-->Krise? Welche Krise? - Zum Beispiel diese....!
Über die US-Wirtschaft schreibt der Economist vom 14. Juni 2003:"Die US-Wirtschaft steckt bis zum Hals in unausgelasteten Kapazitäten. (...) Bei den massenhaften Überkapazitäten ist ein andauernder Investitionsboom unwahrscheinlich. Noch beunruhigender ist die Frage, wie lange die amerikanischen Verbraucher die Nachfrage noch halten können. Die Verschuldung über Konsumentenkredite steigt dramatisch." (Seite 45f.)
Unter der Überschrift „Aussterben der Auto-Riesen“ beschreibt dieselbe Ausgabe des Economist eine sterbenskranke US-Autoindustrie:
„Der amerikanische Automarkt boomt mit mehr als 16 Millionen Neuzulassungen im Jahr.... Aber alle Anzeichen künden von ziemlicher bitteren Zeiten für Detroit. Wenn es so weitergeht, geht die gesamte Autobranche den Bach runter - vorne weg Ford, der von den Autoriesen am tiefsten im Treibsand steckt. (...)

Zugegeben, schon einmal hatte man diese amerikanische Kernbranche für tot erklärt, aber sie war wieder ins Leben zurückgekehrt.
Chrysler erreichte die 80er Jahre nur dank einer Bundesbürgschaft. Auch Ford schrammte zu Beginn der 80er nur knapp am Bankrott vorbei. Ihm kam die US-Regierung mit Importbeschränkungen gegen japanische Konkurrenten zu Hilfe.
Chrysler war zu Beginn der 90er Jahre in einer ähnlich schlechten Lage, bevor es an Daimler-Benz verkauft wurde.
1991 hatten die drei US-Konzerne Schulden von zusammen 7 Milliarden Dollar.

Von General Motors erzählt man, dass es im Jahr 1992 nur um Minuten vom Bankrott entfernt war. Damals starrten die Bosse von GM auf ihr Faxgerät und warteten auf die eine Herabstufung ihrer Kreditrankings, wodurch die Firma in die Zahlungsunfähigkeit gestürzt wäre. Die Herabstufung kam nicht und General Motors erholte sich wieder. (...)
In den 90er Jahren profitierte die amerikanische Autoindustrie von einer boomenden Aktienbörse, die ihre wachsende Ausgaben- und Schuldenlast für Betriebsrenten reduzierte, während sie Personal abbauten, um ihre Produktivität zu steigern.
In der heutigen Zeit ist kein Rettungsanker mehr in Sicht. (...)

Der Chef von General Motors, Rick Wagoner, hatte nach dem 11. September mit Preisabschlägen und zinsfreien Krediten reagiert, um die Autoverkäufe in einer Zeit der schwächelnde Wirtschaftslage am Rollen zu halten. Nach inzwischen zwei Jahren sind die Preisabschläge immer noch in Kraft und es ist keine wirtschaftliche Wende zum Besseren in Sicht. (...)
Ford musste seine Preisabschläge und sonstigen Verkaufsanreize in diesem Frühjahr um die Hälfte steigern - mit der Wirkung, dass Ford für jeden verkauften Personenwagen 3.208 Dollar zuzahlt. (...) Seit Mitte der 90er Jahre sind die Listenpreise für Neuwagen jedes Jahr real um 1% gefallen. (...)
Auch der europäische Automarkt ist übersättigt und man rechnet mit einem Verkaufsrückgang von 10% im laufenden Jahr. (Seite 66)

Die amerikanische Autoindustrie steckt tief in der Klemme. Sie hat 20% mehr Produktionskapazität als nötig.
Die drei großen japanischen Autobauer (Toyota, Nissan und Honda) produzieren und verkaufen in den USA die ganze Bandbreite ihrer Modelle ohne große Preisabschläge.
Die normale Reaktion der Industrie angesichts solcher Überkapazitäten wäre ein Schrumpfungsprozess mit Verlagerung des Schwerpunkts auf den Profit statt auf den Umsatz. Aber in Detroit ist nichts normal. (...)

General Motors hat ungedeckte Verpflichtungen von 19 Milliarden Dollar für Betriebsrenten - das entspricht seinem gesamten gegenwärtigen Marktwert. (...)
General Motors, mit 2,5 Betriebsrentnern pro Beschäftigten, muss für jedes produzierte Auto mit 1000 Dollar zusätzlichen Kosten für Renten und Krankenkosten der Ehemaligen rechnen. (...)

In den letzten beiden Jahren half die US-Regierung den notleidenden Landwirten, den Stahlwerken und der privaten Luftfahrt mit Subventionen und Importbeschränkungen. Es ist nur noch eine Frage der Zeit, bis auch ein Autokonzern erwägt, die flexiblen US-Regeln bei Zahlungsunfähigkeit zu nutzen, um seine Verpflichtungen für Betriebsrenten loszuwerden, wie es schon verschiedene Stahlfirmen und Luftfahrtgesellschaften getan haben. (...)

Die Zeichen stehen auf Sturm.
Kann Detroit dem Tod ein drittes Mal von der Schippe springen? Die Aussichten stehen schlecht. (...)
Das Ende der amerikanischen Autokonzerne ist nicht länger nur eine Schreckensvision, es wird von Tag zu Tag mehr eine reale Möglichkeit.“

Aus: „The Economist, 14.06.03: 11 und 65ff.
Ãœbersetzung: Wal Buchenberg, 15.06.2003.

-->Danke für die Übersetzung und fürs Posten.

Die regelmässigen Bonitätsabstufungen bei GM und F werden zur Zeit doch gar nicht zur Kenntnis genommen! Es ist schon Irre!
Die Anleihen von F und GM sind eigentlich schon Junk.


Yet, corporate bond investors say the broad credit market remains largely unfazed by the problems facing these key credit market issuers.

"The market will listen to the news but not for long," said Gary Zeltzer, chief investment officer at Meadowbrook Asset Management in Uniondale, New York."It will punish GM for the day but, next week, it will be fine.

The strength in the overall corporate bond market is being supported by a desperate search for yield, Zeltzer said.

http://biz.yahoo.com/djus/030613/1252000592_1.html

Oder hier:
Yield rises on GMAC bonds after Moody's downgrade
Friday June 13, 9:12 am ET


LONDON, June 13 (Reuters) - Yields on bonds of General Motors Acceptance Corp., the financing arm of U.S. auto giant General Motors (NYSE:GM - News), rose on Friday after Moody's downgraded its rating on the company.
A dealer in London said GMAC's 6.125 percent bond due 2007 was yielding 247 basis points over German government bonds, 10 basis points more on the day. Meanwhile, dollar-denominated debt was hit harder, with a 2008 bond yielding 295 basis points over Treasuries, 15 basis points more on the day.

"Some tried to push bids 20 to 25 basis points wider, but there were no offers, so we're back to around 10 wider," the dealer said of the euro debt.

Moody's said it had cut GM's rating to Baa1 from A3, and GMAC's rating to A3 from A2.

http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/030613/markets_bonds_gmacbond_1.html

Ich lese gern den"Backseat Driver" Kommentar von Jerry Flint"FORBES"
http://www.forbes.com/columnists/col_archive.jhtml?author=jerry+and+flint&aname=Jerry+Flint&date=2003

Kurz seine Meinung zu den Problemchen!
http://www.forbes.com/columnists/2003/03/10/cz_jf_0310flint.html
Backseat Driver
Ford Tough
Jerry Flint, 03.10.03, 6:15 PM ET

Is Ford going bankrupt?
The story was reported this past Friday in the Daily Telegraph of London. Understand, London newspapers have been having trouble keeping readers interested since Diana died and Fergie started wearing tops.

So let's cut to the chase.

Ford Motor (nyse: F - news - people ) is not going bankrupt now or in the near future. While nothing is impossible, I rank the chance as something less than the possibility that aliens from outer space--all resembling Pamela Anderson--will land from rocket ships to seize Earth, and that Saddam Hussein will win his war against the U.S. in a mano-a-mano arm-wrestling contest with President George W. Bush......

I'm not saying that the pension and future health care costs aren't a problem. A $7 billion obligation isn't a joke. Over the years, either profits or some assets have to be pushed into the fund. That's what General Motors is doing right now to beef up its fund. Of course, it would help if the stock market turned around.

Companies just don't go bankrupt because of underfunded pension funds. What counts is if the company is successfully selling its product and making money. If it is, the pension problems get solved.

Detroit automakers--Ford and GM--are old-economy companies. They aren't Enron or WorldCom, and they don't exist in smoke and dreams. The car companies own factories that make real products. The accounting isn't aimed at pushing up the stock to trick investors. I'm talking about honest companies run by honest men. Yes, they make mistakes. But when they do screw up, they--and you, dear reader--hear it from me.

Look at General Motors, which was in worse shape than Ford and has been turning around its U.S. business. The same thing will happen to Ford.

-->Backseat Driver
The Union Is Strong, The Automakers Are Weak
Jerry Flint, 03.26.03, 11:00 AM ET

NEW YORK - A few weeks ago I explained how the growth in non-union assembly plants was creating problems both for domestic manufacturers and the United Auto Workers. Detroit faces another headache: Contracts with the UAW expire in mid-September. This year there will be plenty of tension between the two sides.



The almost-ritual negotiations formally start 60 days before the old contract is due to expire. July 17 this year will be a moment for opening-day speeches and photo ops. As the contract deadline nears, a target company will be picked, and then the serious bargaining starts with that company. The other manufacturers are put on the back burner. If there is no contract, there may be a strike at the target.

Or there may not be a strike. If a contract seems close, bargaining can continue without a strike. And it's common to have a limited strike over what are called"local working conditions" even after a national contract is reached. Anything can happen.

I recall a year when nothing happened. That was in the terrible recession of 1958. Back then contracts expired in the spring, but the car business in 1958 was so bad that Walter Reuther, the UAW president, kept his people on the job for months without a contract."We'll rock and roll all summer," he said. Reuther waited a few months for business to recover before he put on the pressure.

Who will be the initial UAW target? Whoever signs the contract first sets the pattern for the rest of the industry. This year, General Motors (nyse: GM - news - people ) wants the honor. Ford Motor (nyse: F - news - people ) usually is softer, and the new UAW president, Ron Gettelfinger, came out of the Ford bargaining unit. Michael Bruynesteyn and John Tomlinson, analysts at Prudential Financial, think that Chrysler (nyse: DCX - news - people ) will be the target. But frankly, none of the automakers are terribly tough. The union usually gets everything it really wants.

What does the union want?

For starters, it wants to keep everything its got. That wonderful pay (the average assembler earns $60,000 a year) and those company-paid 100% medical benefits.


The union won't want to give up any of its pension programs, with extra early retirement money, and 65% benefits for a retiree's surviving spouse. And don't forget the guarantees of pay forever if a plant closes and a worker can't be transferred to a nearby facility. There's profit sharing, too, plus the 67 paid holidays during the current four-year contract, exclusive of vacation time.

The union will want another signing bonus. In 1999 each union member got $1,350. And this time around the union wants help from GM, Ford and Chrysler to force suppliers to go union.

What do the companies want?

Relief. In the last contract they foolishly promised not to close any plants. Forget that. Even if annual unit sales stay around 16 million units, foreign manufacturers are adding too much capacity in spanking-new non-union plants. Some factories must be closed. So the manufacturers will fight hard to get some concessions from the union on closing facilities.

The manufacturers would like some kind of co-pay for medical benefits, but victory here will be difficult, more likely impossible, despite the climbing costs. The union will also fight hard to keep all its retirement benefits.

Who usually wins these battles? The union.

The workers can do a six-week strike standing on their heads. They are older and their houses are paid down or paid off, as are their cars and the boats. Their spouses often work. In fact, these laborers have been working so hard that I'm sure that many of them would welcome a few weeks off for a strike. Fall in Michigan is a great time to take a vacation, paint the house or go hunting.

It's the company that can't stand a strike. Strikes can delay new model launches and cause significant financial losses. Even worse, whichever company is hit with a strike may lose business permanently to the others still working.

Understand, the UAW is a good union and a democratic union. Its leaders are elected in honest elections. But you don't get elected by promising blood, sweat, toil and tears--not in America today. You don't get elected by cutting pensions or medical coverage. Hey, do you know of any congressional member running on a platform of cutting Medicare or raising your taxes?

The UAW has a new president this year. Traditionally the new man has to prove in his first test that he's no pushover, that he's tough.

You may ask,"How does this jerk Flint know this?" Let me say that I was born in Detroit and worked in that town for The Detroit News, The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. I covered UAW-industry bargaining every year from 1958 to 1970. Later I was the chief labor writer for The New York Times.

I knew Walter Reuther and Leonard Woodcock and Douglas Fraser, the great UAW leaders, good men and fine Americans, too. Reuther was a great phrasemaker:"Too old to work, too young to die" or"This union is about more than another nickel in the paycheck."

But that was then. This is now.

Detroit isn't in trouble because of the unions. But the unions are part of the problem. The question to be answered in these negotiations is this: Will they be part of the solution?

<ul> ~ The Union Is Strong, The Automakers Are Weak </ul>