vwd:

Die Hightech-Werte konnten auf breiter Front zulegen, nachdem sich Barton
Biggs, der Technologie-Guru von Morgan Stanley, positiv zu dem Marktsegment
geäußert hatte. Biggs hatte erklärt, es sei"reiner Wahnsinn", wenn jede
Erholung im Technologiebereich sofort wieder durch Gewinnmitnahmen zunichte
gemacht würden. Die Anleger sollten mehr Durchhaltevermögen zeigen, empfahl Biggs.

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> Die Anleger sollten mehr Durchhaltevermögen zeigen, empfahl Biggs.
Es ist eine Frechheit so etwas zu verlangen. Bei 7000 Punkten im Nemax sagte man, bald sei das Einstiegsniveau erreicht. Bei 5000 Punkten meinte man Aktien seien billig und es muß ja wieder nach oben gehen. Bei 4000 Punkten war der Nemax ja angeblich extrem unterbewertet. Bei 3000 dachte man:"NEIN das kann ja jetzt unmöglich noch weiter runter gehen" und bei 2000 kamen die gleichen Durchhalteparolen bevor der Nemax All Share <font color="#FF0000">von diesem Niveau</font> dann nochmal auf rund ein Drittel zusammenschrumpfte.

Diese Durchhalteparolen sind typisch im Anfangsstadium von längerdauernden Bärenmärkten wie z.B. auch 1929/1930. Sie sind ein letzter Hilfeschrei und der noch immer sitzenden Glaube an die Rückkehr der Hausse.


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Er sollte sich einmal die woechentlichen Kommentare seines Chef-Oekonomen, Steven Roach durchlesen!

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seit wann ist biggs der tech guru von stanley?.. ist doch marryyy meeeker
na egal.. hier der original text:

The latest views of Morgan Stanley Strategists and Economists worldwide
Topic Analyst/Ext
Global Strategy Barton Biggs (New York) 762-7150
Rejuvenation Takes Time
I still believe the selling panic last September after the
Attack probably marked the primary lows of this bear
market. However, the celebration currently going on is both
excessive and premature. I think there is still a lot of
“event” risk out there, and I don’t believe in the V shaped
recovery in the economy or profits. (I am not as euphoric as
some about a V in Afghanistan either.) Most earnings
estimates for next year are too optimistic for a low-nominal-
GDP world. The consensus believes monetary and fiscal
stimulus will work, and that this cycle is no different from
its last two or three predecessors. Greenspan’s halo,
although tarnished, is still intact. By contrast, I believe that
lower interest rates and liquidity won’t revive the American
consumer, who is wounded and will remain impaired for
several years. Rejuvenation takes time. The bust we have
had is not commensurate with the size of the boom. Steve
Roach is right. The world economy is still deteriorating and
there is no pricing power. The equity markets haven’t got
that message yet.
It is pure madness that the tech bubble is being inflated
again. Orders appear to have finally stabilized, but
medium-sized, marginal technology names are selling at 8
to 10 times sales and 50 times earnings. There has still not
been a institutional or public capitulation, and stocks in
America in particular are not cheap, although there are some
bargains in other parts of the world. I still look for a test of
the September lows in the months to come. History teaches
that most primary bear market bottoms experience a retest
and that the final low comes not with an intense selling
climax but rather after selling has been exhausted.


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>Er sollte sich einmal die woechentlichen Kommentare seines Chef-Oekonomen, Steven Roach durchlesen!

und das schreibt roach heute:

China feels the global heat. Chinese export growth has
gone from 28% in 2000 to just +0.1% on a year-over-year
basis in October 2001; this has taken real GDP growth
down from 8.0% in 2000 to 7.0% in 3Q01.

Less exposed to the IT cycle. China’s export growth
compression has been limited compared with ASEAN
economies -- mainly because it is far less exposed to IT
exports than its Asian neighbors. IT exports to the US made
up only about 30% of total Chinese exports in 2000 --
about half the 50% to 80% exposure elsewhere in Asia.
Exposure to the consumer. Consumer-type products
account for fully 50% of total Chinese exports, three to four
times the shares in other Asian economies; the post-
September 11 capitulation of the American consumer
suggests that Chinese export comparisons are about to head
into negative territory.

GDP growth to test 7% threshold. Barring any new
sources of economic growth, further slippage on the export
side of the equation could push overall Chinese GDP
growth below the all-important 7% threshold for a while;
the downside should be limited to about 6.5%.
Two key consequences. With social stability concerns
paramount in China, a sustained growth shortfall may mean
the economy does not absorb all the jobs lost through
restructuring of state-owned enterprises. Sub-7% growth
could also exacerbate the recent tilt back to the cusp of
deflation.

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Global: Recession Verdict
Stephen Roach (New York)
The verdict, itself, was hardly a surprise. By the time the
Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) convened its formal deliberations
in late November, few would doubt that
America was already in recession. But the verdict came
with an important twist. The academics also determined
that this contraction began a full six months before the
terrorist attacks of 11 September. There’s great significance
to this finding. It underscores the unique character
of this recession, as well the unusual dynamics that will
shape its eventual recovery.
By designating March 2001 as a business cycle peak, the
NBER seems to be validating the diagnosis that I have
long been sympathetic to — namely, that this recession
stems importantly from the post-bubble aftershocks now
afflicting the US economy. Sure, there were other forces
at work in setting the stage for this downturn — especially
the impacts of sharply rising energy prices during late
1999 and 2000. But most of the other proximate causes of
this recession — the lagged effects of Fed tightening from
mid-1999 to mid-2000, a wrenching contraction in corporate
profits, a collapse in IT-led capital spending, and rising
layoffs — are all traceable to the bubble-induced excesses
of the US economy.
The impact of the asset bubble on the real side of the US

economy is not that difficult to discern. In the midst of an
unprecedented five years of 25% annualized appreciation
in the S&P 500 over the 1995-99 interval, both consumers
and businesses went to excess. Consumers mistakenly
believed that the stock market had become a new and
permanent source of saving. As a result, they were perfectly
content to implement a critical change in saving
tactics — shifting the mix of saving away from the paycheck
and into the “automatic” returns of the mutual fund.
At the same time, businesses became convinced that the
capital markets would generously reward those who spent
the most on new technologies. And so the IT-spending
binge took on a life of its own, aided and abetted at the
end by the ultimate mania of New-Economy hype —
Nasdaq 5000 and the e-commerce frenzy of B2B and
B2C. Meanwhile, a saving short US economy had little
choice but to turn to foreign capital in order to fund this
investment splurge. The result was a massive and unprecedented
current-account deficit that not only left the
United States overly dependent on foreign financing but
also in the position to export its bubble-induced excesses
to the rest of the world. America was living beyond its
means, and the world wanted a piece of the action.
America has only begun the long march of purging the
excesses that built up during the asset bubble. This recession
initiated the process but is unlikely to complete it.
Asset bubbles always pop. Alas, this one was no different.
And once it popped, it was only a matter of time before
the cards in the real economy came tumbling down.
That’s what this recession is really all about. All it took
was a bit of a Fed-engineered slowdown from the hypergrowth
of the late 1990s. Rapid spending on IT and
white-collar headcount suddenly morphed into bloated
cost structures, unleashing an extraordinary squeeze on
corporate profit margins. Cost-cutting was the only way
out — first capital and eventually labor. With the benefit
of hindsight, it was this strain of post-bubble cost cutting
that sowed the seeds of this recession. It’s a time-honored
process that is as old as the business cycle itself.
And it’s far from over. The metrics I use to gauge America’s
bubble-induced excesses are hardly flashing the allclear
sign. The capacity overhang has hardly been eliminated.
The capital spending share of nominal GDP was
still 11.9% in 3Q01 — down from the cycle high of a little
over 13% but well above trough readings of about 10% hit
in earlier downturns. The personal saving rate has moved
up from close to “zero,” but at 2.4% in 4Q01, our estimates
leave little doubt of the shortfall from pre-bubble
norms of close to 8%. And while the current account
deficit has narrowed from a record 4.5% of GDP, at an
estimated 3.8% in 4Q01, it remains excessive by any standards
of the past. Nor can America’s external imbalance
be expected to narrow in a synchronous global recession;
weakness in the rest of the world means any pullback in
imports will be matched by a comparable reduction in
exports.
In short, America has only begun the long march of purging
the excesses that built up during the asset bubble.
This recession initiated the process but is unlikely to complete
it. To the extent a post-recession US economy is
still dealing with the legacy of a devastating asset bubble,
there will be significant offsets to the classic forces of
cyclical recovery. Aggressive policy stimulus notwithstanding,
these powerful headwinds won’t die down easily.
That’s not to say economic recovery won’t occur —
it’s just that it seems unlikely to conform to the bubblefree
outcomes of the past. It’s been more than a year and
a half since the Nasdaq bubble popped. I continue to be
amazed at what little attention this event gets in shaping
expectations of the US economy — either on Wall Street
or in Washington. The message from the NBER is a real
wake-up call.


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