Nach dem Irak-Krieg. Rosige Aussichten!

verfasst von kingsolomon, 12.12.2002, 10:22

-->Wenn es für die einzige"Supermacht" so unendlich viel zu gewinnen gibt, bei
ein paar kaum nennenswerten Risiken; da muss den Falken um Bush doch der Speichel aus dem Mund tropfen...

ein Bericht von STRATFOR, dem geopolitischen Sprachrohr der US-Regierung


The War After Iraq
Summary
For the United States, fighting and winning a war against Iraq
has become a strategic imperative. Although it is true that this
war could engender greater support for al Qaeda among the Islamic
masses, the consequences of not attacking Baghdad -- from
Washington's perspective -- could be worse. But even more
important, a victory and U.S. occupation of a conquered Iraq
would reshape the political dynamic in the Middle East. The
United States would be in a position to manipulate the region on
an unprecedented scale.
Analysis
The current struggle over the soul of the weapons inspection
process in Iraq must not divert attention from the primary
strategic reality: The world's only superpower has decided that
the defeat and displacement of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's
regime is in its fundamental national interest. That superpower
prefers that its allies and the United Nations concur with its
position, but this preference should not be mistaken for a
requirement.
Washington is prepared to wait a reasonable length of time to
procure that support -- particularly since its own military
strategy dictates that operations should not begin until January.
Nevertheless, regardless of the stance the U.N. and U.S. allies
have adopted, there is little doubt that the United States will
press forward and, in all likelihood, will defeat and occupy
Iraq.
There are some negative reasons for this. It is no longer
politically possible for the Bush administration to abandon its
quest. By this, we do not mean"politically" in a domestic sense,
although that is a consideration. Of far greater importance are
the political consequences the United States would incur in the
Islamic world if it did not carry out its threats against Iraq.
Many have pointed to the potential consequences of waging a war -
- namely exciting greater support for al Qaeda among the Islamic
masses -- but public debate has neglected to consider the
consequences of inaction.
Al Qaeda persistently has argued that the United States is
fundamentally weak. From Beirut in the 1980s to Desert Storm,
Somalia and now the Afghan war, the United States, the argument
goes, has failed to act decisively and conclusively. Unwilling to
take casualties, Washington either has withdrawn under pressure
or has refused to take decisive but costly steps to impose its
will. Al Qaeda has argued repeatedly that the United States
should not be feared because, at root, it lacks the will to
victory.
Should the United States -- having made Iraq the centerpiece of
its war-making policy since last spring -- decline engagement
this time, it would be another confirmation that, ultimately, the
United States lacks the stomach for war and that increasing the
pressure on Washington is a low-risk enterprise with high
potential returns. In other words, at this point, the political
consequences of failing to act against Iraq might reduce hatred
of the United States somewhat but will increase contempt for it
dramatically.
Machiavelli raised the core question: Is it better for a prince
to be loved or feared? He answered the question simply -- love is
a voluntary emotion; it comes and it goes, but it is very
difficult to impose. Moreover, it is an emotion with
unpredictable consequences. Fear, on the other hand, is
involuntary. It can be imposed from the outside, and the behavior
of frightened people is far more predictable. This is the classic
political problem the United States faces today. Washington
cannot possibly guarantee the love of the Islamic world.
Therefore, it cannot guarantee that if it does not attack Iraq,
Islamic hatred for the country will subside. But it is certain
that if it does not attack, fear of the United States will
decline. According to this logic, the United States cannot
decline war at this point.
War is the issue; voluntary regime change is not. It is not only
important that Hussein's government fall, it is equally important
that the United States be seen as the instrument of its
destruction and the U.S. military the means of his defeat. Given
the logic of its strategy, the United States must defeat the
Iraqi army overwhelmingly and be seen as imposing its will. It
must establish its military credibility decisively and
overwhelmingly.
The reasons go beyond transforming the psychology of the Islamic
world. The United States has direct military reasons for needing
to defeat Iraq in war. From Washington's viewpoint, any outcome
must allow the United States to occupy Iraq with its own military
forces. This is not because it needs to govern Iraq directly,
although demonstrating control over a defiant Islamic country
would support its interests. Nor is oil the primary issue,
although this would give the United States some serious
bargaining power with allies. The primary reason is geography.
If we look at a map, Iraq is the most strategic country between
the Levant and the Persian Gulf. It shares borders with Jordan,
Syria, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait and, most of all, Saudi Arabia. If
the United States were to occupy Iraq, it would be there by right
of conquest. Unlike any other country in the region, the United
States would not have to negotiate with an occupied Iraq. It
would have ample room for deploying air power in the heart of the
region. More important, it would be able to deploy a substantial
ground force capable of bringing pressure to bear within a 360-
degree radius. Within a matter of months, the United States would
become the most powerful military force native to the region.
Consider some of the consequences. For example, the Saudi royal
family currently is caught between two fears: the fear of al
Qaeda sympathizers inside and outside the family and fear of the
United States. On the whole, officials in Riyadh fear al Qaeda
sympathizers somewhat more than they fear the United States. They
will attempt to placate the United States, but they are not
prepared to make the kind of fundamental, internal changes needed
to act meaningfully against al Qaeda sympathizers.
With several U.S. armored divisions on the nation's borders,
however, the Saudi calculus must change. When Iraq deployed
forces against Saudi Arabia, Riyadh relied upon the United States
to protect its interests. If U.S. forces deploy on its borders,
who will come to Saudi Arabia's aid then? Riyadh's assumption
always has been (1) that the United States, concerned about Iraq
and Iran, could not turn on Saudi Arabia and (2) that the United
States lacked the military means to turn on it. All of that is
true -- unless the United States has occupied Iraq, has control
of the Iranian frontier and perceives Saudi Arabia as a direct
threat because it has failed to control al Qaeda. The Saudi fear
factor then would change dramatically and so, one suspects, would
its actions.
Similarly, the threat to Iran from U.S. ground and air forces
also has been extremely limited. Iran's western frontier has been
secure since Desert Storm, and the country has been relatively
insulated from U.S. power. Domestic affairs have developed in
relative security from the United States or any external threat.
If the United States occupies Iraq, the Iranian reality will be
fundamentally changed. This does not mean that Iran will become
pro-American -- quite the contrary, it might retreat into
rigidity. But it will not stay the same.
Following a war in Iraq, the United States would become the
defining power in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. It is
difficult to imagine any coalition of regional nation-states that
could emerge either to oust or control the United States. Even in
the event that a tide of anti-Americanism ripped the region
apart, the objective strategic equation would not permit a
coalition of regional forces to mount a substantial challenge to
the United States. To the contrary, Washington would be in a
position to manipulate the region on an unprecedented scale. It
also would be able to mount operations against al Qaeda
throughout the region much more effectively than it can today
and, we should add, without requesting permission.
The downside of this strategy is obvious and much-discussed.
Hatred and resentment of the United States will run deep, and
this undoubtedly will generate more recruits for al Qaeda, at
least in the short run. Certainly, al Qaeda will continue its
strategy of striking at U.S. targets where and when it can. If
the United States attacks Iraq against European wishes, the
Europeans potentially might withdraw intelligence collaboration,
thus increasing U.S. vulnerability. These are not trivial
concerns, and Washington takes them seriously.
But ultimately, Washington appears to believe that the upside of
an occupied Iraq trumps the downside.
1. It is true that al Qaeda recruitment might rise, but al Qaeda
does not have a problem with recruitment now. Not only do its
core operations not require large numbers of operatives, but in
fact, they cannot use large numbers because they depend upon
stealth and security, both of which make large-scale recruitment
impossible. It will be difficult to turn intensified hatred into
intensified, effective operations. Random attacks in region
doubtless will increase, but this will be a tolerable price to
pay. Ultimately, al Qaeda already operates at its structural
capacity and cannot capitalize on increased sympathy for its
cause.
2. Any government in the region will have to reassess the
fundamental threat it faces. With a U.S. presence in Iraq, Saudi
leaders, for example, will recalculate their interests. A pro-al
Qaeda government would become the target of a very real U.S.
regional power. A neutral government would come under tremendous
U.S. pressure, including the threat of attack. Governments -- and
not only that in Saudi Arabia -- would find it in their interest
to suppress the growth of al Qaeda sympathies, in collaboration
with the United States.
3. European states will not abrogate relations with the United
States no matter what it does in Iraq. Ultimately, al Qaeda and
militant Islam are as much a threat to Europe as to the United
States. Ending intelligence cooperation with the United States
would hurt Europe at least as much as Washington. Moreover,
Europe is vulnerable to the United States in a range of economic
areas. A successful operation in Iraq, once concluded, would
create a new reality not only in the region but globally. The
Europeans might accelerate development of an integrated defense
policy -- but then again, even this might not happen.
The U.S. view, therefore, apparently is that a post-war world in
which U.S. forces operating out of Iraq establish a regional
sphere of influence -- based on direct military power -- is the
foundation for waging a regional war that will defeat al Qaeda.
The United States does not expect to obliterate either al Qaeda
or related groups, but it does expect to be able to further
contain the network's operations by undermining the foundations
of its support and basing in the region. Washington also would be
able to control the regional balance of power directly, rather
than through proxies as it currently must. In effect, the era in
which Washington must negotiate with a state like Qatar in order
to carry out essential operations will end.
What is most interesting here is that, ultimately, it doesn't
matter whether the Bush administration has clearly thought
through these consequences. The fact is that no matter
Washington's intent, the conquest of Iraq will have this outcome.
History frequently is made by people with a clear vision, but
sometimes it is the result of unintended consequences. In the
end, history takes you to the same place. However, in our view,
the Bush administration is quite clear in its own mind about how
the region will look after a U.S.-Iraq war. We suspect that the
risks are calculated as well.
1. The United States might get bogged down in a war in Iraq if
enemy forces prove more capable than expected and -- facing high
casualties in Baghdad -- Washington might be forced to accept an
armistice that would leave it in a far worse position
psychologically and geopolitically than before.
2. The consequences of U.S. occupation might be the opposite of
what is expected. A broad anti-U.S. coalition could form in the
region, and al Qaeda might use the changed atmosphere to increase
its regional influence and to intensify anti-U.S. operations.
3. European leaders actually might shift from making speeches to
supplying direct military support for Saudi Arabia and other
states in the region against the United States.
4. Prior to an attack, U.S. public opinion might shift massively
against a war, making it impossible for the United States to act.
Once again, the superpower would appear to be all talk, no
action.
Officials in Washington believe none of these things will happen.
This view ultimately will prove either correct or incorrect. But
in understanding what is transpiring with Iraq, this must be
understood as the core U.S. perception. It is what drives the
United States forward. From Washington's point of view, this is
the clearest path to taking the initiative away from al Qaeda and
reshaping regional power in such a way as to deny it effective
sanctuary -- even though this strategy undoubtedly will spawn
further hatred of the United States

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gesamter Thread:

• Nach dem Irak-Krieg. Rosige Aussichten! - kingsolomon, 12.12.2002, 10:22
  • na endlich mal klare Worte - der Krieg nach Irak - Digedag, 12.12.2002, 11:24
  • Re: Nach dem Irak-Krieg. Rosige Aussichten - oder doch nicht ganz? - Emerald, 12.12.2002, 17:36