Hallo,

Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?

ciao!
SchlauFuchs

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>Hallo,
>Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?
>ciao!
>SchlauFuchs


The Privateer

2001 Volume Late January Issue Number 416


GLOBAL REPORT


IT HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN


At the moment, the Greenspan Fed is"re-liquefying" the U.S.
financial system at breakneck speed. This can be seen from
the fact that the U.S. M-3 money stock has increased by
$US 112 Billion in three weeks!

The Investment Company Institute reported that over the
same period, U.S. Money Market Funds reported increases in
fund assets of $US 67.6 Billion, the biggest rate of money
inflows seen in three years. From Trim Tabs came a report
that $US 15 Billion has flowed into equity funds.

It Always Begins With Currencies:

Globally, the most important thing to constantly keep an eye
on is currencies. They often break trends and reverse
direction long before stock markets follow. The U.S. Dollar
has now fallen by 17% against the Euro since November
2000. Just about the only currency the U.S. Dollar has not
fallen against is the Yen.

What comes next is the reaction of the stock market. U.S.
corporate chiefs are now looking at imports (not including oil)
becoming more expensive. After that, having to pay these
higher costs, they will look to raise prices and then they will
look at massive cost cuts to save money fast.

And all of this will inevitably lead to an earnings crash.

The process is already underway, but so far, the cheer squad
from Wall Street has managed to keep most people
(especially Americans) in the U.S. market. Europeans have
seen their currency recover, and are now looking hard at the
prospects of future U.S. earnings and not seeing any. They
have begun to sell out of the U.S. stock markets, but not in
any great volumes - yet.

Giving Credit Where Due:

The Privateer will certainly give credit to Mr Greenspan - for
being the cause and prime mover behind the biggest credit expansion in history. The facts are
these. Between the beginning of 1995 and the end of June 2000, the U.S. financial system
increased its debts by $US 4.15 TRILLION. U.S. corporate and private consumer debts increased
by $US 4.75 TRILLION. In sum, the"private" sector of the U.S. economy increased its debts by
$US 8.9 TRILLION in 5.5 years.

$US 8.9 TRILLION is almost nine MILLION million Dollars. The U.S. Federal government admits to
funded debts of about $US 5.7 TRILLION, accumulated over about 210 years. Now, you can see
where the inflation is REALLY coming from. U.S. stock markets have already fallen. The U.S. Dollar
is next.

The State Of The U.S. Markets:

Back in March 2000, U.S. stock markets stood at a valuation of 181% of U.S. GDP. That can be
compared with where they stood in 1990, which was a valuation of 60% of U.S. GDP. The ratio of
the value of U.S. markets to the U.S. GDP had therefore tripled over a decade. It is this huge
valuation overshoot that Mr Greenspan is now attempting to sustain.

The Wiltshire Index, which is the widest in the U.S., has fallen by 20%. As an aside, spare a small
thought for foreign (specifically European) investors. They have just taken a double hit. The
Dollar has fallen against their currencies and the Euro. Then there is the added pain of a 20% fall
in the Wiltshire Index. If you are an American investor, spare more than a small thought. You can
rest assured that all these foreigners are now standing ready to sell into any rallies.

That means that the Greenspan"re-liquefication" push may lure many Americans to either
re-enter the U.S. markets or (more likely) add to their portfolios, but these American will be
buying shares that the foreigners are now primed to sell. Once that first rotation from foreign
hands into American hands is over, the U.S. stock market stands primed for its next downswing.

The harder Greenspan pushes his"re-liquefication", the easier he makes it for foreign holders of
U.S. shares to hand them to Americans. They can do it without breaking the U.S. stock markets
on the downside. That has two effects. First: As foreign holders sell out of their shares, they will
seriously consider selling out of the U.S. Dollar too.

To the extent that happens, it will put the U.S. currency under pressure and add to the already
established downside momentum. Second: If a renewed demand for shares by Americans is met
by selling by foreigners, then U.S. markets will not rally to any great extent. If this happens, the
point will be reached where the American holders lose patience and sell out. Some will, most
won't. The historical norm is that domestic shareholders hold on ALL the way down.

Always keep this in mind. A stock market valuation of 181% of GDP is not only"unusual", it is
unprecedented. To scale back to the levels of 1990 (60% of GDP) would not be the equivalent of
a"soft" landing (the 1990 recession was a mild one) or even a"hard" one, it would be the
equivalent of a crash.. To scale back this ratio would take a 66% fall in U.S. stock markets from
their March 2000 levels. Even the Nasdaq hasn't fallen that far yet. And the Dow has hardly
moved at all.

Behind The U.S. Debts Lies Money:

Between 1995 and the end of 2000, the U.S. Federal Reserve Inflated the quantity of the U.S.
M-3 money stock by 55%! That is what"inflation" IS! It is always and only a monetary event.
The effects of inflation, and they are many, result from this increase in the stock of money. Price
moves, including the prices of shares, are certainly a result of inflation, but it is the effect of
inflation upon valuations which are often the most dangerous. When an asset increases in
valuation, the potential amount that can be borrowed against that asset also increases. Asset
valuation increases allows money to be borrowed at much faster and more reckless speeds than
do mere decreases in interest rates.

This inflation effect upon collateral seeds the ground for more loans. If, as is the case in many
parts of the U.S., real estate prices are climbing fast, that is an increase in collateral. Home
owners usually decide to"liquify" part of their increased collateral by re-financing their
mortgages. Then, they have more money to spend. For years now, this money has been going
into consumer goods, and shares.

In ten years, the ratio between U.S. stock market valuations and U.S. GDP tripled. Since mid
1995, consumer and corporate debt has increased almost $US 9 TRILLION and U.S. M-3 is up
55%. The result is a GIGANTIC increase in debt, domestic and foreign. A credit expansion is a
DEBT expansion.

The U.S. Dollar - Versus - The Debts:

Greenspan is caught in a cleft stick of his own making. If he again lowers interest rates to enable
the huge internal debts to be more easily carried, he risks the U.S. Dollar. If he doesn't, he risks a
debt crash.

Watch The U.S. Banks:

The U.S. banking sector is a close copy of the Japanese banking sector, circa 1989/90. The
Japanese used the same means to create the same thing - a bubble. Japanese real estate prices
had exploded and the Japanese stock market had soared. In the second half of 1989, the Bank of
Japan raised rates, and waited. They didn't have to wait long. The huge over-valuation of land
and shares continued until the end of 1989 while the economy was already slowing. In 1990,
valuations broke and the slide was unstoppable. The Bank of Japan chased the slump all the way
down with interest rates which fell to 0.0%.

But it was too late. The Japanese stock market had irretrievably crashed. Worse, the land
valuations which had been the collateral foundation for enormous bank loans crashed. Suddenly,
Japan's banks stood with massive loans outstanding and next to no collateral underpinning these
loans. They did not stand with the capital in reserve to deal with any of this. In fact, they were
all just plain flat broke.

This was the Japanese sequence. It is just starting to happen for the U.S. commercial banks,
mainly in the area of commercial loans. What has not yet been seen in the U.S. are some really
BIG commercial loan failures. When these start to surface, then the way is cleared for a U.S.
repeat of the entire Japanese sequence laid out in the above paragraph. There is one last thing
to mention in this regard, and it is a huge difference. The difference is SAVINGS. Even at the
height of their"boom" at the end of the 1980s, the Japanese were huge savers. They still are. It
has been this huge savings pool that has saved Japan, so far. In the case of the U.S., there are
NO private savings at all. The U.S."savings rate" is MINUS 0.8%.

The Approaching Danger Of A U.S. Hyper-Inflation:

The Japanese have managed to hang on for a decade, sustaining their internal economy with one
HUGE budget deficit after another. The Japanese government could do this because the Japanese
public had left them a huge pool of private savings to draw on. But this process of ever ongoing
budget deficits (the present one is 10% of GDP) has taken government debts to 130-140% of
Japanese GDP. The key here is that U.S. authorities have NO such private savings to draw upon.
They are not there. That only leaves one drastic alternative to a future HUGE debt write-off and
that is - a massive U.S. cash money inflation - a real increase in the quantity of cash U.S. Dollars
or near cash U.S. Dollars. Without any genuine savings, that would be the only way to"cover"
the fast approaching bad debts.

This is the"Latin American" (or"banana republic") solution. Latin America has been using this
"solution" since the late 1970s, when Arab"Oil Dollars" were being recycled there by U.S. banks.
This caused the usual credit expansion there, followed by a share and land boom. That was
followed in turn by a crash in shares and then land, which tore the heart out of the collateral
behind the U.S. banks' loans. The U.S. banks were bailed out by the IMF. The Latin American
nations resorted to the old method of simply printing the currency to cover, forcing interest rates
through the roof and leaving the currencies worthless. After that, they launched"new" currencies
and promised to do better the next time around.

Comparative Score Cards:

In the U.S., the Nasdaq is now merely"over-valued", the rest of the market is still hugely"over
valued". The U.S. real estate bubble is starting to fray at the edges in some places. External
deficits on trade and current account are accelerating, increasing the net external debt of $US
2.2 TRILLION by an annual rate of close to $US 500 Billion. All of this is what the Latin American
nations have been facing for decades.

A Pre-Made Accident Waiting To Happen:

The sudden break and the fast fall of the U.S. Dollar which began in late Nov. 2000 was the first
item in what will be a historical sequence. The Greenspan panic rate cuts of Jan. 3, 2001 were
the second. Now, the world is waiting for more rate cuts to come from the Fed in a fast fire
sequence. The"hope" here is that one of the cuts in the sequence will act to underpin the entire
U.S. financial system and its economy. What nobody seems to be sure of is which one of these
cuts will act to"save" the U.S. financial system.

Understanding The Problem:

The whole world of finance also stood and waited as the Bank of Japan chased the Japanese
economy downstairs with rate cuts all the way down to ZERO. It didn't"work", and expecting it
to"work" now in the U.S. is to entirely misunderstand the real nature of the economic problem.
By its nature, a credit expansion ALWAYS leads to ever larger and more numerous
mal-investments. None of these show themselves to be mal-investments until the wave of
artificial credit starts to ebb away. In the U.S. case, all the mal- investments have already been
made. They are HERE. And being here, there are no means between here and hell with which to
make them into viable economic investments. A re- start of the U.S. credit expansion will NOT do
it. Even a short-lived rerun of the U.S. credit expansion will only cause other sectors of the U.S.
economy to add to their already outstanding mal-investments or start other and new mal-
investments in other areas. Mal-investments are like building bridges in all the wrong places.

These bridges can be engineering marvels and things of artistic beauty, but if people find they
don't want to go where the bridges lead, they are useless. That is true even if it costs these
people nothing or next to nothing (due to the credit expansion and lower interest rates) to pay
to cross them.

If the credit expansion dries up, then the people using the bridge have to pay out of their own
pockets. Most of them will not cross the bridge at all or will find a cheaper alternative way to get
to where they wanted to go so. The bridge is a mal-investment - it stands empty. To suddenly
discover these empty bridges and then to recommend more of the policy that brought them into
existence in the first place is to vehemently insist upon building bridges everywhere - to no
economic purpose.

The simple and fundamental economic fact is that once a credit expansion has run its course,
people by their millions decide to return to the economic choices open to them when paid for by
their own earnings, not their earnings PLUS their borrowings. If many of these people have taken
losses, either on their share investments (as in Japan) or upon the values of their houses (though
the loans against them haven't fallen) then there is no hope this side of hell that such people will
suddenly become big spenders when lower interest rates on new loans are dangled before them.
Even at near ZERO rates of interest, just like the ones in Japan, the powers-that-be simply
cannot get the internal economy going again, because the consumer won't spend. They will
certainly take advantage of the lower interest rates, but they will use them to re-finance their
existing loans. That will cut the lenders earnings to ZERO - just like the rates.

Waiting For The American Consumer:

At this point in the global economic saga, the world is waiting for the American consumer. But if
enough Americans decide that they won't play the borrow-and-spend game anymore, then it is
not only the U.S. economy that is in Japanese territory, so is the entire world. It has been these
American consumers, through their buying of imports, who have sustained most of the Asian
economies. It is only Europe which stands in a different global position because only 2% of its
output goes to the U.S.A.. Asia will be"toast" if U.S. imports decline badly. The 15 European
Union nations will cope.

The global problem is that the U.S. credit expansion has caused the economic equivalent of the
rest of the world building false economic bridges everywhere, but especially to the U.S. These
mal-investments were made because a large part of the U.S. credit expansion flowed overseas to
buy imports. The U.S. trade and current account deficit inundated the world with a huge outflow
of borrowed U.S. Dollars.

The REAL U.S. Economy:

The REAL U.S. economy makes real physical economic goods. It has been getting hammered since
June 2000. The index of manufacturing activity fell sharply in the fourth quarter of 2000. Output
has now been below 50 for three months in a row. U.S. export orders have been declining for
three straight months. This is a very fast contraction and it is clearly accelerating. The
production index has fallen from 49.6 % in November to just 42.4 % in December. Anything below
50 is very real contraction.

Worse, U.S. corporate prices of inputs have risen from 56.6 in November to 61.0 in December.
Worst of all are the input cost increases is energy. Here are just a few examples. Jet fuel has
climbed in price by 59.6% from Nov 1999 to Nov 2000; diesel is up by 53.7%, natural gas by
51%, propane by 45.5%. The only two energy areas not showing huge price increases (yet) are
electricity for consumers and commerce which have climbed over the above time frame by
respectively 2.6% and 2.9%. But these figures do not yet reflect the current electricity crisis in
California. Overall, over the this past period, U.S. corporate energy costs have climbed by an
average of 20%. Consumer prices will react later.

A Mighty Credit Crunch:

U.S. corporations can no longer go to Wall Street and sell some more shares. That avenue is
closed for raising more money. Corporate bonds are VERY hard to sell. The banks have taken their
"welcome mats" for corporate borrowers and hidden them in the basement. Inside, in the back
rooms, U.S. banks are counting up the fast climbing number of business and corporate loans that
are going sour. Over at the junk market for corporate paper, speculative bond yields were 9.4%
higher than matching U.S. Treasury paper. Junk bonds issued by IT outfits, like competitive local
exchanges, are now carrying yields of up to 33% (that is NOT a"misprint"). The sum of all this is
that U.S. businesses cannot get any money.

It Took Intervention To Get To Here:

Interventionism is the disease of governments. It is the obnoxious and deadly dangerous idea
that people in the government can - through their complex manipulations of interest rates, money
quantities, rules and regulations which are constantly changing, and all the rest. - achieve more
than a proper free market held together by clear property rights and sound money and credit.
When the sum of all the accumulated interventions inside the U.S. economy is beginning to show
up clearly - a great danger is arriving - fast!

The"stage" has been set for decades, but it has taken the fantastic credit expansion of
1995-2000 to reach the present point. Now, the REAL crunch is on. And the most certain thing
Americans and the rest of the world can count upon is that to"cure" all these
government-caused economic problems, even MORE interventions will be resorted to! As analysed
earlier in this section, these problems, once caused, exist in physical reality. They are the
mal-investments, the bridges which lead nowhere and which no one wants to cross anymore.
Fundamentally, that is why no amount of additional government intervention can make these
mal-investments economically viable.

The Next Danger:

That danger arrives on January 20. Knowing that the U.S. economy is in dire straits, the new
Bush Administration is almost certain to try to act to"save" the economic situation. Their only
means with which to do that is MORE government interventions in the U.S. financial system and
economy.

This is the fundamental problem with Interventionism. All nations have indulged in it. But only one
nation, the U.S., has yet to pay the price for it. The"cure" for old interventions has always been
"new" interventions - on top of the old ones. As long as the U.S. was seen to be"booming", the
"cure" was seen to be working. When the U.S. is seen to have stopped"booming", the crisis of
intervention is at hand.



INSIDE THE UNITED STATES


STEPPING INTO THE PRE-MADE WRECKAGE

When President Bush steps into the Oval Office, he will also be stepping into the greatest
economic mess any President has stepped into since President Hoover. Only one central
economic fact is needed to both validate and justify this statement. Here it is: Between 1925
and 1929, the (Benjamin) Strong Fed inflated the U.S. stock of money by 10%. Between 1995
and 2000, the Greenspan Fed inflated the U.S. stock of money by 55%. All economic historians
know what happened in 1929, but it takes valid economic theory - such as the Austrian Theory
of the Trade Cycle - to look into what will happen now.

Obviously, based upon the 10% inflation of the '20s money stock and the 55% inflation of the
'90s money stock, the problem now is at least 5 times bigger than the monetary mistakes made in
the lead up to 1929. As to the massive mal- investments made in the U.S.A. and especially in
Japan and across Asia, there is really very little that can be done. A lot of these plants and their
equipment will have to be shut down. After that has regrettably been done, new investments
must be made in new plant and equipment that actually do have an economically valid consumer
demand behind it - and not borrowings.

That means that a"transitional" RECESSION is required.

A transitional recession is one where, as mal-investments are written off and new investments
entered into, the economy goes through a period of transitional unemployment and lowered living
standards and the financial system goes through a period of writing-off the bad loans.
Governments, standing before this otherwise normal economic event, can in principle do only two
things. They can cut government expenditures to the bone and lower taxes to match. This will
free up the cash flows of private individuals and all the affected businesses and enable them to
SAVE. They can then use the savings to pay down most of the outstanding loans, and then
stand with the means in hand to make new and valid investments.

The other thing a government has to do is to set interest rates free. Under no circumstances
must any attempt be made by a government to hold interest rates lower than where a free
market in SAVED and lendable funds would have placed them. It is high interest rates that
attract savings, not low ones. Along with setting interest rates free, a government must
deregulate - FULLY.

If the above economic principles are adhered to, the U.S. economy could work itself into the
clear in three to five years. If they were adhered to in Asia, then Asia could emerge from the
wreckage too.

It Won't Happen!

None of the above will happen, or it will happen to a woefully insufficient degree. This is because
American politicians are by now too scared of the illusions in the minds of the American public
which they themselves have so vigorously fostered over the last eight years. These illusions are
fundamentally based upon the idea that endless borrowing was and is the yellow brick road to
endless wealth.

When politicians stand forward and promise"prosperity", they have to"create" it. But there never
has been a stock of consumable goods and new plant and equipment (capital) in some well
hidden warehouses behind the Treasury. Politicians, in fact and in reality, CANNOT create either
wealth or prosperity.

Having already"bought the basic premise", President Bush is regrettably certain to act with great
vigour to maintain"prosperity", which in economic reality will mean that he will try to keep viable
all the many mal-investments that now clutter up the U.S. economy. That is simply to act in
utter defiance of the economic facts. More money, created either directly or through lower
interest rates, won't make unviable investments viable. Nonetheless, Mr Bush is certain to try
even more intervention and money creation.



INSIDE JAPAN


THE ACCELERATING DESCENT OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY

Overview:

For close to ten long years, Japan's political powers-that-be have tried, in vain, to sustain the
mal-investments which Japan made during the boom of the late 1980s. Japan's fundamental
economic problem is that it never attempted to get rid of these mal-investments, it simply tried
to perpetuate them. Most of them are still here, cluttered with huge corporate debts.

These unviable corporate debts are the nightmare of Japan's commercial banks. After all, they
made all these loans back in the booming 1980s. When Japan's real estate values crashed,
Japan's banks stared at the collapse of the collateral foundation underpinning an even larger
amount of loans. Now, after ten long years, Japan's economy is again sliding backwards towards
a new recession, this time led by a decline in exports to the, so far, insatiable U.S. economy.
Again, the currency is leading events. Japan's Yen is now falling fast against the U.S. Dollar and
even faster against the EU's Euro. Japan's program clearly is to let the Yen fall as fast, or faster,
than Japan's exports to the U.S.A. are falling, all this done in an attempt to sustain the only part
of Japan's industry that is functioning - exports.

The Effect Upon The Rest Of Asia:

But as Japan's Yen falls against the U.S. Dollar, all the rest of the Asian economies will
increasingly see their exports to the U.S.A. decline. It cannot be long before most of these
smaller economies also start their own currencies downwards! And then, a race will be on and the
"winner" will be the nation which can make its currency fall farthest against the U.S. Dollar. The
problem is that these falling currencies will again cause a huge capital flight, just like the one
that happened during the crisis of 1997-99.

At some point in this old sequence of competitive currency devaluations, China will have to act.
If it does not do so, it will lose an ever larger part of its share in the export market to the U.S.
economy. But, once China devalues, the rest of Asia will be thrown for a loop. This is because
the last time that China did, in early 1998, the Asian Crisis escalated into a global financial crisis.

The First Asia Crisis Re-Visited:

When the first Asia Crisis exploded across the world's headlines at the beginning of 1998, the
central thing never made mention of was that all these Asian economies stood with huge
mountains of foreign exchange reserves. It ought to have been the most natural thing in the
world for these nations to use part of their reserves to defend their currencies and re- liquify
their financial systems. But they did not do so. Instead, the IMF and World Bank stormed in with
multi- billion bail-out packages. The end result was that few, if any, of these vast holdings of
foreign exchange reserves were thrown on the market. And that leads straight to the question:
What are the"foreign exchange reserves" held by the Asian nations?

They are hundreds of Billions of U.S. Dollars worth of U.S. TREASURY DEBT PAPER.

Obviously, if huge amounts of U.S. Treasury debt paper had been sold, the U.S. bond market
would have fallen, and that means that U.S. market rates of interest would have climbed. When
all the U.S. Dollars acquired from such sales were also sold, the U.

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>Hallo,
>Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?
>ciao!
>SchlauFuchs

[b]"Der Klassiker" -

> Von Kurt Richebächer
>
>
> Börsen-Zeitung, 19.10.1999
>
> Im Lichte der Daten, an denen die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung eines Landes
> heute hauptsächlich gemessen wird, liegt die amerikanische Wirtschaft seit
> mindestens vier Jahren unter strahlendem Sonnenschein. Das reale
> Sozialprodukt erhöhte sich in dieser Zeit im jährlichen Durchschnitt um
> 3,6% bei gleichzeitiger Zunahme der Beschäftigung um insgesamt fast sieben
> Millionen oder 1,3% jährlich. Was den Glauben an einen tief greifenden
> Paradigmenwechsel in der amerikanischen Wirtschaft aber vor allem schürte,
> war die Tatsache, dass bei hohem Wachstum gleichzeitig die Inflationsraten
> für Konsumenten- und Produzentenpreise fielen. Das war für viele
> normalerweise unvorstellbar.
>
> Schnell hatte man die passende Erklärung parat: Im internationalen
> Vergleich liege die amerikanische Wirtschaft insbesondere aus zwei Gründen
> weit an der Spitze: Erstens hat sie einen großen Vorsprung in der
> Entwicklung und Anwendung der neuen Informationstechnologie, und zweitens
> habe das von Wall Street gesetzte Leitbild vom Shareholder Value in
> Corporate America gesammelte Management-Energien freigesetzt, die zu
> gründlichen Verbesserungen in den Gewinnen und im Produktionsfortschritt
> geführt haben.
>
> Shareholder Value über alles
>
> Auf eine kurze Formel gebracht: Die ausdrückliche Verpflichtung des
> Managements, unter allen Umständen und in erster Linie den Shareholder
> Value zu maximieren, wird als die wirksamste Methode betrachtet, die
> Leistung in der Wirtschaft zum Besten der Allgemeinheit zu maximieren.
> Stichwort und Schlagwort: Corporate Restructuring. Indem sich dieses
> Leistungsprinzip inzwischen über die gesamte amerikanische Wirtschaft
> ausgebreitet hat, sei letzten Endes der gegenwärtige, lange
> wirtschaftliche Aufschwung mit all seinen hervorragenden Eigenschaften
> zustande gekommen. Aus dieser Sicht werden andere Länder inzwischen
> weitgehend daran gemessen, inwieweit sie die angeblich bewährten
> amerikanischen Methoden übernommen haben.
>
> Hausse zieht blinden Glauben nach sich
>
> Es passt alles wunderschön zusammen. Doch vor allem haben wohl die
> endlosen hohen Kursgewinne an Wall Street für eine allgemein hohe
> Bereitschaft gesorgt, diesen und anderen wohlklingenden Erklärungen fast
> blinden Glauben zu schenken. Zu einer ersten Diskussion über die Ursachen
> der Aktienhausse und der glänzenden Performance der amerikanischen
> Wirtschaft in den letzten Jahren ist es nie gekommen. Die wenigen
> kritischen Stimmen, die sich meldeten, wurden nicht widerlegt, sondern
> einfach überhört. Was spricht gegen diesen Glauben an ein
> Wirtschaftswunder in Amerika? Erstens die Tatsache, dass die angeblich
> schlüssigen Beweise in Wahrheit alles andere als schlüssig sind, und
> zweitens die vorliegenden monetären Daten, die klar und deutlich besagen,
> dass Herr Greenspan über die unmäßigste Kreditinflation präsidierte, die
> es je in der Welt gegeben hat. Das nämlich ist der Stoff, aus dem
> regelmäßig Bubbles entstehen.
>
> Bis auf den heutigen Tag ist stets und ständig zu hören und zu lesen, eine
>"asset bubble", also eine Inflationsblase in Finanz- oder Sachanlagen, sei
> sehr schwer zu erkennen, bevor sie platzt. So Greenspan und viele andere
> in ständiger Wiederholung. Das ist einfach eine faule Entschuldigung für
> diejenigen, die nicht sehen wollen. Theoretische Erkenntnis wie
> geschichtliche Erfahrung geben in dieser Beziehung eine ebenso einfache
> wie klare Antwort: Entscheidendes Kriterium für eine inflatorische
> Entwicklung jeglicher Art ist die jeweils stattfindende Kreditexpansion,
> und zwar Kreditexpansion im Vergleich mit zwei volkswirtschaftlichen
> Aggregaten: erstens dem inländischen Sparaufkommen und zweitens dem
> Anstieg des nominalen Sozialprodukts, das die gesamtwirtschaftliche
> Aktivität misst. Noch in den achtziger Jahren gehörte diese Einsicht zu
> den Binsenweisheiten in der Nationalökonomie.
>
> Greenspan übergeht sinkende Ersparnis
>
> Die Kreditausweitung der letzten Jahre in den USA ist ohne Vergleich und
> Beispiel in der Geschichte, weil sie von einem völligen Kollaps der
> persönlichen Ersparnisbildung begleitet war. Es ist zur Norm geworden,
> dass die privaten Haushalte beständig mehr ausgeben, als sie verdienen.
> Fast ein Drittel des Anstiegs der Konsumausgaben in diesem Jahr ging auf
> das Konto sinkender Ersparnis. In seinen zahlreichen Reden hat Herr
> Greenspan nicht einmal auch nur ein einziges Wort über die Tatsachen
> verloren. Zum Vergleich sei bemerkt, dass Japan in seinen Bubble-Jahren
> der späten achtziger Jahre eine persönliche Sparquote von 12 bis 13%
> hatte, nach vorher 15 bis 16%.
>
> Ein nicht weniger tolles Bild bietet sich beim Vergleich der laufenden
> Kreditexpansion mit dem gleichzeitigen Anstieg des nominalen
> Sozialprodukts. Dieses stieg im vergangenen Jahr um 400 Mrd. Dollar und in
> der ersten Hälfte dieses Jahres um 200 Mrd. Dollar. Dem stand eine
> Kreditaufnahme des privaten nicht-finanziellen Sektors, also von
> Konsumenten und Unternehmen zusammen, von 995 Mrd. Dollar beziehungsweise
> 532 Mrd. Dollar gegenüber. Auf einen Dollar Anstieg des Sozialprodukts kam
> von deren Seite damit rund 2,5 Dollar Neuverschuldung. Wohlgemerkt, dies
> ist alles private Verschuldung, denn die Regierung macht in ihrem Haushalt
> einen Ãœberschuss.
>
> Schuldenberge gebären Blasen
>
> Daneben ist aber die explosionsartig zunehmende Kreditaufnahme eines
> dritten Sektors in Betracht zu ziehen, und zwar des Finanzsektors. Er
> borgte im vergangenen Jahr 1,068 Mrd. Dollar und 557 Mrd. in der ersten
> Hälfte dieses Jahres. Das ergibt in der Terminologie des Federal Reserve
>"net flows through the credit markets" von 2120 Mrd. Dollar im Jahre 1998
> und von 1080 Mrd. Dollar in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres. (Nebenbei
> bemerkt, die jüngsten Zahlen sind nicht auf Jahresrate hochgerechnet).
>
> Um die Brisanz der Inflationsblase in den amerikanischen Finanzmärkten zu
> verstehen, ist es notwenig, sich die Brisanz der Schuldenblase vor Augen
> zu führen, aus der jede Bubble letztlich hervorgeht. In den vergangenen
> viereinhalb Jahren bis Mitte 1999 hat die Neuverschuldung in den
> amerikanischen Kreditmärkten insgesamt um mehr als 7200 Mrd. Dollar oder
> um 40% auf 24428 Mrd. Dollar zugenommen. Das sind 363% des derzeitigen
> jährlichen Sozialprodukts. Von dieser Gesamtverschuldung entfielen 25% auf
> die privaten Haushalte, 24% auf Unternehmen, 15% auf die Regierung und 29%
> auf den finanziellen Sektor.
>
> Im Rückblick erscheint es sonnenklar, dass das amerikanischen Kreditsystem
> vor allem von 1997 auf 1998 vollkommen außer Kontrolle geraten ist. Die
> Neuverschuldung des privaten nicht-finanziellen Sektors, also der
> Konsumenten und Unternehmen, schnellte von einem Jahr zum anderen um 41%
> und die des finanziellen Sektors um sage und schreibe 64% in die Höhe.
> Obwohl dies wirklich ein ungeheuerlicher Sprung war, nahm ihn niemand zur
> Kenntnis, denn Kreditzahlen sind für Alan Greenspan und Wall Street
> grundsätzlich ohne Interesse. Das einzige, was sie im monetären Bereich
> aber auch nur gelegentlich beachten, sind die Geldmengen. Immerhin
> beschleunigte sich das Wachstum der Geldmenge M3 auf 11%, nach 9% im
> Vorjahr. Doch auch das erschien irrelevant angesichts sinkender
> Inflationsraten.
>
> Für die meisten ausländischen Betrachter ist es ein Rätsel, was die
> explosionsartige Zunahme der Kreditaufnahme des finanziellen Sektors in
> den USA zu bedeuten hat. Es handelt sich in der Hauptsache um so genannte
>"non-bank financial intermediaries", die sekurisierte Hypotheken und alle
> Arten von Konsumkrediten kaufen und finanzieren. Die Verbindlichkeiten der
> größten Institute in dieser Gruppe sind"Federal government-related" und
> genießen infolgedessen Staatsgarantie, die ihre Refinanzierung erleichtert
> und verbilligt. Hauptsächliche Refinanzierungsquelle sind der
> amerikanische und der internationale Geldmarkt, die sie mit
> verschiedenartigen kurz- und mittelfristigen Instrumenten anzapfen.
> Letztlich wurden sie zur unerschöpflichen Quelle für den unersättlichen
> Konsumkredit.
>
> Kaum jemandem scheint klar zu sein, dass sich hier inflatorische
> Kreditschöpfung reinsten Wassers in phantastischen Ausmaßen abspielt. Im
> Unterschied aber zur Kreditgewährung der Banken findet in diesem Falle
> keinerlei Geldschöpfung in Gestalt einer gleichzeitigen Vermehrung der
> Bankeinlagen, sondern eine Beschleunigung der Geldumlaufsgeschwindigkeit
> statt. Was diese Institute über die Geldmärkte von ihren Kreditgebern
> ausleihen, um damit Kreditpapiere zu kaufen, sind letzten Endes bestehende
> Bankeinlagen, das heißt bestehende Kassenbestände von Unternehmen und
> institutionellen Anlegern. Die unsichtbare monetäre Expansionswirkung
> findet durch schnelleren Umschlag der Einlagen statt.
>
> Man führe sich vor Augen, dass die Käufe dieser Institute von
>"sekuritisierten" Krediten von 550 Mrd. Dollar im Jahre 1996 auf mehr als
> 1000 Mrd. Dollar im Jahre 1998 zugenommen haben. Diese Summen, um nicht zu
> sagen Unsummen, lassen keinen Zweifel daran, dass diese Institute bei der
> Bildung der großen amerikanischen Kredit- und Finanzblase in den letzten
> beiden Jahren direkt und indirekt eine absolut entscheidende Rolle
> gespielt haben.
>
> Kreditpyramide führt zu Illiquidität
>
> Eine der Folgen dieser Entwicklung ist natürlich, dass Kreditschöpfung und
> Geldschöpfung in den USA wie nie zuvor auseinander klaffen. In der Wirkung
> auf Wirtschaft und Märkte besteht keinerlei Unterschied zur
> Kreditschöpfung der Banken, die mit Geldvermehrung verbunden ist. Wohl
> aber wird das Finanzsystem auf längere Sicht zwangsläufig illiquider,
> indem im Verhältnis zur Geldmenge eine immer größere Kreditpyramide
> entsteht. Ebenso sollte klar sein, dass die Bewegungen der Geldmengen
> unter diesen veränderten institutionellen Bedingungen ein völlig
> unzulänglicher Maßstab für die Geldpolitik geworden sind.
>
> Womit wir zur wichtigsten Frage überhaupt in diesem Zusammenhang kommen:
> Was genau war und ist die entscheidende treibende Kraft hinter dem langen
> Boom der amerikanischen Wirtschaft und der stürmischen Hausse des
> Aktienmarktes gewesen? War es die Kreditblase, die wir beschrieben haben?
> Oder ist es der berühmte Paradigmenwechsel in der Wirtschaft als Folge von
> High Tech und Corporate Restructuring, den Wall Street und Herr Greenspan
> beschwören? Halten wir als erstes nochmals fest: Die Kreditexpansion, die
> in den letzten Jahren in den USA stattgefunden hat, ist ohne Beispiel in
> der Geschichte. Sie stellt alle bisherigen Bubble-Erfahrungen in den
> Schatten. Ebenfalls einmalig in der Geschichte ist es, dass alle Welt,
> nicht nur unabhängige Beobachter und Kommentatoren, sondern vor allem auch
> die verantwortlichen Geldpolitiker, über die entfesselten Kreditfluten
> einfach hinwegsehen. Sie werden nicht einmal zur Kenntnis genommen.
>
> Dazu sei festgestellt, dass sich die Fed in den zwanziger Jahren über den
> haussierenden Aktienmarkt bereits anfangs 1928 Sorgen zu machen begann und
> von da an bemüht war, ihn durch Zinserhöhungen frühzeitig zu bremsen. Erst
> recht aber wäre in der damaligen Fed niemand auf die Idee gekommen, die
> Aktienhausse gar mit den großen Errungenschaften der industriellen
> Revolution zu rechtfertigen, wie Greenspan es immer wieder mit Bezug auf
> Computer- und Informationstechnologie getan hat. Wall Street schwärmte
> zwar von einer neuen Ära, niemand aber in der Fed. Dabei erzielte die
> Industrie mit einer damaligen neuen Technologie, die primär die
> Produktionsanlagen verbesserte, ungleich höhere, messbare
> Produktivitätsgewinne als es heute mit der neuen Informationstechnologie
> geschieht.
>
> Kein Verständnis für Mises und Hajek
>
> Die Meinungsverschiedenheiten über die wirtschaftliche und finanzielle
> Entwicklung in den USA gehen letztlich jedoch weit über die Frage hinaus,
> ob die Aktienhausse der letzten Jahre eine inflatorische Bubble darstellt
> oder aber einen tief greifenden Paradigmenwechsel in der Wirtschaft
> widerspiegelt. Anhaltende, größere Inflationsblasen in den Sach- und
> Finanzanlagen haben erfahrungsgemäß die unangenehme Eigenschaft, dass sie
> je nach Dauer und Ausmaß mehr oder weniger starke Verwerfungen in der
> ganzen Wirtschaft bewirken, die langwierige und schmerzvolle
> Anpassungsprozesse nach sich ziehen, nachdem die Bubble geplatzt ist.
>
> Das ist allerdings eine Erkenntnis der Ã-sterreichischen Schule (Mises,
> Hayek), wofür die große Mehrheit der amerikanischen Nationalökonomen kein
> Verständnis hat. In der gängigen amerikanischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte
> hatte die Depression der dreißiger Jahre absolut nichts mit den
> wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Auswüchsen der späten achtziger Jahre zu
> tun. Schuld war allein eine zu restriktive Geldpolitik der Fed, nachdem
> die Aktienblase geplatzt war. Im gleichen Sinne werden die anhaltenden
> wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten in Japan allein einer falschen
> Geldpolitik in der Gegenwart, nicht aber den wirtschaftlichen und
> finanziellen Auswüchsen und Verzerrungen aus den vorangegangenen
> Bubble-Jahren zugeschrieben.
>
> BoJ mit selben Trivialitäten bombardiert
>
> Für diesen Gedanken, für einen neuen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung könne es
> zuerst eines möglicherweise langwierigen und schmerzvollen
> Anpassungsprozesses bedürfen, haben in Amerika weder Politiker noch
> Nationalökonomen etwas übrig. Jede wirtschaftliche Stockung ist ihrer
> Ansicht nach leicht und schnell zu beheben, indem die Notenbank einfach
>"Geld druckt". Das einzige, was ihnen dabei in den Sinn kommt, sind
> massive Offenmarkt-Käufe der Notenbank von Staatspapieren. Mit dieser
> simplizistischen Forderung wird die japanische Notenbank von maßgebenden
> amerikanischen Nationalökonomen seit Monaten bombardiert.
>
> Dummes Zeug
>
> Zurück zur Ausgangsfrage: Bubble oder neue Ära in den USA? Wie gesagt, die
> übliche Behauptung, eine Anlagen-Bubble sei schwer zu erkennen, bevor sie
> platzt, ist dummes Zeug. Entscheidendes und spielend leicht erkennbares
> Kriterium ist, wie gesagt, die jeweils laufende Kreditexpansion.
> Typisches, ins Auge springendes Kennzeichen jeder Inflationsblase in Sach-
> oder Finanzanlagen ist eine Kreditexpansion, die das Sozialproduktwachstum
> deutlich übersteigt. Es mag manchmal Grenzfälle geben, aber die
> gegenwärtige Entwicklung in den USA ist kein Grenzfall, sondern der
> extremste Fall, den es in dieser Hinsicht je gegeben hat, womit die
> Aktienhausse der vergangenen Jahre als besonders schlimme Inflationsblase
> oder Bubble qualifiziert ist.
>
> Aber solche Bubbles finden nicht im luftleeren Raum statt. Wie gesagt, in
> aller Regel führt die inflatorische Kreditvermehrung direkt und indirekt
> zu mehr oder weniger starken Verzerrungen in den Strukturen der
> Wirtschaft. Aus der"asset bubble" wird auf diese Weise die"bubble
> economy". Im Falle Japans bewirkte die Bubble der späten achtziger Jahre
> im Aktien- und Immobilienmarkt einen Investitionsboom ohnegleichen in
> Industrieanlagen und kommerziellen Bauten. Selbst nach zehn Jahren haben
> die japanischen Unternehmen noch mit den damaligen massiven Fehl- und
> Überinvestitionen zu kämpfen. Von völlig anderer Art sind die
> Bubble-Auswirkungen der vergangenen Jahre auf die Wirtschaft in den USA.
> Auf dem Weg über die gewaltigen"wealth effects" des haussierenden
> Aktienmarktes zugunsten der privaten Haushalte ist vor allem der Konsum
> überstimuliert worden, übrigens ähnlich wie schon in den zwanziger Jahren,
> als in den USA der Konsumkredit erfunden wurde.
>
> Wahrzeichen Handelsbilanzdefizit
>
>
> Doch Herr Greenspan und die meisten amerikanischen Volkswirte sind außer
> Stande, in der maßlosen Kreditvermehrung, dem Zusammenbruch der privaten
> Ersparnisbildung sowie dem explodierenden Handelsbilanzdefizit bedenkliche
> Ungleichgewichte zu sehen, die auf die Dauer nicht haltbar sind. Das
> riesige Defizit im Außenhandel wird ganz im Gegenteil als das Wahrzeichen
> einer vor Kraft strotzenden Wirtschaft gesehen und hingestellt.
> Handelsbilanzüberschüsse werden verächtlich als Zeichen wirtschaftlicher
> Schwäche abgetan. Dass Volkswirtschaften mit starkem Wachstum dank hoher
> innerer Ersparnisbildung in der Regel starke Handels- und Zahlungsbilanzen
> aufweisen, ist ihnen völlig unbekannt.
>
> Beispielloses Nebeneinander
>
> Um es zu wiederholen und zu unterstreichen: Amerika ist der extremste Fall
> von"asset bubble" und"bubble economy", den es je gegeben hat. Das hat
> seinen Grund in dem beispiellosen Nebeneinander von völlig
> unkontrollierter Kreditexpansion und völligem Zusammenbruch privater
> Ersparnisbildung. Es bedeutet, dass die amerikanischen Märkte letztlich
> von zwei ungewöhnlichen und unsicheren Finanzierungsquellen abhängen. Das
> eine ist pures finanzielles Leverage, also kreditfinanzierte Anlagen, und
> das andere sind Auslandskäufe. Wobei das finanzielle Leverage bekanntlich
> in großem Umfang durch Refinanzierung in niedrig verzinslichen
> ausländischen Währungen stattgefunden hat, in Yen, Euro und Schweizer
> Franken. Hat die amerikanische Wirtschaft aber in puncto Ertragskraft und
> Produktivität erheblich gewonnen, wie Wall Street unter Berufung auf
> Hightech und Shareholder-Value-Primat zu behaupten pflegt? Darüber muss es
> doch objektive und unbestreitbare Statistiken geben. Ja, es gibt sie, aber
>...
>
> Gewinnentwicklung gibt nichts her
>
> Was die Gewinne betrifft, so haben es die Analysten geschafft, mit
> verschiedenen Vergleichskniffen den anhaltenden Eindruck eines besonderen
> Gewinnbooms in diesem Aufschwung zu erwecken. In der Tat war dies in den
> Jahren 1993/94 der Fall, nicht aber aus Gründen erhöhten
> Produktivitätsfortschritts, sondern als Folge scharfer Zinssenkungen. In
> den folgenden Jahren setzte sich der Gewinnanstieg zwar fort, aber mit
> stark rückläufiger Tendenz. Vom 3. Quartal 1997 bis zum 1. Quartal 1999
> herrschte dann Gewinnstagnation. Erst im zweiten Quartal dieses Jahres kam
> es zu neuem Gewinnanstieg (siehe Chart 1 und 2).
>
> Kurz gesagt, in der Gewinnentwicklung der vergangenen Jahre gibt es
> nichts, absolut nichts, was zu euphorischem Gerede von Paradigmenwechsel
> und neuer Ära in der Wirtschaft berechtigt. Eher haben sich die Gewinne in
> diesem Aufschwung unterdurchschnittlich entwickelt, obwohl zwei
> außergewöhnliche, stark Gewinn steigernde Einflüsse zur Wirkung kamen:
> massive Verwendung von Stock Options und hohe Kursgewinne der
> Pensionsfonds im Aktienmarkt.
>
> Stock-Options 1 Billion Dollar schwer
>
> Es wird geschätzt, dass die ausstehenden Stock-Options heute einen
> Marktwert von etwa einer Billion Dollar haben. Im Grunde sind es
> Gehaltszahlungen, die aber nicht als Kosten in die
> Gewinn-und-Verlust-Rechnung eingehen. Was sodann die Kursgewinne der
> Pensionsfonds betrifft, so haben sie die Unternehmensgewinne dadurch
> erhöht, indem sie den Unternehmen die sonst notwendigen erheblichen
> Einzahlungen zur Fundierung der Pensionsverpflichtungen ersparen. Nicht
> wenige Unternehmen gehen allerdings noch weiter und kassieren einen Teil
> der Kursgewinne für eigene Rechnung.
>
> Manipulation ist oberste Pflicht
>
> Im Ãœbrigen ist es ein offenes Geheimnis, dass zahlreiche Unternehmen jeden
> Buchhaltungstrick ausnutzen, um ihre Gewinne zu verschönern. Zu den
> wenigen, die dies offen kritisieren, gehört Warren Buffet, Amerikas
> meistbewunderter Investor, der sich kürzlich wie folgt äußerte:"Eine
> wachsende Zahl sonst hochgradiger Manager - die man gerne als Vater seiner
> Kinder oder als Treuhänder seines Nachlasses sähe - sind zur Ansicht
> gekommen, dass es völlig legitim ist, die Gewinne zu manipulieren, um die
> Wünsche von Wall Street zu befriedigen. Viele Manager halten solche
> Manipulationen in der Tat nicht nur für zulässig, sondern für ihre
> Pflicht." Es sollte klar sein, was letztlich hinter dieser merkwürdigen
> Einstellung steht: die allgemeine Besessenheit gegenüber der erklärten
> Notwendigkeit, den Shareholder Value unablässig zu steigern.
>
> Und was hat es mit der viel gerühmten Steigerung des
> Produktivitätsfortschritts in der amerikanischen Wirtschaft auf sich?
> Jawohl, sie hat sich in den letzten Jahren praktisch verdoppelt, von 1%
> auf gut 2% jährlich. Ohne viel zu fragen wurde diese Verbesserung von
> vornherein dem gestärkten Computereinsatz und selbstverständlich dem um
> sich greifenden Corporate Restructuring zugeschrieben.
>
> Computer verfälschen Statistik
>
> In der Wirklichkeit hatte diese Verbesserung der Produktivität einen ganz
> anderen, und zwar einen rein statistischen Grund. Entscheidend war
> letztlich eine Umstellung in der Statistischen Bemessung der
> Computerinvestitionen der Unternehmen. Da die Leistungskraft der Computer
> bei zudem rapide fallenden Preisen exponentiell zunahm, kamen die
> amtlichen Statistiker auf den Gedanken, für die Bemessung dieser
> Investitionen einen Index zu entwickeln, der die beiden Vorgänge im
> Computerbereich - höhere Leistung zu sinkenden Preisen - erfassen und
> widerspiegeln sollte. Er fand die Bezeichnung"hedonischer" Preisindex.
>
> Dieser Index wird nun seit Ende 1955 (Anmerkung: muss wahrscheinlich"1995" heißen)
> angewendet. Es waren sicherlich
> vernünftige Überlegungen, die zu dieser Umstellung in der
> gesamtwirtschaftlichen Statistik führten, aber das schließliche Ergebnis
> ist grotesk. Mit der Leistungskraft der Computer explodierten - in der
> Statistik - die Investitionen der Unternehmen, was dann seinerseits in
> entsprechendem Ausmaß das reale Sozialproduktwachstum erhöhte. Dazu eine
> Kostprobe: Im vergangenen Jahr erhöhte sich das reale Sozialprodukt der
> USA - gerechnet in so genannten"chained" Dollars - um 282 Mrd. Dollar
> beziehungsweise um 3,9%. Alle Welt bestaunte diese hohe Wachstumsrate. Den
> wenigsten war klar, dass davon 137 Mrd. Dollar oder 48% auf das Konto der
> auf diese Weise berechneten Computerinvestitionen der Unternehmen gingen.
> Die tatsächlichen Mehrausgaben der Unternehmen hatten dagegen lediglich 14
> Mrd. Dollar betragen. Im ersten Halbjahr 1999 kam der Computeranteil auf
> volle 81 Mrd. Dollar oder 65% innerhalb eines Sozialproduktzuwachses von
> 125 Mrd. Dollar. Glatte zwei Drittel des Anstiegs des Sozialprodukts
> errechnete sich aus Ausgaben, die nicht stattgefunden haben. Im Grunde
> sind es statistische Phantomdollars.
>
> Doch zwangsläufig hatten diese statistischen Umstellungen noch eine
> weitere bedeutsame Folge. Indem sie das Sozialproduktwachstum erhöhten,
> stieg in gleichem Maße der gesamtwirtschaftliche
> Produktivitätsfortschritt. Da die amerikanische Sozialproduktstatistik die
> Computerinvestitionen der Unternehmen separat ausweist, konnte jeder
> allerdings mit Leichtigkeit nachrechnen, dass die für die Gesamtwirtschaft
> ausgewiesene Produktivitätsverbesserung in Wirklichkeit nicht überwiegend
> auf gewaltige Produktivitätssprünge im Computersektor selbst zurückgeht,
> auf den gerade 1% des Sozialprodukts in den USA entfällt, das hieß
> letztlich auf besagte statistische Umstellung. Wer jedoch hatte ein
> Interesse daran, dies offen zu legen? Niemand, leider nämlich hätte es den
> einzigen Anhaltspunkt für den Paradigmenwechsel in der amerikanischen
> Wirtschaft widerlegt.
>
> Immerhin, vor einigen Monaten veröffentlichte ein führender akademischer
> Experte in Produktivitätsfragen, Prof. Robert J. Gordon, Northwestern
> University, eine umfassendere Studie über genau diese Frage - mit
> vernichtendem Urteil über die angeblichen großen Produktionsgewinne in der
> neuen Ära.
>
> Vernichtendes Urteil zur Produktivität
>
> Die Studie gipfelte in der Feststellung, das Bild der wirtschaftlichen
> Entwicklung in den USA werde durch die besondere Art der statistischen
> Erfassung des Computersektors völlig verzerrt. In den 99% der Wirtschaft
> außerhalb der Computerindustrie habe keinerlei Produktivitätsverbesserung
> stattgefunden, so dass für eine"new-economy"-Revolution nicht der
> geringste Raum bleibt. Die Explosion in der Herstellung und Nutzung von
> Computern hatte außerhalb der Computerindustrie, die auf 1% des
> Sozialprodukts entfällt, keinerlei messbare Produktivitätswirkungen. Im
> Gegenteil habe sich ansonsten das Produktivitätswachstum eher etwas
> verlangsamt. Wörtlich:"When stripped of computers, the productivity
> performance of the durable manufacturing sector is abysmal, with no
> revival at all and a further slowdown in 1955-99 (Anmerkung: Muss wahrscheinlich
"1995-99" heißen) compared to 1970-95."
>
> Dieses vernichtende Urteil von Prof. Gordon erklärt einiges, insbesondere
> die enttäuschende Gewinnentwicklung. Zugleich drängt sich die Frage auf:
> Wo ist eigentlich der Boom, wenn die aufgeblähten Computerzahlen nicht
> wären? Für 99% der Wirtschaft verbliebe ein reales Wachstum von knapp 2%
> jährlich. Ein mehr als mageres Ergebnis, wenn man die riesige Kreditblase
> bedenkt. Trotzdem, der Boom existiert, aber er findet eben größtenteils
> außerhalb des Sozialprodukts in den Anlagemärkten statt: im Aktienmarkt,
> im Anleihemarkt, im Immobilienmarkt, während von dem nicht in Frage
> stehenden Konsumboom der größere Teil inzwischen durch das Riesenloch in
> der Handelsbilanz ins Ausland abfließt.
>
> Bubble oder neue Ära? Über die Antwort auf diese Frage kann nach diesen
> Ausführungen kein Zweifel bestehen. Die Revolution in der amerikanischen
> Wirtschaft hat nicht stattgefunden, weder durch die
> Informationstechnologie noch durch das Shareholder-Value-Primat. Und sie
> wird auch niemals stattfinden, denn beide sind von ihrer Natur her dazu
> nicht geeignet. Der Druck, unablässig höhere Gewinne auszuweisen, drängt
> die Unternehmen vor allem zu Kostensenkungen, dies aber auf Kosten von
> Neuinvestitionen, und das führt insgesamt zu sinkenden Gewinnen.
>
> Neue Technologie leider nur Wunder
>
> Und was ist mit der Prosperität, welche die neue Technologie hervorbringen
> soll? Es ist ein technisches Wunder, ohne Frage, nur leider ein Wunder,
> das nicht die notwendigen Eigenschaften besitzt, daraus ein
> wirtschaftliches Wunder zu schaffen. Ein Vergleich mit den
> wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der industriellen Technologie macht dies
> klar und deutlich. Die industrielle Technologie hatte sehr starke
> Produktivitätswirkungen, die Arbeitskräfte freisetzte. Aber aus der
> arbeits- und kapitalintensiven Herstellung der Anlagen und Maschinen
> dieser Technologie entstanden große neue Kapitalgüterindustrien, die den
> Menschen andere, neue Arbeit gaben. Es war ein wunderbares Zusammenspiel
> von Arbeitsteilung und Kapitalbildung, das die große Prosperität des
> industriellen Zeitalters hervorbrachte.
>
> Maßlose Konsumentenverschuldung
>
> Nichts davon gilt für die Informationstechnologie. Auch sie setzt
> Arbeitskräfte frei. Aber die Herstellung der Hightech-Ausrüstung ist mit
> minimalem Arbeits- und Materialeinsatz verbunden. Hightech ist vorzüglich
> geeignet, die Phantasie der Aktienanleger anzuregen, jedoch völlig
> ungeeignet, die Ausgaben- und Einkommensströme in der Wirtschaft zu
> vergrößern. Weder neue Technologien noch Shareholder-Value-Primat haben
> die amerikanische Wirtschaft in den letzten Jahren vorangetrieben, sondern
> es war ein ganz primitives Rezept: maßlose Konsumentenverschuldung.

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>>Hallo,
>>Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?
>>ciao!
>>SchlauFuchs
>
> The Privateer
> 2001 Volume Late January Issue Number 416
>
> GLOBAL REPORT
>
> IT HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN

Danke, genau sowas hab ich gesucht. Hat jemand was dagegen, wenn ich den Text ins deutsche übertrage und poste?

ciao!
SchlauFuchs

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>>Hallo,
>>Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?
>>ciao!
>>SchlauFuchs
>"Der Klassiker" -
>> Von Kurt Richebächer
>>
>> Börsen-Zeitung, 19.10.1999

Danke, JüKü,
das Material werde ich auch gebrauchen können.

ciao!
SchlauFuchs



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Sehr gute Zusammenfassung trauriger Wahrheiten.
André
P.S. Fehlt am Ende etwas Text?
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>>Hallo,
>>Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?
>>ciao!
>>SchlauFuchs
>
> The Privateer
> 2001 Volume Late January Issue Number 416
>
> GLOBAL REPORT
>
> IT HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN
>
> At the moment, the Greenspan Fed is"re-liquefying" the U.S.
> financial system at breakneck speed. This can be seen from
> the fact that the U.S. M-3 money stock has increased by
> $US 112 Billion in three weeks!
> The Investment Company Institute reported that over the
> same period, U.S. Money Market Funds reported increases in
> fund assets of $US 67.6 Billion, the biggest rate of money
> inflows seen in three years. From Trim Tabs came a report
> that $US 15 Billion has flowed into equity funds.
> It Always Begins With Currencies:
> Globally, the most important thing to constantly keep an eye
> on is currencies. They often break trends and reverse
> direction long before stock markets follow. The U.S. Dollar
> has now fallen by 17% against the Euro since November
> 2000. Just about the only currency the U.S. Dollar has not
> fallen against is the Yen.
> What comes next is the reaction of the stock market. U.S.
> corporate chiefs are now looking at imports (not including oil)
> becoming more expensive. After that, having to pay these
> higher costs, they will look to raise prices and then they will
> look at massive cost cuts to save money fast.
> And all of this will inevitably lead to an earnings crash.
> The process is already underway, but so far, the cheer squad
> from Wall Street has managed to keep most people
> (especially Americans) in the U.S. market. Europeans have
> seen their currency recover, and are now looking hard at the
> prospects of future U.S. earnings and not seeing any. They
> have begun to sell out of the U.S. stock markets, but not in
> any great volumes - yet.
> Giving Credit Where Due:
> The Privateer will certainly give credit to Mr Greenspan - for
> being the cause and prime mover behind the biggest credit expansion in history. The facts are
> these. Between the beginning of 1995 and the end of June 2000, the U.S. financial system
> increased its debts by $US 4.15 TRILLION. U.S. corporate and private consumer debts increased
> by $US 4.75 TRILLION. In sum, the"private" sector of the U.S. economy increased its debts by
> $US 8.9 TRILLION in 5.5 years.
> $US 8.9 TRILLION is almost nine MILLION million Dollars. The U.S. Federal government admits to
> funded debts of about $US 5.7 TRILLION, accumulated over about 210 years. Now, you can see
> where the inflation is REALLY coming from. U.S. stock markets have already fallen. The U.S. Dollar
> is next.
> The State Of The U.S. Markets:
> Back in March 2000, U.S. stock markets stood at a valuation of 181% of U.S. GDP. That can be
> compared with where they stood in 1990, which was a valuation of 60% of U.S. GDP. The ratio of
> the value of U.S. markets to the U.S. GDP had therefore tripled over a decade. It is this huge
> valuation overshoot that Mr Greenspan is now attempting to sustain.
> The Wiltshire Index, which is the widest in the U.S., has fallen by 20%. As an aside, spare a small
> thought for foreign (specifically European) investors. They have just taken a double hit. The
> Dollar has fallen against their currencies and the Euro. Then there is the added pain of a 20% fall
> in the Wiltshire Index. If you are an American investor, spare more than a small thought. You can
> rest assured that all these foreigners are now standing ready to sell into any rallies.
> That means that the Greenspan"re-liquefication" push may lure many Americans to either
> re-enter the U.S. markets or (more likely) add to their portfolios, but these American will be
> buying shares that the foreigners are now primed to sell. Once that first rotation from foreign
> hands into American hands is over, the U.S. stock market stands primed for its next downswing.
> The harder Greenspan pushes his"re-liquefication", the easier he makes it for foreign holders of
> U.S. shares to hand them to Americans. They can do it without breaking the U.S. stock markets
> on the downside. That has two effects. First: As foreign holders sell out of their shares, they will
> seriously consider selling out of the U.S. Dollar too.
> To the extent that happens, it will put the U.S. currency under pressure and add to the already
> established downside momentum. Second: If a renewed demand for shares by Americans is met
> by selling by foreigners, then U.S. markets will not rally to any great extent. If this happens, the
> point will be reached where the American holders lose patience and sell out. Some will, most
> won't. The historical norm is that domestic shareholders hold on ALL the way down.
> Always keep this in mind. A stock market valuation of 181% of GDP is not only"unusual", it is
> unprecedented. To scale back to the levels of 1990 (60% of GDP) would not be the equivalent of
> a"soft" landing (the 1990 recession was a mild one) or even a"hard" one, it would be the
> equivalent of a crash.. To scale back this ratio would take a 66% fall in U.S. stock markets from
> their March 2000 levels. Even the Nasdaq hasn't fallen that far yet. And the Dow has hardly
> moved at all.
> Behind The U.S. Debts Lies Money:
> Between 1995 and the end of 2000, the U.S. Federal Reserve Inflated the quantity of the U.S.
> M-3 money stock by 55%! That is what"inflation" IS! It is always and only a monetary event.
> The effects of inflation, and they are many, result from this increase in the stock of money. Price
> moves, including the prices of shares, are certainly a result of inflation, but it is the effect of
> inflation upon valuations which are often the most dangerous. When an asset increases in
> valuation, the potential amount that can be borrowed against that asset also increases. Asset
> valuation increases allows money to be borrowed at much faster and more reckless speeds than
> do mere decreases in interest rates.
> This inflation effect upon collateral seeds the ground for more loans. If, as is the case in many
> parts of the U.S., real estate prices are climbing fast, that is an increase in collateral. Home
> owners usually decide to"liquify" part of their increased collateral by re-financing their
> mortgages. Then, they have more money to spend. For years now, this money has been going
> into consumer goods, and shares.
> In ten years, the ratio between U.S. stock market valuations and U.S. GDP tripled. Since mid
> 1995, consumer and corporate debt has increased almost $US 9 TRILLION and U.S. M-3 is up
> 55%. The result is a GIGANTIC increase in debt, domestic and foreign. A credit expansion is a
> DEBT expansion.
> The U.S. Dollar - Versus - The Debts:
> Greenspan is caught in a cleft stick of his own making. If he again lowers interest rates to enable
> the huge internal debts to be more easily carried, he risks the U.S. Dollar. If he doesn't, he risks a
> debt crash.
> Watch The U.S. Banks:
> The U.S. banking sector is a close copy of the Japanese banking sector, circa 1989/90. The
> Japanese used the same means to create the same thing - a bubble. Japanese real estate prices
> had exploded and the Japanese stock market had soared. In the second half of 1989, the Bank of
> Japan raised rates, and waited. They didn't have to wait long. The huge over-valuation of land
> and shares continued until the end of 1989 while the economy was already slowing. In 1990,
> valuations broke and the slide was unstoppable. The Bank of Japan chased the slump all the way
> down with interest rates which fell to 0.0%.
> But it was too late. The Japanese stock market had irretrievably crashed. Worse, the land
> valuations which had been the collateral foundation for enormous bank loans crashed. Suddenly,
> Japan's banks stood with massive loans outstanding and next to no collateral underpinning these
> loans. They did not stand with the capital in reserve to deal with any of this. In fact, they were
> all just plain flat broke.
> This was the Japanese sequence. It is just starting to happen for the U.S. commercial banks,
> mainly in the area of commercial loans. What has not yet been seen in the U.S. are some really
> BIG commercial loan failures. When these start to surface, then the way is cleared for a U.S.
> repeat of the entire Japanese sequence laid out in the above paragraph. There is one last thing
> to mention in this regard, and it is a huge difference. The difference is SAVINGS. Even at the
> height of their"boom" at the end of the 1980s, the Japanese were huge savers. They still are. It
> has been this huge savings pool that has saved Japan, so far. In the case of the U.S., there are
> NO private savings at all. The U.S."savings rate" is MINUS 0.8%.
> The Approaching Danger Of A U.S. Hyper-Inflation:
> The Japanese have managed to hang on for a decade, sustaining their internal economy with one
> HUGE budget deficit after another. The Japanese government could do this because the Japanese
> public had left them a huge pool of private savings to draw on. But this process of ever ongoing
> budget deficits (the present one is 10% of GDP) has taken government debts to 130-140% of
> Japanese GDP. The key here is that U.S. authorities have NO such private savings to draw upon.
> They are not there. That only leaves one drastic alternative to a future HUGE debt write-off and
> that is - a massive U.S. cash money inflation - a real increase in the quantity of cash U.S. Dollars
> or near cash U.S. Dollars. Without any genuine savings, that would be the only way to"cover"
> the fast approaching bad debts.
> This is the"Latin American" (or"banana republic") solution. Latin America has been using this
>"solution" since the late 1970s, when Arab"Oil Dollars" were being recycled there by U.S. banks.
> This caused the usual credit expansion there, followed by a share and land boom. That was
> followed in turn by a crash in shares and then land, which tore the heart out of the collateral
> behind the U.S. banks' loans. The U.S. banks were bailed out by the IMF. The Latin American
> nations resorted to the old method of simply printing the currency to cover, forcing interest rates
> through the roof and leaving the currencies worthless. After that, they launched"new" currencies
> and promised to do better the next time around.
> Comparative Score Cards:
> In the U.S., the Nasdaq is now merely"over-valued", the rest of the market is still hugely"over
> valued". The U.S. real estate bubble is starting to fray at the edges in some places. External
> deficits on trade and current account are accelerating, increasing the net external debt of $US
> 2.2 TRILLION by an annual rate of close to $US 500 Billion. All of this is what the Latin American
> nations have been facing for decades.
> A Pre-Made Accident Waiting To Happen:
> The sudden break and the fast fall of the U.S. Dollar which began in late Nov. 2000 was the first
> item in what will be a historical sequence. The Greenspan panic rate cuts of Jan. 3, 2001 were
> the second. Now, the world is waiting for more rate cuts to come from the Fed in a fast fire
> sequence. The"hope" here is that one of the cuts in the sequence will act to underpin the entire
> U.S. financial system and its economy. What nobody seems to be sure of is which one of these
> cuts will act to"save" the U.S. financial system.
> Understanding The Problem:
> The whole world of finance also stood and waited as the Bank of Japan chased the Japanese
> economy downstairs with rate cuts all the way down to ZERO. It didn't"work", and expecting it
> to"work" now in the U.S. is to entirely misunderstand the real nature of the economic problem.
> By its nature, a credit expansion ALWAYS leads to ever larger and more numerous
> mal-investments. None of these show themselves to be mal-investments until the wave of
> artificial credit starts to ebb away. In the U.S. case, all the mal- investments have already been
> made. They are HERE. And being here, there are no means between here and hell with which to
> make them into viable economic investments. A re- start of the U.S. credit expansion will NOT do
> it. Even a short-lived rerun of the U.S. credit expansion will only cause other sectors of the U.S.
> economy to add to their already outstanding mal-investments or start other and new mal-
> investments in other areas. Mal-investments are like building bridges in all the wrong places.
> These bridges can be engineering marvels and things of artistic beauty, but if people find they
> don't want to go where the bridges lead, they are useless. That is true even if it costs these
> people nothing or next to nothing (due to the credit expansion and lower interest rates) to pay
> to cross them.
> If the credit expansion dries up, then the people using the bridge have to pay out of their own
> pockets. Most of them will not cross the bridge at all or will find a cheaper alternative way to get
> to where they wanted to go so. The bridge is a mal-investment - it stands empty. To suddenly
> discover these empty bridges and then to recommend more of the policy that brought them into
> existence in the first place is to vehemently insist upon building bridges everywhere - to no
> economic purpose.
> The simple and fundamental economic fact is that once a credit expansion has run its course,
> people by their millions decide to return to the economic choices open to them when paid for by
> their own earnings, not their earnings PLUS their borrowings. If many of these people have taken
> losses, either on their share investments (as in Japan) or upon the values of their houses (though
> the loans against them haven't fallen) then there is no hope this side of hell that such people will
> suddenly become big spenders when lower interest rates on new loans are dangled before them.
> Even at near ZERO rates of interest, just like the ones in Japan, the powers-that-be simply
> cannot get the internal economy going again, because the consumer won't spend. They will
> certainly take advantage of the lower interest rates, but they will use them to re-finance their
> existing loans. That will cut the lenders earnings to ZERO - just like the rates.
> Waiting For The American Consumer:
> At this point in the global economic saga, the world is waiting for the American consumer. But if
> enough Americans decide that they won't play the borrow-and-spend game anymore, then it is
> not only the U.S. economy that is in Japanese territory, so is the entire world. It has been these
> American consumers, through their buying of imports, who have sustained most of the Asian
> economies. It is only Europe which stands in a different global position because only 2% of its
> output goes to the U.S.A.. Asia will be"toast" if U.S. imports decline badly. The 15 European
> Union nations will cope.
> The global problem is that the U.S. credit expansion has caused the economic equivalent of the
> rest of the world building false economic bridges everywhere, but especially to the U.S. These
> mal-investments were made because a large part of the U.S. credit expansion flowed overseas to
> buy imports. The U.S. trade and current account deficit inundated the world with a huge outflow
> of borrowed U.S. Dollars.
> The REAL U.S. Economy:
> The REAL U.S. economy makes real physical economic goods. It has been getting hammered since
> June 2000. The index of manufacturing activity fell sharply in the fourth quarter of 2000. Output
> has now been below 50 for three months in a row. U.S. export orders have been declining for
> three straight months. This is a very fast contraction and it is clearly accelerating. The
> production index has fallen from 49.6 % in November to just 42.4 % in December. Anything below
> 50 is very real contraction.
> Worse, U.S. corporate prices of inputs have risen from 56.6 in November to 61.0 in December.
> Worst of all are the input cost increases is energy. Here are just a few examples. Jet fuel has
> climbed in price by 59.6% from Nov 1999 to Nov 2000; diesel is up by 53.7%, natural gas by
> 51%, propane by 45.5%. The only two energy areas not showing huge price increases (yet) are
> electricity for consumers and commerce which have climbed over the above time frame by
> respectively 2.6% and 2.9%. But these figures do not yet reflect the current electricity crisis in
> California. Overall, over the this past period, U.S. corporate energy costs have climbed by an
> average of 20%. Consumer prices will react later.
> A Mighty Credit Crunch:
> U.S. corporations can no longer go to Wall Street and sell some more shares. That avenue is
> closed for raising more money. Corporate bonds are VERY hard to sell. The banks have taken their
>"welcome mats" for corporate borrowers and hidden them in the basement. Inside, in the back
> rooms, U.S. banks are counting up the fast climbing number of business and corporate loans that
> are going sour. Over at the junk market for corporate paper, speculative bond yields were 9.4%
> higher than matching U.S. Treasury paper. Junk bonds issued by IT outfits, like competitive local
> exchanges, are now carrying yields of up to 33% (that is NOT a"misprint"). The sum of all this is
> that U.S. businesses cannot get any money.
> It Took Intervention To Get To Here:
> Interventionism is the disease of governments. It is the obnoxious and deadly dangerous idea
> that people in the government can - through their complex manipulations of interest rates, money
> quantities, rules and regulations which are constantly changing, and all the rest. - achieve more
> than a proper free market held together by clear property rights and sound money and credit.
> When the sum of all the accumulated interventions inside the U.S. economy is beginning to show
> up clearly - a great danger is arriving - fast!
> The"stage" has been set for decades, but it has taken the fantastic credit expansion of
> 1995-2000 to reach the present point. Now, the REAL crunch is on. And the most certain thing
> Americans and the rest of the world can count upon is that to"cure" all these
> government-caused economic problems, even MORE interventions will be resorted to! As analysed
> earlier in this section, these problems, once caused, exist in physical reality. They are the
> mal-investments, the bridges which lead nowhere and which no one wants to cross anymore.
> Fundamentally, that is why no amount of additional government intervention can make these
> mal-investments economically viable.
> The Next Danger:
> That danger arrives on January 20. Knowing that the U.S. economy is in dire straits, the new
> Bush Administration is almost certain to try to act to"save" the economic situation. Their only
> means with which to do that is MORE government interventions in the U.S. financial system and
> economy.
> This is the fundamental problem with Interventionism. All nations have indulged in it. But only one
> nation, the U.S., has yet to pay the price for it. The"cure" for old interventions has always been
>"new" interventions - on top of the old ones. As long as the U.S. was seen to be"booming", the
>"cure" was seen to be working. When the U.S. is seen to have stopped"booming", the crisis of
> intervention is at hand.
>
> INSIDE THE UNITED STATES
>
> STEPPING INTO THE PRE-MADE WRECKAGE
> When President Bush steps into the Oval Office, he will also be stepping into the greatest
> economic mess any President has stepped into since President Hoover. Only one central
> economic fact is needed to both validate and justify this statement. Here it is: Between 1925
> and 1929, the (Benjamin) Strong Fed inflated the U.S. stock of money by 10%. Between 1995
> and 2000, the Greenspan Fed inflated the U.S. stock of money by 55%. All economic historians
> know what happened in 1929, but it takes valid economic theory - such as the Austrian Theory
> of the Trade Cycle - to look into what will happen now.
> Obviously, based upon the 10% inflation of the '20s money stock and the 55% inflation of the
> '90s money stock, the problem now is at least 5 times bigger than the monetary mistakes made in
> the lead up to 1929. As to the massive mal- investments made in the U.S.A. and especially in
> Japan and across Asia, there is really very little that can be done. A lot of these plants and their
> equipment will have to be shut down. After that has regrettably been done, new investments
> must be made in new plant and equipment that actually do have an economically valid consumer
> demand behind it - and not borrowings.
> That means that a"transitional" RECESSION is required.
> A transitional recession is one where, as mal-investments are written off and new investments
> entered into, the economy goes through a period of transitional unemployment and lowered living
> standards and the financial system goes through a period of writing-off the bad loans.
> Governments, standing before this otherwise normal economic event, can in principle do only two
> things. They can cut government expenditures to the bone and lower taxes to match. This will
> free up the cash flows of private individuals and all the affected businesses and enable them to
> SAVE. They can then use the savings to pay down most of the outstanding loans, and then
> stand with the means in hand to make new and valid investments.
> The other thing a government has to do is to set interest rates free. Under no circumstances
> must any attempt be made by a government to hold interest rates lower than where a free
> market in SAVED and lendable funds would have placed them. It is high interest rates that
> attract savings, not low ones. Along with setting interest rates free, a government must
> deregulate - FULLY.
> If the above economic principles are adhered to, the U.S. economy could work itself into the
> clear in three to five years. If they were adhered to in Asia, then Asia could emerge from the
> wreckage too.
> It Won't Happen!
> None of the above will happen, or it will happen to a woefully insufficient degree. This is because
> American politicians are by now too scared of the illusions in the minds of the American public
> which they themselves have so vigorously fostered over the last eight years. These illusions are
> fundamentally based upon the idea that endless borrowing was and is the yellow brick road to
> endless wealth.
> When politicians stand forward and promise"prosperity", they have to"create" it. But there never
> has been a stock of consumable goods and new plant and equipment (capital) in some well
> hidden warehouses behind the Treasury. Politicians, in fact and in reality, CANNOT create either
> wealth or prosperity.
> Having already"bought the basic premise", President Bush is regrettably certain to act with great
> vigour to maintain"prosperity", which in economic reality will mean that he will try to keep viable
> all the many mal-investments that now clutter up the U.S. economy. That is simply to act in
> utter defiance of the economic facts. More money, created either directly or through lower
> interest rates, won't make unviable investments viable. Nonetheless, Mr Bush is certain to try
> even more intervention and money creation.
>
> INSIDE JAPAN
>
> THE ACCELERATING DESCENT OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY
> Overview:
> For close to ten long years, Japan's political powers-that-be have tried, in vain, to sustain the
> mal-investments which Japan made during the boom of the late 1980s. Japan's fundamental
> economic problem is that it never attempted to get rid of these mal-investments, it simply tried
> to perpetuate them. Most of them are still here, cluttered with huge corporate debts.
> These unviable corporate debts are the nightmare of Japan's commercial banks. After all, they
> made all these loans back in the booming 1980s. When Japan's real estate values crashed,
> Japan's banks stared at the collapse of the collateral foundation underpinning an even larger
> amount of loans. Now, after ten long years, Japan's economy is again sliding backwards towards
> a new recession, this time led by a decline in exports to the, so far, insatiable U.S. economy.
> Again, the currency is leading events. Japan's Yen is now falling fast against the U.S. Dollar and
> even faster against the EU's Euro. Japan's program clearly is to let the Yen fall as fast, or faster,
> than Japan's exports to the U.S.A. are falling, all this done in an attempt to sustain the only part
> of Japan's industry that is functioning - exports.
> The Effect Upon The Rest Of Asia:
> But as Japan's Yen falls against the U.S. Dollar, all the rest of the Asian economies will
> increasingly see their exports to the U.S.A. decline. It cannot be long before most of these
> smaller economies also start their own currencies downwards! And then, a race will be on and the
>"winner" will be the nation which can make its currency fall farthest against the U.S. Dollar. The
> problem is that these falling currencies will again cause a huge capital flight, just like the one
> that happened during the crisis of 1997-99.
> At some point in this old sequence of competitive currency devaluations, China will have to act.
> If it does not do so, it will lose an ever larger part of its share in the export market to the U.S.
> economy. But, once China devalues, the rest of Asia will be thrown for a loop. This is because
> the last time that China did, in early 1998, the Asian Crisis escalated into a global financial crisis.
> The First Asia Crisis Re-Visited:
> When the first Asia Crisis exploded across the world's headlines at the beginning of 1998, the
> central thing never made mention of was that all these Asian economies stood with huge
> mountains of foreign exchange reserves. It ought to have been the most natural thing in the
> world for these nations to use part of their reserves to defend their currencies and re- liquify
> their financial systems. But they did not do so. Instead, the IMF and World Bank stormed in with
> multi- billion bail-out packages. The end result was that few, if any, of these vast holdings of
> foreign exchange reserves were thrown on the market. And that leads straight to the question:
> What are the"foreign exchange reserves" held by the Asian nations?
> They are hundreds of Billions of U.S. Dollars worth of U.S. TREASURY DEBT PAPER.
> Obviously, if huge amounts of U.S. Treasury debt paper had been sold, the U.S. bond market
> would have fallen, and that means that U.S. market rates of interest would have climbed. When
> all the U.S. Dollars acquired from such sales were also sold, the U.


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Ziemlich viel Text dazu in Deutsch:

Gruss

tofir
<ul> ~ hier</ul>
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>Ziemlich viel Text dazu in Deutsch:
>Gruss
>tofir

Danke, tofir, den Link hatte ich sogar schon.


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>Ziemlich viel Text dazu in Deutsch:
>Gruss
>tofir


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>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Für Schlaufuchs und alle Bären ein interessanter Link:

www.dailyreckoning.com
Dort findet man auch den jüngsten Riechebächer Artikel:
"The inevitable crash landing of the USA"

Aber bevor alles Geld in Puts gesteckt wird, denke man daran, daß sich das Szenario über einen Zeitraum vom mindestens 8 Jahren entwickeln wird.
Grüße
André
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

>Hallo,
>Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?
>ciao!
>SchlauFuchs


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