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Mix-Ansicht- Was sollen die Zentralbanken bezüglich sog. ‚asset bubbles' tun? (E) - Popeye, 06.09.2002, 07:07
- Re: Was.. Zentralbanken.. tun? - Kompliment - nereus, 06.09.2002, 08:36
Was sollen die Zentralbanken bezüglich sog. ‚asset bubbles' tun? (E)
-->Dieser Artikel und der integrierte Link befassen sich mit der Frage, ob Zentralbanken sog. ‚asset bubbles' (z.B. in Aktien- und Immobilien-Märkten) rechtzeitig zum Platzen bringen soll oder nicht. Die damit zusammenhängenden Fragen sind vielfältig und das Ergebnis dieser Diskussion kann weitreichende und dauerhafte Konsequenzen nicht nur für Aktienbesitzer haben.
To burst or not to burst?
Sep 5th 2002
From The Economist print edition
Was Alan Greenspan really powerless to stop the
stockmarket bubble?
EVERY August central bankers and economists gather
in the Rocky Mountain resort of Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, for the annual symposium of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City. This year Alan
Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
used the opportunity to give his fullest defence yet
against charges that he should have raised interest
rates in the late 1990s enough to prick the
stockmarket bubble before it got too big. The Fed,
like other central banks, takes account of rising asset
prices (shares or property) to the extent that they
boost spending and hence future inflation. Yet a
financial bubble can inflate even when inflation in
goods and services remains low. And when a bubble
bursts, it may cause severe balance-sheet strains-of
the kind now showing in America.
Mr Greenspan offers two defences for failing to
respond to the bubble. First, he argues that it was
impossible to be certain that the rise in share prices
in the late 1990s really was a bubble until after it
had burst. Second, even if a central bank can detect a
bubble, it is not clear what it can do. A small rise in
interest rates might not work; by increasing
confidence in the central bank's powers, it might even
boost share prices further. On the other hand, a
sharp increase in rates could trigger a recession-the
very outcome central bankers would be seeking to
avoid, says Mr Greenspan.
Detecting and pricking bubbles are both difficult, but
that is not a justification for doing nothing. Monetary
policy always deals with uncertainty. Judging whether
a rise in share prices is justified by an increase in
productivity growth is surely not that different from
deciding whether the potential rate of growth has
increased or decreased. Central banks have to do
that to estimate the gap between actual and
potential output-itself an important input for
forecasting inflation. A central bank does not need to
be completely certain to act. Unrealistic profit
expectations built into share prices in the late 1990s
pointed to the strong probability of a bubble.
Supporters of Mr Greenspan argue that central
bankers are unlikely to have more information or to
make better judgments about share prices than
markets do. Yet central bankers have longer time
horizons and different incentives from the private
sector. In other words, in many circumstances they
may respond differently to the same information.
What of Mr Greenspan's second claim, that a small
rise in interest rates might prove counterproductive?
He cites three years-1989, 1994 and 1999-when
share prices continued to rise even as the Federal
Reserve raised rates. All the same, the impact of
higher rates might be different if the Fed were
actually to state that its aim was to cool the
stockmarket.
There may be no painless way to deflate bubbles. Yet
the correct test is not whether a bubble can be
deflated without some loss of output. Rather, it is
whether the early pricking of a bubble causes less
pain than letting it grow only to burst later. The
longer a bubble is allowed to inflate, the more it
encourages the build-up of other imbalances, such as
too much borrowing and investment, which have the
power to turn a mild downturn into something
nastier. If the Fed had let some air out of the bubble
earlier, America's economy might now be better
placed for future growth.
A recent paper* by Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe at
the Bank for International Settlements addresses the
problem of identifying bubbles. The authors argue
that the focus on asset-price bubbles alone is wrong.
It is only when a boom in share prices or house prices
is combined with a big increase in debt and
overinvestment by firms that economic and financial
stability is threatened. From a study of 34 countries
since 1960, Mr Borio and Mr Lowe conclude that a
simultaneous surge in both credit and asset prices
gives a pretty reliable warning of financial problems
ahead. The case for a rise in interest rates is
therefore stronger when asset-price rises go
hand-in-hand with rapid growth in credit-as in
America in the late 1990s.
Fuelling the fire
Admittedly, for the Fed to justify an increase in
interest rates when inflation was low would have
been hard-but not impossible. It could, for instance,
have argued that raising rates and so containing
financial imbalances would avoid future economic
instability and hence a large undershoot in future
inflation.
Central bankers do not have a political mandate to
respond to asset prices. Even so, Mr Greenspan could
still have done more to warn investors about their
irrational exuberance (which he talked of as long ago
as December 1996). At least he could have refrained
from talking up share prices, if unintentionally,
through his enthusiasm for the new economy. Mr
Greenspan repeatedly expressed confidence that
America's productivity growth had risen significantly,
encouraging investors to form unrealistic profit
expectations. Estimates of productivity growth have
since been cut. Goldman Sachs has shaved its
estimate of trend productivity growth to 2%. Two
years ago, most economists had their sights on 3%
or more.
One positive sign: in his speech Mr Greenspan did at
least accept that the Fed should try to identify
bubbles and to incorporate them into economic
models. But for the moment he doubts that central
banks can do anything about them.
If the American economy recovers fast, then Mr
Greenspan's policies will be vindicated-if bubbles
left to burst of their own accord result only in a mild
recession, central banks do not need to prick them. If
America suffers several years of slow growth as its
financial imbalances unwind, however, the verdict
must be that the Fed got it wrong.
Quelle: Economist
Der unten gepostete Link führt zu dem zitierten Artikel:
"Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability: Exploring the Nexus", BIS Working Paper No. 114, by Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe
<ul> ~ http://www.bis.org/publ/work114.pdf</ul>
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