen Tritt austeilen und sich dann argumentativ zu verabschieden ist keinerlei konstruktives Mitarbeiten hier.
>Ein schwer enttäuschter
>d.

Die Goldverkäufe in England z.B benennen nie den tatsächlichen Käufer.Ich glaube daß das beschriebene ESF diejenige Institution ist die das angeblich auf den Markt geworfene Gold einsammelt und die jeweilige ZB des Geberstaates eine formale Anteilsnotierung für den neuen sich in Vorbereitung befindenden Goldpreis nach Aufwertung hat.
Das erklärt auch warum die Amis sauer auf Länder reagieren die selbst Gold einsammeln wie z.B. Indien.
Wir schaffen es doch so langsam Licht in das Dunkel zu bringen.
Aber zu der Sache Flowtex:Daß so etwas nicht bei der Bundesbank passieren kann dafür wollte ich meinen Kopf nicht zu weit vorstrecken.
Im Fall Flowtex scheint die Politik stark verstrickt zu sein.Scheinbar haben sogar die Finanzämter gewußt um den Fall aber wahrscheinlich war man geil auf die Steuer der immensen Gewinne.Das heißt der Staat hat mit Beute gemacht.
Dann zur Leuna - Affäre,da verschwanden einfach ganze Akten rein zufällig.
Derjenige Journalist welcher hier recherchieren sollte endet wie Barschel.
Hätte einer gédacht daß ganze Aktenberge verschwinden obwohl das Thema schon beim Regierungswechsel heiß war.
NIEMALS.
Und jetzt zur Bundesbank.Daß dort richtig gezählt wird sehe ich noch ein.
Aber im Falle des Betrugs werden auch dort die Inventurzettel verschwinden.
Die ganze politische Kaste ist garantiert ein Sumpf und eine einzige Erpressung macht jeden gefügig wenn er sich irgendwo nicht ganz einwandfrei verhalten hat.
Auch diese Kaste kommt in Geldnot und nimmt was sie kriegen kann.
Wir werden Dinge erleben von denen wir nicht im Traum daran gedacht hätten daß so etwas möglich ist.
Wenns herauskommt gibts eine Standardantwort wie jetzt die Mauerschützen:Wir hatten keine andere Wahl!
Herzlicher Gruß EUKLID
So langsam ist das schwierige Puzzle in einem Stadium wo man merkt es klärt sich schnell auf.Mit jedem eingesetzten Stück wird die Geschwindigkeit bis zur Fertigstellung erhöht.Am Anfang ist es grausam schwierig bis man ANsatzpunkte findet.

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Hallo,

Der Artikel von Turk ist ein Schmarrn, kein"wirkliches Dynamit" (Reinhard in 76058). Es ehrt den Dottore, dass er ihn analysiert, obwohl er lediglich reingestellt war.

Es ist der zweite Artikel des Autors (damals:"Buba-Gold-ist-weggeswappt", anscheinend war es 55855), der dünn begründet ist.

Eine weiterer Kommentar des Artikels findet sich beim Link unten.

Gruß, Dimi
<ul> ~ http://www.gold-eagle.com/editorials_01/tlaga081601.html</ul>
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