Japans capital shortage 600 Miliarden Euro

verfasst von nasdaq, 22.06.2002, 11:24

Seit einem Jahr von 55 auf 69 Billionen Yen gestiegen = ca. 600 Milliarden Euro.
Bitte nachfolgenden Artikel beachten, es ist eigentlich ganz einfach. Man nehme eine notwendige Verzinsung des Kapitals, auf die derzeitigen Gewinne an (4%) und vergleiche diese mit der aktuellen Verzinsung. Um die Verzinsung anzuheben muss Kapital liquidiert werden (Imobillienbesitz abgeschrieben etc...). Diese Abeschreibungen müssen nun vom Eigenkapital aufgenommen werden, sonst passiert das gleiche wie bei Holzmann.

Liegt der abzuschreibende Wert über dem gesamten Eigenkapital so entsteht ein"capital shortage" und dieser liegt auf diesen schwindelerregenden Höhen.

Ein Grund dafür ist sicherlich die schlechte Gewinnlage in den Unternehmen, wenn man aber bedenkt, dass gerade die Kapitalprobleme für einen Großteil der Probleme verantwortlich ist so ist nicht davon auszugehen, dass wir einen massiven Gewinnsprung bekommen werden der die Probleme in der Bilanz ausbügeln kann.

Japan: Captial Shortage Update -- 1 First Street

Robert Alan Feldman



The non-performing loan (NPL) problem is coming back on the agenda of both policymakers and investors. Senior policymakers are once again raising the issue intensively, and the decline of bank stock index to about 200 (Jan. 6, 1992 = 1000), after peaking at 235 on June 3, indicates that investors too are re-examining the financial sector issue. In light of the skepticism about bank forecasts of prospective credit costs, it is important to see how balance sheets of Japanese industries have developed over the last year. Such an examination will update estimates of the capital shortage on the corporate side, and thus help to show whether NPL problem is getting better or worse. The answer is mixed. That said, even the more positive data suggest that the problem remains huge, and that massive efforts will be needed to eliminate the capital shortage in Japanese industry. This result also suggests that investors will again turn their attention to the non-performing loan issue.

At the June 7 meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), many members re-emphasized the importance of the non-performing loan issue, and its relationship with the efficiency of corporate asset use. For example, the following statements were made:

* Prof. Hiroshi Yoshikawa:"The NPL problem is still there.... It is intertwined with the issue of corporate revival."

* METI Minister Takeo Hiranuma (in response to Prof. Yoshikawa):"This is an extremely important observation."

* BoJ Governor Masaru Hayami:"The most important and pressing issue is, after all, conquering the NPL problem."

* MoF Minister Shojuro Shiokawa:"I think that overbanking is a major problem."

* Economics Minister Takenaka:"Ever since our ‘Thick Bone Report’ [of June 2001], we have said that the financial problem and the balance sheet problem live at 1 First Street."

In light of these statements, it is clearly incorrect to believe that somehow the financial sector issue has dropped off the radar screen of the government. Moreover, now that such statements are coming with more frequency and intensity, investor attention is likely to refocus on the financial sector issue.

Unfortunately, investor confidence in forecasts of NPLs from financial institutions and from the authorities remains low. After all, in each of the last three years, initial forecasts have underestimated the final outcome by a country mile. This year, as my colleague Hideyasu Ban recently has written, the estimate of credit costs issued by the major banks of Y2.5 trl. will likely be far too low -- with a figure of Y3.9 trl. likely as the minimum. Once again, investors will be looking outside the forecasts from the financial sector to get a handle on where the NPL issue stands, and where the balance sheet clean-up stands.

Outside of financial sector data, the only source of aggregate data on balance sheet trends is the Ministry of Finance’s Corporate Statistics. Last summer, I published an estimate of the capital shortage, using these data. (See"The Capital Shortage," July 10, 2001.) The method is simple. First, divide recurring profits by a target return on assets (I use 4%, the pre-1990 average in this data set) to derive a target level of total assets. Second, take the difference between actual assets and target assets. If the former exceed the latter, the excess is the amount of required balance sheet shrinkage. Third, assume that the loss to shareholder equity from asset liquidation is 50%. Fourth, apply this loss ratio to the required balance sheet shrinkage, and derive the amount by which shareholder equity will decline. Fifth, compare the actual level of shareholder equity with the required decline. If the required decline exceeds actual shareholder equity, then the industry (or firm) has a capital shortage, equal to the difference of the two.

In my report of July 10, 2001, I applied this method to the 35 industries in the MoF Corporate Statistics, and calculated that the aggregate capital shortage for the 7 capital-short industries was Y55 trl (see Exhibit 1). Applying exactly the same method to data for March 2002, the total capital shortage rose to Y69 trl. There were two major differences between the two years. First, the number of industries that were capital short rose to 15 -- largely as a result of the collapse of profits during the year. In particular, the posting of a loss by the electrical machinery industry generated a capital shortage there of nearly Y13 trl. Other industries that fell into capital shortage were non-ferrous metals, petroleum, apparel, construction (which barely avoided capital shortage in 2001), and wholesale. Second, there were substantial improvements in some industries. In particular, the capital shortage in the real estate industry shrank considerably, from Y39 trl in 2001 to"only" Y15 trl in 2002. This improvement came from both an improvement of profitability (recurring profits in the real estate went from Y1.63 trl in 2001 to Y2.07 trl in 2002) and a shrinkage of the asset base (from Y131 trl in 2001 to Y111 trl in 2002).

Exhibit 1. Estimates of the Capital Shortage (Yen in trillions)


March 2001
March 2002

All Firms



Single Year Basis
55
69

Three Year Average Basis
90
66

Five Year Average Basis
89
80

Real Estate



Single Year Basis
39
15

Three Year Average Basis
44
36

Five Year Average Basis
47
41


Source: Morgan Stanley Research estimates.

With such large fluctuations in the estimates of the level and composition of the capital shortage, some smoothing of the data seems reasonable. The same calculations can be performed with multi-year moving averages, in order to eliminate the cyclical component. The results are interesting. The good news is that the estimated levels of the capital shortage fall for both 3-year and 5-year moving averages. The bad news is that the levels of capital shortage remain very high. These estimates suggest that much remains to be done in raising profits and shrinking balance sheets. The equally troubling, other side of this coin is that the financial sector will also require much more work before investors can be confident that the problem of financial fragility has been solved.



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• Japans capital shortage 600 Miliarden Euro - nasdaq, 22.06.2002, 11:24
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