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Mix-Ansicht- Aktien im Irak... - nasdaq, 20.01.2003, 18:48
- noch mehr Infos zur Wirtschaftslage im Irak... - nasdaq, 20.01.2003, 19:03
noch mehr Infos zur Wirtschaftslage im Irak...
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“[In 1991], Iraq’s total external debt was estimated at $43
billion. Its size constituted 65% of the Gross Domestic Product.”
(Cordesman 1997, 156)
“With virtually no debt-service payments made after 1991, the
foreign debt has risen to an estimated $119bn by the end of 1997,
of which $80.8bn was arrears on principal and $38.1bn arrears on
interest.” (Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Country Profile:
Iraq, 1998-99, 29)
“Annual inflation, which was running at 45% before Iraq invaded
Kuwait in 1990, jumped to an average 500% in 1991. The UN Food
and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has calculated that, from the
imposition of sanctions to the end of 1995, food prices had risen
4,000-fold. …A financial crisis at the end of 1995 forced [the
Iraqi government] to raise the price of the basic monthly ration
almost 50-fold between January and March 1996.” (Economist
Intelligence Unit, EIU Country Profile: Iraq, 1998-99, 15)
“The official value of the dinar, which has remained at
ID0.331:$1 since 1982, bears no relation to its black-market
rate. This hit a low of ID2,660:$1 in December 1995, at the
height of the economic crisis generated by inflation and
sanctions. It recovered on news that Iraq was entering talks with
the UN on an oil-for-food deal, to a peak of ID650:$1 in February
1996. Since 1995 state banks have been allowed to trade at an
unofficial rate; this stood at ID450:$1 in February 1996. The
continuing weakness of the Iraqi economy and the scarcity of
foreign exchange due to UN sanctions have contributed to the
dinar’s further decline against the dollar. The average blackmarket
exchange rate for 1997 was estimated by the EIU at
ID1,498:$1.” (Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Country Profile:
Iraq, 1998-99, 29)
“The effect of the sanctions regime has been catastrophic.
Official figures have not been released for many years but real
GDP is estimated to have fallen by nearly two-thirds in 1991,
owing to an 85% decline in oil production and devastation of the
industrial and services sectors of the economy. Agricultural
growth has since been low and erratic, and manufacturing output
has all but vanished. With the oil-for-food deal, GDP is
estimated to have risen by 25% in 1997. But growth is
concentrated in the oil sector, and sanctions continue to stifle
other sectors of the economy.” (Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU
Country Profile: Iraq, 1998-99, 14-15)
The Iraq sanctions committee has made several grossly
inappropriate waiver decisions, casting a shadow on the
efficiency of the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions
against Iraq: “At one point, five tons of patchouli leaves were
cleared as a food stuff (!); there have several times been sugar
notifications in volumes twice what the total population could
possibly consume; there have been massive approvals for
agricultural equipment without any indication of how they were to
be financed; there have been massive flows of teacups and
drinking glasses. Items are described manipulatively in order to
strengthen their claim of humanitarian usage (e.g. textiles are
disguised as “coffin cloth”); the unit prices given are open to
question: e.g. detergent for $4/ton, water glasses for $10 a
piece.” (Conlon, 86)
“[I]raq’s average per capita income dropped from a peak of $8,161
in 1979 to $2,108 in 1989… [and]to well under $1,000 a year in
1992-1995.” (Cordesman 1997, 124)
“According to the new Iraqi oil minister Lieutenant General ‘Amir
Muhammad Rashid, Iraq lost $85 billion in revenue as a result of
the ban on the export of its oil between August 6, 1990 and July
1995.” (Cordesman 1997, 136)
Quelle:
<ul> ~ http://www.iie.com/topics/sanctions/iraq-economicimpact.pdf</ul>
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