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The Gold Cover Clause
The Deflation Solution
A Subject You Must Understand
if You Wish to Succeed in Gold Investments in 2003
by James E. Sinclair, CEO & Chairman
Tan Range Exploration, www.tanrange.com
December 23, 2002
With your questions answered:
What is the Gold Cover Clause?
How was it and how will it be used?
When will it be used again?
How will affect the US Dollar when implemented?
How will it effect the price of gold before and after implemented?
How will it effect the gold investor immediately and long-term?
In order to comprehend how gold will be utilized to reverse the present economic down spiral we need to build our foundation of reasoning with historical facts as well as several fundamental concepts.
The Federal Reserve Gold Certificate Ratio
AKA
The Gold Cover Clause
Source: Encyclopedia of Banking & Finance (9th Edition) by Charles J Woelfel
Definitions:
The ratio of the prescribed assets to the specified liabilities of Federal Reserve banks, the actually prevailing proportion being reported in the weekly Federal Reserve Statement. Paragraph 3 of Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act was amended June 12, 1945, so as to reduce the minimum reserve requirements of the Federal Reserve banks from 40% of their Federal Reserve notes outstanding and 35% of their deposits to 25% of both their notes and deposits. Where the former requirements, however, had permitted lawful money as an alternative to gold certificates as the required assets for the 35% reserve against deposits and reserves in gold certificates for the 40% against Federal Reserve notes in actual circulation, the new requirement permitted only gold certificates or gold certificate credits as the reserve. Ratio of gold certificates to deposits and Federal Reserve note liabilities, combined, of the Federal Reserve banks had dipped to 41.7% as of December 31, 1945, compared with 90% at the close of 1940. Under Section 11(c) of the Federal Reserve Act, when the gold (certificates) reserve held against Federal Reserve notes fell below 40%, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was to establish a graduated tax of not more than 1% per annum upon such deficiency until the reserves fell to 32.5%; and when the reserve fell below 32.5%, a tax at the rate of not less than 1.5% per annum, upon each 2.5% or faction thereof that such reserve fell below 32.5% per annum, was to be paid by the Federal Reserve bank concerned, but the bank was to add the amount of the tax to the discount rate.
Under the June 12, 1945, amendment (59 Stat. 237), when the reserve held against Federal Reserve notes fell below 25%, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was to establish a graduated tax of not more than 1% upon such deficiency until the reserves fell to 20%; and when the reserve fell below 20%, a tax at the rate of not less than 1.5%, upon each 2.5% or fraction thereof that the reserve fell below 20%, was to be paid by the Federal Reserve bank concerned, but the bank was to add the amount of the tax to the discount rate.
By act of Congress approved March 3, 1965 (P.L. 89-3), this reserve requirement contained in Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act for the maintenance of gold certificates of not less than 25% against Federal Reserve bank deposit liabilities was eliminated. Ratio of gold certificates to Federal Reserve notes outstanding and deposit liabilities, combined, had dipped to 27.5% as of December 31, 1964. Based on the new required coverage of only Federal Reserve notes outstanding, the ratio would have been 42.7% as of December 31, 1964.
By the end of 1967, the ratio of gold certificates to Federal Reserve notes outstanding was down to 27.1%. By act of Congress approved March 18, 1968 (P.L. 90-269), the revised provision of Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act, under which the Federal Reserve banks were required to maintain reserves in gold certificates of not less than 25% against Federal Reserve notes (the so-called gold cover against the notes) was finally eliminated altogether.
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JES NOTE:
By P.L. 90-269 on March 18, 1968 the Dollar Reserve Standard & international political economics were founded. With this event, the creation of money supply no longer had any controls other than the will of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Note the comments made by Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan on the over production of money concerning the results of a fiat (paper) monetary system in his comment on gold. Understanding the event of March 18, 1968, in the light of the recent statement made by Chairman Greenspan concerning fiat monetary system’s incapacity, is quite important to your understanding of what will occur in the not too distant future.
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Recent quote from the December 19, 2002
Chairman of the Federal Reserve: Remark on Gold
JES NOTE: The following statement by Chairman Greenspan on the basic Gospel of Gold and related to the unbridled creation of money supply that has occurred without the Gold Cover Clause in effect.
"Although the gold standard could hardly be portrayed as having produced a period of price tranquility, it was the case that the price level in 1929 was not much different, on net, from what it had been in 1800. But, in the two decades following the abandonment of the gold standard in 1933, the consumer price index in the United States nearly doubled. And, in the four decades after that, prices quintupled. Monetary policy, unleashed from the constraint of domestic gold convertibility, has allowed a persistent over issuance of money. As recently as a decade ago, central bankers, having witnessed more than a half-century of chronic inflation, appeared to confirm that a fiat currency was inherently subject to excess."
JES NOTE: The next four statements by the Chairman refer to what I believe is the preparation to invoke all of the means that were used in the Roosevelt years to fight deflation and include a preemptive measure should inflationary figures fall below the zero level.
"Moreover, a major objective of the recent heightened level of scrutiny is to ensure that any latent deflationary pressures are appropriately addressed well before they become a problem.
“Although the US economy has largely escaped any deflation since World War II, there are some well-founded reasons to presume that deflation is more of a threat to economic growth than is inflation."
"The expansion of the monetary base can proceed even if overnight rates are driven to their zero lower bound."
"Clearly, it would be desirable to avoid deflation. But if deflation were to develop, options for aggressive monetary policy responses are available."
JES NOTE:
I firmly believe that you can now expect a rise in the price of gold without significant interruption unless it runs too hard, too fast. Devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold was one of the tools used in the 1930 to fight deflation. Since that is the nature of gold to run hard price-wise, you can expect gold to be turned back at certain levels as it was last week at $354.50. It will be turned back again at $372. However, I am now convinced that we will see a price in the area over $400 in the not too distant future as the Federal Reserve acts to offset incipient deflation by significant additional expansion of monetary aggregates and the attendant effect on the dollar.
Gold will be called back into the system via a modernized version of the Gold Cover Clause somewhere, but no later than the time at which the USDX (dollar measure) trades in the middle.70s. This will then be necessary to prevent the dollar from experiencing a free-fall in the form I have suggested above. In my opinion, introduction of a modernized Gold Cover Clause - Reserve Ratio will work some time after it is introduced to restructure dollar confidence. Since the need exists now to expand the monetary aggregates, a Gold Cover Clause will not immediately find its way into the system.
I now believe that with this plan in hand, the cyclical bottom due in the general equities market by June of 2004 has a reasonable chance of occurring.
Nobel Comments on the Noble Metal
Robert Mundell 1999 Nobel Prize Winner for Economics
On The Role of Gold In Monetary Application
The Gold Cover Clause Background and History
Nixon and Ford
1968: Sterilized “gold cover” on Fed liabilities
Foreign Banks cash in dollars for gold
1971: Nixon repudiated U.S. gold obligation
Wage and price controls
“WIN”: Whip Inflation Now!
“In April 1934, after a year of flexible exchange rates, the United States went back to gold after a devaluation of the dollar. This decreased the gold value of the dollar by 40.94 percent, raising the official price of gold 69.33 percent to $35 an ounce. How history would have been changed had President Herbert Hoover devalued the dollar, three years earlier!
France held onto its gold parity until 1936, when it devalued the franc. Two other far-reaching events occurred in that year. One was the publication of Keynes' General Theory; the other signing of the Tripartite Accord among the United States, Britain and France. One ushered in a new theory of policy management for a closed economy; the other, a precursor of the Bretton Woods agreement, established some rules for exchange rate management in the new international monetary system.
The contradiction between the two could hardly be more ironic. At a time when Keynesian policies of national economic management were becoming increasingly accepted by economists, the world economy had adopted a new fixed exchange rate system that was incompatible with those policies.
In the new arrangements, which were ratified at Bretton Woods in 1944, countries were required to establish parities fixed in gold and maintain fixed exchange rates to one another. The new system, however, differed greatly from the old gold standard. For one thing, the role of the United States in the system was asymmetric. A special clause allowed any country the option of fixing the price of gold instead of keeping the exchange rates of other members fixed. Because the dollar was the only currency tied to gold it was the only country in a position to exercise the gold option. There thus came into being the asymmetrical arrangements in which the United States fixed the price of gold whereas other countries fixed their currencies to the dollar. Another difference of the new system from the old was that not even the United States was on anything that could be called a full gold standard. The dollar was no longer in the old sense"anchored" to gold; it was rather that the world price level, and therefore the real price of gold, was heavily influenced by the United States. Gold had become a passenger in the system.
Was a new system created at Bretton Woods? From the early planning it seemed that this would be the case. The British and American plans both contained provisions for a world currency: John Maynard Keynes had his"bancor," and Harry Dexter White had his"unitas." But these forward-looking ideas were soon buried. No doubt the Americans came to believe that a world currency would clip the wings of the dollar. There was not therefore a Bretton Woods"system" but rather a Bretton Woods"order" outlining the charter of a system that already existed.
World War II brought a repetition of the monetary imbalances of World War I. The devaluation of the dollar and gathering war clouds in Europe made the dollar a safe haven and the recipient of gold to pay for war goods. The United States sterilized the gold imports and imposed price controls. It was therefore able to run deficits without going off gold. Because gold was still"overvalued" in this era of"dollar shortage," interest rates remained incredibly low. By 1945, the public debt had soared to 125 percent of GDP.
At the end of the war, the U.S. price level doubled as a result of the end of price control, the unleashing of pent-up demand and the expansionary monetary policies of the Federal Reserve System that continued to support the bond market. The postwar inflation halved the real value of the public debt, increased tax revenues as a result of"bracket creep" in the steeply-progressive income tax system (which rose to 92.5 percent), halved the real value of gold and eliminated its overvaluation. After further inflation during the Korean War and the onset of steady"secular" inflation, gold became undervalued.
Meanwhile, Germany and Japan, in the aftermath of their paper-money inflations, under the auspices of the U.S. occupation authorities, had currency reforms in which 10 units of old money were exchanged for 1 unit of new currency; both reforms took place in 1948, with the exchange rate for Germany set at DM 4.2 = $1, and for Japan at ÂĄ360 = $1. The exchange rates later proved to undervalue German and Japanese labor and the two economies performed spectacularly in the post-war period, fulfilling their destiny of overtaking Britain and France as the second and third largest economies in the world.
Until the 1960's, U.S. macroeconomic policy was based more on closed-economy principles than on the requirements of an international monetary system. Monetary and fiscal policy was directed at the needs of internal balance and the balance of payments was all but ignored. In 1949 the United States had peaked at over 700 million ounces of gold, more than 75 percent of the world's monetary gold. Gold losses began soon after, but the effect of these sales on the money supply was sterilized by equivalent purchases of government bonds by the Federal Reserve System. The gold losses were at first looked upon as a healthy redistribution of the world's gold reserves but toward the late 1950's they were recognized as dangerous.
The Federal Reserve System was required to keep a 25 percent (reduced from 40 percent in 1945) gold cover behind its currency and deposit liabilities. If gold reserves fell below this level, interest rates would have to be raised. If the fall in gold reserves reached the level of required reserves, the United States would be forced to take account of its balance- of- payments constraint like any other country. The problem of the appropriate mix for monetary and fiscal policy came to the foreground during the administration of President John F. Kennedy, who took office in 1961.
At this time I played a part in the story. Newly arrived in the Research Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the fall of 1961, I was asked to look into the theoretical aspects of the monetary-fiscal policy mix. The main problem in this post-Sputnik era was sluggish growth and subpar employment in the United States in contrast to Europe and Japan (precisely the reverse of the situation today), and a now worrisome balance of payments deficit. Three schools of thought had emerged. Keynesians, led by Leon Keyserling, the first Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, pushed for easy money and an increase in government spending. The Chamber of Commerce argued for fiscal constraint and tighter money. The Council of Economic Advisers, following the Samuelson-Tobin"neo-classical synthesis," advocated low interest rates to spur growth and a budget surplus to siphon off excess liquidity and prevent inflation.
In my analysis, I showed that none of the above policies would work, and would lead the economy away from equilibrium. The correct policy mix was to lower taxes to spur employment, and tighten monetary policy to protect the balance of payments. My paper was circulated by the IMF to its members in November 1961 and published in IMF Staff Papers in March 1962.
It gradually came to be realized that the policies of the Kennedy administration were not working: the wrong policy mix had produced increasingly disequilibrating effects: a steel strike, a stock market crash, and stagnation. At the end of 1962, Kennedy announced a reversal of the policy mix, with tax cuts to spur the economy and interest rates to protect the balance of payments. Legislative delays meant that the tax cut had to wait until the summer of 1964 but its anticipation positioned the economy for the great expansion of the 1960's.
The adoption of my policy mix helped the United States to achieve rapid growth with stability. It was not intended to and could not solve the basic problem of the international monetary system, which stemmed from the undervaluation of gold. Nevertheless the problem of the U.S. balance- of- payments was intricately tied up with the problem of the system. With very little excess gold coming into the stocks of central banks from the private market, and the US dollar the only alternative component of reserves, the U.S. deficit was the principal means by which the rest of the world was supplied with additional reserves. If the United States failed to correct its balance of payments deficit, it would no longer be able to maintain gold convertibility; on the other hand, if it corrected its deficit, the rest of the world would run short of reserves and bring on slower growth or, worse, deflation. The last scenario hinted at a repetition of the problem of the interwar period.
Two basic solutions were consistent with preserving the system. One solution was to raise the price of gold. The founding fathers of the IMF had put a provision in the IMF Articles of Agreement for dealing with a gold scarcity or surplus: a change in the par values of all currencies, which would have changed the price of gold in terms of all currencies and left exchange rates unchanged. In the 1968 election campaign, candidate Richard M. Nixon chose Arthur Burns as his emissary on a secret mission to sound out European opinion on an increase in the price of gold. It turned out to be favorable and Burns recommended prompt action immediately after the election. Nothing, however, came of it.
The other option was to create a substitute for gold. This course was in fact adopted. In the late summer of 1967, international agreement was reached on an amendment to the IMF articles to allow the creation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), gold-guaranteed bookkeeping reserves made available through the IMF, with a unit value equal to one gold dollar, or 1/35 of an ounce. Somewhat less than SDR 10 billion were allocated to member countries in 1970, 1971 and 1972, but they proved to be inadequate—too little and too late--to meet the main problems of the system.
On August 15, 1971, confronted by requests for conversion of dollars into gold by the United Kingdom and other countries, President Nixon took the dollar off gold, closing the"gold window" at which dollars were exchanged for gold with foreign central banks. The other countries now took their currencies off the dollar and a period of floating began.
But floating made the embryonic plans just forming for European monetary integration more difficult, and in December 1971, at a meeting at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D. C., finance ministers agreed on a restoration of the fixed exchange rate system without gold convertibility. A few exchange rates were changed and the official dollar price of gold was raised but the act was almost purely nominal since the United States was no longer committed to buying or selling gold.
The world thus moved onto a pure dollar standard, in which the major countries fixed their currencies to the dollar without a reciprocal obligation with respect to gold convertibility on the part of the United States. But U.S. monetary policy was too expansionary in the following years and, after another ineffective devaluation of the dollar, the system was allowed to break up into generalized floating in the spring of 1973. Thus ended the dollar standard.
What lessons can be learned from the second third of the century? One is that the policy mix has to suit the system. Another is that a gold-based international system cannot survive if war-related inflation makes gold undervalued and the authorities are unwilling to adjust the gold price and create a sufficient quantity of gold substitutes. A third lesson is that the superpower cannot be disciplined by the requirements of convertibility or any other international commitment if it is at the expense of vital political objectives at home; the tail cannot wag the dog. A fourth lesson is that a fixed exchange rate system can work only if there is mutual agreement on the common rate of inflation. Europe was willing to swallow the fact that the dollar was not freely convertible into gold in the 1960's, but when U.S. monetary policy became incompatible with price stability in the rest of the world (and in particular Europe), the costs of the fixed- exchange- rate system were perceived to exceed its benefits.
A final lesson is that political events, and in particular the Vietnam War soured relations between the Atlantic partners and created a tension in the 1960's that can only be compared with the pall cast over the international system by disputes over reparations in the 1920's. Fixed-exchange-rate systems work better among friends than rivals or enemies.”
Source: http://www.robertmundell.net/NobelLecture/nobel4.asp
JES NOTE: My only disagreement with the above is that in practice, the Dollar Reserve Standard reemerged along with the strong dollar in 1983. The Dollar Standard and Global Markets became the marching orders for all economies led by the Cheerleaders of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. It is this post-Chairman Volker’s period that I believe was the topic in Greenspan’s remark that we may have come full cycle.
The Gold Cover Clause Reserve Ratio
The Final Solution
First: To understand the key ingredient in this presentation, the reinstatement of a modernized Gold Cover Clause, you must comprehend what in fact the dollar is. To understand this, I suggest that you need to think of the dollar in its essential role as the common share of the United States of America. Just as common shares of corporations fluctuate in the market place, so do currencies and the common shares of countries. Much like a quarterly or annual report, the reported Budget Deficit portrays the quality of economic management of this country. The Trade Surplus or Deficit is akin to the earnings report of the corporation, the USA. The level of the discount rate is the dividend rate of the common shares of the USA.
Second: We can track the establishment of the Instant Gratification Economy in the late 60’s to its birth in the Nixon Administration. That unfortunate birth took place with the reduction of the requirements of the Gold Cover Clause from 5% to 0%. The function of the Gold Cover is to assure that the size of the money supply does not exceed a given amount of gold cover.
The sterilization of the Gold Cover Clause handed the control of the supply of money in the USA over to quasi-political special interest control. It was this act that gave birth to the paper economy of the USA, thereby founding the ensuing three-generation Instant Gratification Economy funded by the over production of dollars, now, IMO, confirmed by Chairman Greenspan’s own words. Why has the present Chairman of the Federal Reserve System made this distinction so positive to the function of gold in a monetary system?
Items that control act as alarms. Gold was a control and an alarm that rang through its price. Currency parities were alarms in terms of market fluctuations to or away from parity rates. Nixon's sterilization of the Gold Cover Clause accelerated the world economy on a course to a condition devoid of an alarm system. Today's body economic is much like the human body with the disease whereby the body loses its ability to feel pain, thus inadvertently placing itself in harm’s way. We now live in an"Alarmless Casino Society" within the"Instant Gratification Economy", now in the throes of its own demise. That is why the markets have become pure casinos in which a daily crisis sounds no alarm.
An interesting question one might ask oneself is: What post-Nixon Governor of the Federal Reserve has failed to prime the money pump in the USA during the last two years of an incumbent president's term in order to grease the wheels of the economy and equity markets, facilitating the incumbent's re-election?
Third: Gold has one primary role in its relation to a currency. That role is not convertibility. Convertibility dealt with gold's role in controlling Trade Balances. The source of the problem is not trade balances; it is the freedom to create violent changes in the supply of money. Gold has only one monetary function; it acts as a control. Gold could control the very item that stands at the foundation of today's nemesis, the errors in human judgment resulting in mismanagement of the money supply. It is a glaring contradiction for an economic society, built on the ability of free markets to effect economic distribution, to trust a group of 'quasi-political special interest people with titles' with the management of our economy via the expansion or contraction of the money supply, primarily. Communism and socialism are supposedly dead, the USA is in the process of paying a high price for it is a socialist principle to allow the titled few to manage the economy as has been the case since the reduction of the Gold Cover Clause to Zero.
Fourth: To determine how a group of people with the ability to act will perform in a market crisis, we need only examine their reasoning and action in a previous situation. The recent extreme decline in US equities have been blamed in part on the Imperialistic Attitude of CEOs acting in some cases above and beyond the law. In order to attempt to create a return of confidence in the paper assets, the common shares of US corporations, new laws have been passed for mandating corporate management's ethical behavior. This is what is called a Legislated Enforced Ethic. Therefore, one can conclude, that in an economic crisis the minds of those empowered to act will gravitate towards a solution that includes the utilization of legislated enforced ethics, especially if the means are already legislated and in the system.
Fifth: Definition -- A spiral is a grouping of cause and effect that work to accelerate each other towards an event which then empowers the spiral itself.
There exists a clear downward spiral of events, each affecting the other with no evidence that this cycle will end. A downward spiral in markets is not much different from a downward spiral in the human experience. In that sense, a downward spiral such as depression requires intervention in order to reverse it. Psychotropic drugs, as an intervention, are often prescribed in order to provide an intervening window that can prevent the depression down spiral from going to its predictable end. Should the patient grasp that opportunity provided by the intervention, taking a more positive look at their circumstances, real progress may occur in their lives. Similarly, to reverse a downward economic spiral of today's proportion, great intervention is necessary to affect a long-term recovery.
Sixth: Who says that the US dollar, once it closes below 104 on the USDX index, cannot at some time in its 21-month future window of Bear possibilities put on a NASDAQ-type decline? We live in a Casino market world affecting all markets, played by tranches of money larger than that of the central bank individually or collectively. Nobody in the established investment community expected the NASDAQ to do what it did. Nobody in the established investment community expects the US dollar to do what it will do. The heart of the Down Spiral is the US dollar. To stop the Down Spiral, should it get totally out of hand, before a collapse of the $72 trillion dollar mountain of sewage, unfunded, specific obligation paper, called derivatives, the dollar will have to be rescued long-term by some act to resuscitate faith in that paper asset, the US Dollar.
Seventh: The Present Economic Spiral, which will cause a significant rise in the gold price and a significant further drop in the US dollar, is:
In the Environment of an expanding US Budget Deficit, we are experiencing an expanding US Trade Deficit, which impacts an expanding US Current Account Deficit which now at 5% of US Gross Domestic Product produces significant currency adjustments in the US dollar.
As a result of a new decline in the dollar below the first low of 104 as measured by the USDX index, non-US holders of US Government Securities will begin to reduce their purchases. The shift in momentum of purchasing reverses the previous up trend in this market, which will result in a surprise increase in interest rates in the environment of weak business conditions internationally. This results in a further drop in general equities from any recovery level or from the present levels, as we have always seen that declining US equity prices are accompanied by further declines in the US Dollar. Therefore a further drop in the US Dollar occurs. And therefore the down spiral marches on and on. This economic spiral will continue to push gold higher and the dollar lower. Each time it impacts upon itself, the factors in the Down Economic Spiral further impact the holders of US Treasury instrument, producing the 5th Element of a Long-term Bull Market in Gold by creating the most unexpected Long Term Bear market in US Treasury instruments due cyclically and fundamentally, as explained above, to occur. Historically US interest rates are not made by the Federal Reserve. Rather, US interest rates are a product of the market level of US Treasury instruments. That is a key concept to keep in mind.
Eighth: As part of the conditioning that has taken place during the experience of the three-generation"Instant Gratification Economy", the majority of market participants, even those akin to gold, believe that governments are more powerful than markets. This is a fallacy about to be proven wrong. Markets are the most powerful economic forces in a world awash in paper money. Markets force monetary policy, not the other way around.
The Tools to Prevent a Deflationary Melt-down
War is Now Declared on “Deflation”
And the Financial General in the CONFLICT
Is
Chairman of the Federal Reserve,
Economic General Alan Greenspan
The Tools Are:
A devaluation of the dollar in terms of gold by allowing an appreciation in gold’s price without significant opposition by central banks.
Reinstitution of a modernized Gold Cover Clause in which the gold holding of the USA will be rationalized to the then existing market price for gold. The holding of Gold for the purpose of this new Federal Reserve Ratio will be considered as the percentage required for the then outstanding liabilities.
To expand monetary aggregates, the price of gold must rise or the US Federal Reserve, on behalf of the Treasury, would be required to buy gold. A firm gold market then becomes the friend of the Fed and not the enemy of the dollar.
The necessary aura of gold acting as a control would bring greater confidence to the US dollar at the devalued price in terms of the gold price and work toward the appreciation of the dollar versus other currencies.
Adjustment of the Tax Code with a focus on those areas that historically support investment in business activity, which is a most Republican approach to tax codes. Expansion of tax benefits for business investment.
Expansion of monetary aggregates to any level required should inflation figures go to net negative basis with significant expansion ahead of that event in an attempt to prevent deflation.
Fulfillment of all presently financed government projects.
The potential of a War
What all this means to the Gold Investor
This bull market in gold is generational and not cyclical in nature. It will span a much longer time than any advisor so far has suggested. It may well exist for the next 30 years.
There is no need to be concerned that a missed sell point for a trader under $400 gold is a lost opportunity. In fact, gold will continually make higher lows and higher highs into the predictable future.
Gold producer hedgers who refuse or cannot reverse their hedge positions are in serious trouble.
Gold shares have a bright, long-term future.
The value of properties in promising gold fields will increase significantly.
Exploration for new gold properties will increase significantly.
© 2002 James E. Sinclair
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