- Wer stopt die Nasdaq? Jetzt hilft auch kein steigender Ã-lpreis mehr! - Rainer, 04.09.2000, 13:06
- Re: Ideologie?? - Josef, 04.09.2000, 13:24
- Re: Wer stopt die Nasdaq? Jetzt hilft auch kein steigender Ã-lpreis mehr! - JüKü, 04.09.2000, 13:50
- Re: Wer stopt die Nasdaq? Jetzt hilft auch kein steigender Ã-lpreis mehr! - Neutra, 04.09.2000, 17:52
- Re: Euro, etc. - Prospector, 04.09.2000, 19:22
- Re: Euro, etc. - Oldy, 04.09.2000, 20:00
- Re: Euro, etc. - Prospector, 04.09.2000, 19:22
- Re: Wer stopt die Nasdaq? Jetzt hilft auch kein steigender Ã-lpreis mehr! - Neutra, 04.09.2000, 17:52
- Re: Wer stopt die Nasdaq? Jetzt hilft auch kein steigender Ã-lpreis mehr! - 2good4you, 04.09.2000, 17:22
- Re: Wer stopt die Nasdaq? Jetzt hilft auch kein steigender Ã-lpreis mehr! - Diogenes, 04.09.2000, 20:15
Re: Euro, etc.
>>>Der Euro scheind auch weiter zu fallen! Trendwende bei 0,88 wird immer mehr in Frage gesstellt. bis lang war es falsch auf einen steigenden Euro zu setzen.
>>>Ist dieses Board eigentlich idiologisch unterlegt?
>>[b]Was hätte eine Ideologie, wenn es so wäre, mit einem fallenden Euro zu tun. Man sollte mal die amerikanischen Kommentare zum Euro zur Kenntnis nehmen,dann versteht man,warum erso tief steht.
OK. Ich weise auf einen Artikel aus Barron's von 4. Sept. 2000, mit dem Titel"The Euro Paradox", geschrieben von Mieczyslaw Karczmar, ein in New York lebender Oekonomischer Berater der Deutschen Bank.
Einige Auschnitte:
The 20 month long tale of the euro can be best characterized as a combination of disappointment and confusion. Disappointment with the currency's weakness, and confusion regarding the EZB's policies. From a peak of $1.18 in Jan. '99, the eurro dropped to 88.45 cents in May of this year before reviving a bit, and reaching 96 cents in July. But late last week, it hit a new low of 88.38 cents - 25% below its peak. And market sentiment surrounding the currency remains negative.
How to explain this weakness, especially in light of Euroland's good economic recovery and an overwhelming bullish outlook for the new currency prior to itslaunching?
The standard explanation blames the extraaordinary strength of the American economy, which boosted the dollar's value. Thus, the popular perception is the greenback's strength, rather than the euro's weakness. But this argument stands on shaky ground because, while the dollar is up against the euro, it's down against the Japanese yen. On the other hand, the euro has depreciated against all major currencies. In truth, the prime causes of the euro's weakness have come from Europe.
First the euro has been a victim of excessive expectations. Well before its inception, it was widely beleived it would be a strong currency. This view was bolstered by the successful transition and by compliance with the Maastricht treaty by even the the leat likely countries of the Mediteranean area.
Second, early in its existence, the euro suffered from the"Red Oskar" syndrome, and attempt by former German Finance Minister, Oskar Lafontaine, to politicize the EZB. Even after his resignation, the shadow of political interference has hung over the bank.
This should not be surprising in view of the embarrassing haggling by Germany and France in mid-1998 over the selection of the EZB's president.
Although the Maastricht Treaty has established the EZB in the German Bundesbank's mold, French politicians have expressed reservations about non-elected central banker's power to indirectly determine the unemployment rate in France.
Finally, the EZB has failed to establish its credibility in the critical period following the euro's debut. It's top officials have been speaking with different and sometimes contradictory voices regarding policy priorities of the new central bank and the assessment of the euro's performance.A sense of benign neglect emerged towards the euro's weakness as the EZB consistently refused to intervene in the market to support the currency, despite the advice of prominent economists, including Robert Mundell, the Nobel Prize winner and intellectual godfather of the euro.
This sense of indifference evolved into a suspicion among market participants that there was a dliberate policy aimed at gaining export competitiveness.
Er sagt weiter damit haben sie Erfolg gehabt.
The euro's weakness, in the face of favorable fundamentals, has been essentially a psychological phenomenon indicating a lack of confidence in the European Central bank's ability to secure a strong and stable currency. Therefore, it shouln't be surprising that a shift of currency reserves from the dollar area hasn't materialized. By keeping the euro low, the EZB defeated an important policy objective - transformingthe euro into an international transaction, investment and reserve currency that could challenge the dollar.
What is the outlook for the euro. In the near term it is likely to pick up moderately as the American economy slows while Euroland still expands briskly.
This may lift the dollar/euro exchange rate toward parity by the end of this year. But these cyclically driven movements carry the seeds of their reversal.
It is only a matter of time before lower import absorption by the US hurts European exports, which will be additionally reduced by the lower dollar.
The longer-term outlook primarily will depend on the credibility of the EZB, particularly on its independence from political interference. The experience of the past 20 months doesn't augur well.
If the EZb was unable to build its credibility during the period of strong economic growth and falling unemployment, it could be more difficult when the economy slows, let alone slips into recession, and unemployment starts rising. Political pressure would intensify under such circumstances.But even when disregarding the cyclical factors, it's not entirely clear whether the EZB is interested in transforming the euro into an international transaction and reserve currency thant would take on the greenback.
Of course, the exchange rate between the dollar and the euro will depend not only on the attitude of the EZB, but also on developments in the States. But regardless of what the deveoplments might be, US policy makers should's lose sleep over fear that, in the foreseeable future, the dollar will be deprived of its function as a global currency.
Herein lies the paradox: DeGaulle's idea of challenging the dollar has become even more compelling now, when his political successors have"promoted" the US from a superpower to a hyperpower, and when all of Europe is striving to emancipate itself fromAmerican dominance.
Das ist also ein Beispiel einer americ. Perspektive zum Thema Euro, aber von einem welcher fuer eine Europ, d.h. Deutsche Bank arbeitet. Er vertritt bestimmt die Meinungen vieler anderer hier. Ich finde es besonders interessant dass er die Meinung vertritt die EZB habe gar kein Interesse aus dem Euro eine starke reserve currency zu machen.
Wenn das war ist, hat man der Bevoelkerung aber ein faules Ei verkauft!!!!
mfg. Prospector
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