Re: Aaah, die Giraffen-Theorie des Goldes!

verfasst von dottore, 04.10.2004, 16:15

-->Hi,

schön, dass wir wieder mal was aus dem Munde eines Herrn hören, der die Interessen seines Landes (Goldförderlandes) vertritt.

So eine Rede könnte der ZB-Chef von Südafrika 1:1 halten, dito die Herrn aus Kanada, Australien & alike.

Natürlich hält er die Rede auch vor dem absolut passenden Forum, nämlich:

The London Bullion Market Association

Was wollen die hören? Das wollen die hören.

Und am liebsten am deren Bullion Market Forum.

Ich nehme an, nach der artigen Rede lagen sich alle Bullion-Fritzen minutenlang unter Tränen in den Armen.


>I would like to thank the conference organisers
>for this opportunity to share my thoughts on
>such a complex, even mythical subject as gold
>and the prospects for the near and medium-term.
>I assume that the request was made for one
>simple reason: that I, as a senior executive of
>the Bank of Russia, should know more than
>other ordinary mortals.

Klar weiß er mehr, er ist (ich darfs verraten) nämlich unsterblich. Und 500 Tonnen unsterblichen Goldes hat er auch noch unter sich - Bravo!

>For the central bank, the gold stock is the
>international payment reserve for the whole
>country -- for the state authorities, private
>companies and corporations, as well as individual
>citizens.

Payment-Reserve klingt immer gut, noch dazu, wenn's eine für alle ist.

>Like any reserve, it needs to be
>conserved, in terms of both actual physical form
>and its value. To a lesser extent, we need to be
>concerned about its liquidity, or more precisely,
>market price developments.

Also Probleme mit der Konservierung der physikalischen Form wären mir neu. Aber man lernt immer gern was dazu.

>We [i.e. the central banks] are concerned with other, less
>immediate problems regarding gold. In a figurative
>sense the central bank's attitude can be compared
>with that to a giraffe. I have in mind an image of an
>animal that suggests certain ambiguity, at least in
>the Russian language.
>On the one hand, when Russians say that someone
>is reacting like a giraffe, they are highlighting that
>person's slow reaction. It even suggests a degree
>of slow-wittedness. On the other hand, the evident
>magnificence of the animal commands respect.

Ja, da legst di nieda.

>"The giraffe is tall, and he sees all" -- the words of
>the Russian bard Vladimir Vysotskii are well known
>throughout Russia.
>With this allegory in mind, I would like to mention
>the issues concerning gold which fall within the
>"giraffe category", or more formally, present
>concerns of a central bank.

Und ich dachte immer der KGB sähe dort alles.

>These are several: the volume of actual precious
>metal stock, both in absolute and relative terms
>(essentially, the optimum component of the metal
>in total monetary reserves); methods of controlling
>the stock; ensuring both security and availability
>for liquidity purposes and at the same time
>optimising income-earning potential. All these
>issues reflect very practical concerns.

Also jetzt geht's zur Sache. Der Praktiker holt aus.

>It may seem strange but all bear direct relation to a
>problem that is often considered purely theoretical:
>What is gold currently, and what will it be tomorrow?
>Real money with intrinsic value? A raw material? A
>cash commodity that has lost some of its monetary
>functions? If so, what are the prospects -- complete
>loss of gold's role or a restoration of lost functions,
>in one form or another?

Die"lost function" ist fix wieder da: Gold zu GZ erklären - fertig! Dazu braucht's keine Restauration (klingt auch so out-dated), sondern ein flink geschriebener Ukas von Meister Putin himself.

>There is a wide circle of leading financiers who believe
>that pondering on these themes is a fruitless academic
>exercise. They are convinced that the heads of the
>world's richest countries, who once agreed to abolish
>exchange of national currencies for gold at a fixed rate,
>have in fact demonetised gold altogether.

Tja, demonetisiert (de-gzt) haben sie bestens. Oder darf noch wer seine Steuern in Gold bezahlen?

>In their eyes,
>the existence of official gold reserves is simply a
>remnant of the past, a financial monument to the gold
>and gold-currency standards, which will ultimately be
>absorbed by the global gold market. This market has
>properly organised infrastructure, products, rules, and
>procedures, and central banks are merely one of its
>clientele. For them, this is the only reality to be
>reckoned with.

Ja, der Goldmarkt funktioniert so fein wie alle Märkte zur Cassa und auf Termin.

>Is this a true picture for gold in the modern world?
>Many people do not think like this; the reality is more
>complicated. The contemporary gold market has
>emerged as a byproduct of a series of agreements
>between governments, initiated by the United States
>and supported by the other major powers, in whose
>possession the bulk of all gold ever extracted lies.

Bei jedem Abschied fließen Tränen...

>These agreements (the most important of which were
>the Jamaica Agreements of 1976) created ideal
>conditions for stimulating international trade by means
>of expanding credit facilities in national currencies.

1976 war eine Beerdigung Dritter Klasse. Die Leiche lag schon 5 Jahre im Kühlfach.

>The obligations on debtor countries to pay off the trade
>deficits with gold (upon demand of the creditor
>countries) severely limited the exporter countries'
>opportunities for trade expansion. The importer
>countries were made to live within their means,
>predicated by their gold reserves. Gold was
>therefore considered by a number of economists
>and policy makers as an instrument guaranteeing
>order and justice in international economic relations,
>while others remained convinced that it hindered
>international economic progress and development.
>The latter, as you know, secured the upper hand.

Wie wahr. Man stelle sich vor, die USA hätten ihr ganzes Gold abliefern müssen ("upon the demand of the creditor countries") und danach nix mehr gehabt. Womit hätten sie die schönen Waren aus aller Welt bezahlen können, deren Verkauf in die USA doch schönen"Progress" außerhalb der USA beschert haben. VW wäre schon zur Unzeit verschieden. Heute jaulen sie auf, dass ihr US-Verkauf um 28 Prozent"eingebrochen" sei. Ein längst verschwundener VW-Konzern könnte wenigstens nicht mehr jaulen (ohrenschonend).

>That brief look back into the past was necessary to
>make the following conclusion: The present state of
>the gold market and its future cannot be analysed in
>isolation from the problems of the international
>monetary system.

Das"monetary system" hat keine Probleme. Aber das Kreditsystem.

>Some people may question this conclusion because
>of the incompatibility of the present volumes in the
>respective gold and foreign currency markets. I would
>suggest that the volumes do not matter for this
>particular purpose. The modern monetary system,
>although undoubtedly robust and long-standing, in
>fact has a number of flaws and weaknesses. These,
>like the birth of the new, can cause health problems
>to the participants of the system.

Die Krankheit ("health problem") heißt Überschuldung.

>This disconcerting phenomenon occurs because, by
>taking gold out of international payments turnover,
>people are undermining payment discipline. The
>discipline I have in mind is at a macro-level; that is,
>the discipline of rich industrial countries whose
>convertible currencies have taken the role of an
>international trade medium by virtue of their
>economic strength and have been accepted by the
>world community as reserve units of payment.

Die"world community" hat das zu akzeptieren, was als GZ vorgeschrieben ist. Fertig.

>Although there are several reserve currencies, the
>blatant lack of discipline is demonstrated by the U.S.
>dollar.

Aha, jetzt kommt der moralin-getränkte Russen-Finger.

>I am leaving aside the main aspects of this
>problem, such as the social and economic injustice
>of a world order that allows the richest country in the
>world to live in debt, undermining the vital interests
>of other countries and peoples.

Und wer lebt suupi von den US-Schulden?"Other countries & peoples"!

>What is important for
>us today is another aspect, which is connected with
>the responsibility of the state issuing the reserve
>currency and for the international community
>preserving that currency's buying power.

"Responsibility of the (a) state" - totlach.

>Given the actual behaviour of the dollar on the forex
>markets, the problem could be more accurately
>termed the irresponsibility of the U.S. government in
>relation to the market valuation of its currency in
>international circulation.

Wenn meine Schulden automatisch weniger wert werden - Klasse! Oder?

>Today the net debt owed by the United States to the
>outside world (the so-called"international investment
>position") is in the region of US$3 trillion. To
>understand the scale of this figure, let me remind you
>that it exceeds the total official currency reserves in
>all the world's countries (including the United States
>itself). According to the International Monetary Fund
>statistics at last year-end, the world pool of foreign
>currency reserves totalled Special Drawing Rights
>2,013 billion or about US$2,800 billion. The volume
>of cash only ("greenback" banknotes) available outside
>the United States totals about US$400 billion.

Die USA brauchen keinen SDRs - komischerweise aber die anderen.

>The world has come to a paradoxical situation in which
>the creditor countries are more concerned with the fate
>of the dollar than the U.S. authorities themselves are.

Darauf hatte schon Popeye hingewiesen. Die Gläubiger schlafen richtig schlecht.

>Thus, the evolution of the U.S. dollar's reserve role in
>recent years has given ground to some quite pessimistic
>forecasts, based on rational economic theory. No wonder
>that the number of people who have held assets in dollars
>and now wish to diversify them partly into gold -- the
>traditional shelter from inflation and political adversity
>-- is steadily growing.

Warum nicht in andere"Währungen" (GZs) diversifizieren? Bringt doch mehr, wenn sich schon jemand um"the fate of the dollar" barmt. Es geht auch nicht um"den" Dollar, sondern ausschließlich um Dollarforderungen. Das muss man in Russland noch zu unterscheiden lernen.

>The statistical correlation between the market prices of
>dollar and gold is obvious. For the problem we discuss
>today it means specifically that gold, in addition to its
>unique physical and chemical properties used in
>industry, has retained its particular monetary
>attractiveness for cautious financial investors, and its
>market price is still heavily influenced by the state of
>the international monetary system.

Kreditsystem, Genosse!

>This dualism in gold price formation distinguishes it
>from other commodities and makes the movements in the
>price sometimes so enigmatic that market analysts
>need to invent fantastic intrigues to explain price
>dynamics. Many have heard of the group of economists
>who came together in the society known as the Gold
>Anti-Trust Action Committee and started a number of
>lawsuits against the U.S. government, accusing it of
>organising an anti-gold conspiracy. They believe that
>with the assistance of a number of major financial
>institutions (they mention in particular the Bank for
>International Settlements, J.P. Morgan Chase,
>Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, and others), some senior
>officials have been manipulating the market since
>1994. As a result, the price dropped below US$300 an
>ounce at a time when it should, if it had kept pace with
>inflation, reached US$740-760.

Dumm gelaufen. Nicht mal die Infla reingeholt.

>I prefer not to comment on this information but dare
>assume that the specific facts included in the lawsuits
>might have given ground to suspicion that the real
>forces acting on the gold market are far from those of
>classic textbooks that explain to students how prices
>are born in a free market.
>So even those who stick to traditional economic
>theory in analysing and projecting gold market
>developments should admit that various factors that
>influence gold price interact between themselves in a
>constantly changing manner, sometimes in a very odd
>way. Here, as in nuclear physics, some factors briefly
>disappear or cease to act, and in their place comes a
>new dominant market factor. This causes confusion for
>the forecasters in their efforts to build a logically
>balanced model for the metal price movements.

Logik auf Märkten?

>So I do not even dare shed light on the methodology
>of gold price forecasting, but would like to risk outlining
>basic factors, which are permanently (and I stress
>"permanently") acting on the market. There are four of
>them -- two relating to the raw material properties of
>gold and two to its monetary qualities.
>As an economist educated in the Marxist school, I
>believe that the base for gold prices is rooted in the
>sphere of the real economy. Like any mineral raw
>material, mined gold has its intrinsic value.

Seine Arbeitswert-Theorie hat der alte Marxist wenigstens nicht verlernt.

>This value
>fluctuates quite significantly depending on the location,
>time, and technology of extraction. The market averages
>out the individual expenses, optimising them at a level
>that is acceptable to the industry that uses the metal
>in its production. The absolute values in monetary
>terms for this factor fluctuate, although they are the
>least mobile element of the price.
>The production cost category has its own"floor and
>ceiling." The technological particularities of gold
>extraction determine the minimum price level at which
>production is economically feasible in the industry
>as a whole. We think that the worldwide level is currently
>about US$200 per ounce. This is the minimum price limit.

Ach was! Fahr die Löhne runter, schreib nix mehr ab, usw., usw.

>With lower prices the industry will plunge into a zone of
>catastrophe. So the average costs of gold production in
>volumes sufficient to satisfy expected market demand
>(over the past 15 years this has averaged 2,500 tonnes
>with the upward trend) are the first factor.

Von dem dauernden Nachfrage-Plus sieht man leider nur wenig im Preis.

>The second factor is the real volumes of demand
>generated by the consuming industries for physical gold.
>The behaviour of industrialists (jewellery is playing the
>most important role) is mainly caused by factors
>connected with an economic activity cycle. During the
>1990s there was a significant but uneven rise of demand
>for jewellery: from 2,200 tonnes in 1990 to 3,200 tonnes
>by the end of the decade, with a peak of 3,350 tonnes in
>1997. The first three years of the new millennium saw a
>decline of demand from jewellers; the volume of metal
>purchased by the industry dropped down to 2,550 tonnes
>in 2003.

So kann's gehen. Und warum sollte der Preis bei fallender Nachfrage steigen?

>The fundamental correlation between gold prices
>and the volume of demand from industry is normally linear
>in character. This correlation cannot be the sole cause
>behind the dramatic falls in prices, but can show a vector
>for price movement, which can be enhanced or indeed
>maximised through the efforts of speculators.
>However, even when speculative activity is relatively quiet
>this vector is not always clear. There are"anti-phases" in
>economic activity in various parts of the world, and on top
>of these, various national traditions in demand for the
>metal.
>A recent example of this occurred at the turn of the
>century. After prices reached a 20-year low of US$252 in
>May 1999, demand for physical metal increased and
>pushed the price temporarily to a new"equilibrium level"
>of US$300 by the end of the year. The concept of
>"equilibrium" reflects the situation on the market when
>its participants believe that they are aware of a balance
>between supply and demand. It brings a measure of
>price stability to the market.
>Such a situation appeared to take place following the
>central banks' Washington Agreement on Gold.
>However, as soon as demand started to shrink again
>and a danger of excess supply arose, prices went
>down. This was the beginning of a two-year market
>stagnation, with the price waving within a range of
>US$270-290. It was not sufficient for the metal
>producers, but they were unable to control the
>situation. It was investors who made the weather on
>the market.

Alles altbekannt.

>Now the time has come to admit that investment
>demand was, and still is, the main driving force behind
>price fluctuations on the gold market. The changing
>character of demand heavily depends on what is going
>on in the international foreign currency and financial
>markets.

Jetzt wird's spannend.

>The investors pay continuous attention firstly to the
>dollar rate of exchange and secondly to the level of
>interest rates for financial assets. The volatility of
>these indicators directly influences investor interest
>in gold. Since this interest is realised not through
>operations with physical metal but through deals with
>gold derivatives on stock-exchange and
>non-stock-exchange markets (where gold is mentioned
>only as a base asset), the volume of these deals can
>exceed the volume of trade in physical metal dozens
>of times. Last year turnover with gold derivatives was
>about 4,000 million ounces (or 129,000 tonnes), but
>physical metal actually sold totalled 120 million
>ounces or some 3,860 tonnes. As it is said: Feel the
>difference!

Der Genosse kennt den Zins-Derivate-Markt noch nicht. Der macht 95 % der Derivate-Märkte aus. Da liegt das Verhältnis nicht bloß bei Faktor 33... (Wer will kann's ja mal ausrechnen).

>It is true that the markets for derivatives linked to
>other raw materials also usually exceed the operations
>with base assets. The difference in volumes are
>incomparably less (five to 10 times). At the same time
>the markets for derivatives with foreign currencies and
>prime securities as base assets are developing every bit
>as rapidly as the gold derivatives.

Much, much more rapidly.

>What can we infer from that?
>One conclusion, at least, is clear: Gold is predominantly
>a financial asset, not merely a precious metal.

Was für eine elegante Volte! Je mehr in etwas derivativ gezockt wird, desto eher haben wir es mit einem"financial asset" zu tun. Ich hatte mal in Maine Potatoes gezockt und als das settlement kam, konnte nicht geliefert werden. Also? Also waren damals sogar Kartoffeln"financial assets".

>In this capacity gold is competing with other financial
>assets on a variety of parameters. Being inferior in
>terms of returns, it is far more reliable than anything
>else for protection against war-related, political,
>financial, economic, and credit risks, and also provides
>a high level of liquidity and lower management costs.

Schönes Argument. In"credit risks" wird mehr als in raw materials gezockt, also ist jenes raw material, in dem am meisten gezockt wird, ein"financial asset". In FAs wird aber gezockt, um dort Verluste zu vermeiden (hedge, hedge). Also wird in Gold gezockt, um dort Gewinne zu erzielen.

>However, since the rate of return is the main measure
>of success for financial institutions under normal
>conditions, investment-related decisions depend
>directly on the stability of the international monetary
>system, strength (or weakness) of the dollar, and the
>level of interest rates on financial markets.

In FAs kann ich runter zocken, bis auf Null. In Gold aber nur bis auf 200, weil dort - siehe oben - dann steht: Ab jetzt kanns nur noch aufwärts gehen.

>This dependence is not linear in nature. Correlation
>factors change from time to time because decisions
>are taken by investors individually on the basis of their
>market expectations. As a result, investors' reaction
>may race ahead or lag behind developments on the
>forex and financial markets. If we examine gold price
>movements over the last 10-12 years, it becomes
>clear that during the first half of the 1990s the
>dominant factor was the weak dollar and the market
>was still living in hope of a recurrence of the 1980s
>"gold fever."
>From 1997 onward, as the dollar strengthened, these
>hopes were dispelled, investors turned around, and price
>fell to the level of support on the physical market.

Also sind beim"level of support" alle long? Das ist ja noch besser als bei 35 $/oz. long gewesen zu sein.

>It
>seems to us that the depth and duration of this
>depressed phase of gold prices were to a considerable
>extent caused by the wide use of gold derivatives by
>investors.

Mit anderen Worten: Weil's im Ergebnis wurscht ist, ob ich rauf oder runter zocke, habe ich runter gezockt, bis"the level" erreicht war. Warum sollte ich dann nicht eines Tages wieder Richtung"level" zocken?

>Insofar as these instruments are intended for
>protecting banks and their customers against unwanted
>and unexpected changes in price dynamics, they can
>provoke massive closing of the existing position at a
>specific moment. This process may take the form of a
>chain reaction. As a result, the price falls below the
>level dictated by the sensible interests of investors.

Ja, dann ist's ganz schlecht.

>I would also like to note that recently the central banks
>have been playing a significant role in the gold market.

Womit wir gleich zwei"levels" haben:

1. Das, wenn die ZBs mit ihren Faxen aufhören.

2. Das, ab dem die Minen schließen.

>Low interest rates in the money markets and revaluation
>of gold reserves in line with lower market prices have
>exacerbated the problem of the financial efficiency of
>gold stock management. To earn some income on the
>stock and compensate for"book losses" caused by its
>revaluation, a number of central banks have started to
>place a part of their reserves into deposits with
>commercial institutions -- leasing operations.

Tempi passati. Also, was jetzt?

>Data available to me suggest that these banks deposited
>about 1,000 tonnes in 1991, and 10 years later the
>volume of the deposits reached 4,800 tonnes. Naturally,
>the central banks' activity increased market liquidity and
>thus also put downward pressure on the gold price. The
>influence of these operations, however, must not be
>exaggerated. It is even incomparable with the pressure
>that was exerted on the market of gold derivatives.
>The same conclusion can be made about the central
>banks' sale of some of their gold reserves. All market
>participants have been paying particular attention to
>these operations since September 1999, when 15
>European central banks agreed in Washington on the
>orderly sale of 2,000 tonnes of gold from their official
>reserves over the next five years.
>One month ago the agreement was extended for a
>further five years (to September 2009), setting the total
>sale limit at 2,500 tonnes or 500 tonnes per year. One
>may wonder if these agreements and sales indirectly
>indicate that these countries have embarked on a
>long-term gold demonetisation programme and if their
>statement that"gold will remain an important element
>of global monetary reserves" is nothing but a sort of
>soothing therapy for the market. Such opinions exist,
>although they do not prevail.
>I think that the agreements do not give ground for this
>view.

Ja, der Markt ist schlauer als der Markt. Der erste Markt zockt, weil er im Gold ein"financial asset" sieht, ultimativ wie die ZBs versichern. Der zweite zockt, weil die ZBs in ihm keine FA mehr sehen.

>First, the participating countries own between them
>12,300 tonnes of gold. The share of the metal in their
>official monetary reserves has reached 36 percent.
>This is significantly higher than the average for all the
>world's countries (10-12 percent). So the sales can
>be seen as optimisation of the reserves structure.

Klasse! Das dritte"level" kommt in Sicht. Wenn auch die Gold-Fett-ZBs auf 10-12 % runter sind.

>Secondly, the countries making the sales (France,
>Germany, and some others) are currently enduring
>budget deficits exceeding the limits laid down by the
>Maastricht Treaty. Hence, this may explain the
>temptation to solve their budgetary problems without
>reducing expenditure or raising taxes.
>The current decisions by the monetary authorities in
>European countries could therefore be considered
>sensible, like the actions of certain Asiatic states that
>in recent years increased the gold portion within their
>monetary reserves.

Ja, China, weil es seine IMF-Beteiligung auffüllen musste.

>The internal imperfections of the
>international monetary system (which I spoke about
>earlier) have already led to a number of regional
>financial crises and still carry the danger of larger
>upheavals.

Klar erkannt.

>Under these conditions, the growing
>interest of investors in real assets, gold in particular,
>is more than justified.

Im Gegenteil. Sind die"financial crises" endlich da, wird just das Geld fehlen (wie sonst sollte eine FC definiert sein, wenn nicht durch Geld das"fehlt"?), um groß ins Gold zu steigen. Da stehen die Gerichtsvollzieher Schlange.

>And on that optimistic note, I would like to end my
>presentation.

Und warum kauft er selbst kein Gold? Der arme Kerl predigt Wein und bleibt beim Wasser.

Schaut's bloß (obere Tabelle):

Naja, für ein Bullion Market Forum hat's gereicht.

Thread gesperrt

 

gesamter Thread:

• Perspectives on Gold:Oleg V. Mozhaiskov, Chairman C. Bank of Russia - CRASH_GURU, 04.10.2004, 09:47
  • Re: Perspectives on Gold - Sehr lesenswert - Danke! - Popeye, 04.10.2004, 10:17
    • Re: Perspectives on Gold - Sehr lesenswert - Danke, @Popeye! - ---Elli---, 04.10.2004, 12:36
  • Re: Aaah, die Giraffen-Theorie des Goldes! - dottore, 04.10.2004, 16:15