Re: Wer weiß was zum Herstatt-Fall '74? Was war damals genau los?

verfasst von dottore, 05.01.2001, 16:15

>Hi!
>Habe gerade nochmal unter einem Link was gelesen zum Domino-Ausfalleffekt (Dank an black nochmal für den Link). Habe bislang nichts von dem Herstatt-Fall gewusst, aber wahrscheinlich wird so eine Dominoausfallreihe bald (oder genau jetzt?) wieder beginnen - wer ist der erste Domino-Stein?
>Falls jemand mehr über den Herstatt-Fall parat hat, würde ich mich über ein kurzes posting freuen.
>Tobias

Iwan D. Herstatt hatte nach dem Kriege eine alte Familienbank seines Namens in Köln am Rhein wieder aufleben lassen. War eine KGaA. Großaktionär: Gerling.

Bei Herstatt saßen in der Devisenstube 5 Herren unter Leitung von Dany Dattel (alias Daddel). Während die Herren zockten, ging IDH lieber auf Karnevalssitzungen, Spezialität: Prunksitzungen.

Die Herren zockten auf dem Dollar rum, der damals hin- und herzuckte wie blöd. Die Herren kamen darob in eine Milliarden-Schieflage.

Eines Tages um 14.00 Uhr (!) stellte sich der GF Graf von der Goltz mit Megafon vor die Banktür (Gitter runter) und erklärte, die Bank sei soeben vom Aufsichtsamt (plus Buba etc.) geschlossen worden.

Da begann natürlich alles zu wackeln. Mit Ach und Krach konne ein allgemeiner Bank-Run in Deutschland verhindert werden. Danach die Klärung der Schadensfrage. Gerlig kam unter Druck und musste einen Teil seines Konzerns abgeben (übernahm dann Flick) um einige 100 Mios nachzulegen. (Später schaffte er ein Comeback - großer Mann!).

Danach Prozesse gg. Iwan D., Daddel & Cie. Diverse Verurteilungen, aber mähliche Strafen, weil die Sache ausgestanden war und sich die Märkte beruhigt hatten.

Wenn diese erste große Bankpleite im Nachkriegsdeutschland schon wieder die Runde macht - oh, oh!

Gruß

d.

(Bringe gern zum EWTreff noch eine Herstatt-Aktie - antiquarisch - mit).

>Hier der Textauszug zum"Herstatt-Effekt":
>What is Herstatt Risk, and what are the"Yellow Warning Lights"?
>"Herstatt Risk" is a phrase used in certain economic circles to describe a sequence of cascading cross-defaults amongst banks and other financial institutions, in a kind of domino effect. It is greatly feared.
>Herstatt Risk is named after Bankhaus Herstatt, which was a small German bank highly active in foreign exchange dealings, and it was a string of losses in these dealings that caused its demise in June 1974. It left $620m of unsettled forex trades, where counterparties had paid up but had not received the exchange currency- the time difference between settlements in different countries meant that, unfortunately for those on the wrong side of the deal, the Herstatt bank had already been closed down by the time that the payment of currency owed was due.
>
>Herstatt's default set up a terrifying domino effect of payment defaults throughout the international banking community- of the kind that they never want to see again, at all costs.
>The problems highlighted by the Bankhaus Herstatt were considered so serious that it was considered necessary to set up the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, the Secretariat for which is provided by the Bank for International Settlements.
>Because of the fears over Herstatt Risk, monetary authorities are sensitive to too-rapid change in forex rates. One sees concern over this being expressed in statements by the Bank of Japan, while the US Treasury continually promotes the"strong dollar". It is easy to see in which direction the Yen/Dollar rate would create most risk.
>The spectre of Herstatt Risk was probably what Alan Greenspan had in mind when he commented on the rescue operation for LTCM, on October 1, 1998:
>"It was the judgment of officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who were monitoring the situation on an ongoing basis, that the act of unwinding LTCM's portfolio in a forced liqudiation would not only have a significant distorting impact on market prices but also in the process could produce large losses, or worse, for a number of creditors and counterparties, and for other market participants who were not directly involved with LTCM. In that environment, it was the FRBNY's judgment that it was to the advantage of all parties--including the creditors and other market participants--to engender if at all possible an orderly resolution rather than let the firm go into disorderly fire-sale liquidation following a set of cascading cross defaults."
>Greenspan also alluded to the domino chain of linkages between banks and businesses when he said this on September 23, 1998:
>"The failure of some banks is highly contagious to other banks and businesses that deal with them"
>The Herstatt effect was involved when in Spring 1931 the Austrian Credit-Anstalt bank failed after customers withdrew funds on worries over the soundness of the bank's loans. A cascade of financial problems ensued, which contributed a great deal to the economic problems of the 1930s.
>The Herstatt effect led to a large spread between three-month CD rates and three-month Treasury bill rates. Spreads such as this are considered warning signs for such systemic risks.
>To set the risks into perspective against recent market conditions, consider the significance to banks of the following"Yellow Caution Lights", in short, it seems that the FDIC may be concerned that banks have been throwing caution to the wind and funding investments that may turn out to be over-optimistic- which would be a classic case of malinvestment taking place in a time of easy credit (to recap Minsky,"At the later stages of a boom, general euphoria created an environment conducive to the over issuance of increasingly low-quality credits... a vulnerable financial structure made up of mountains of weak debt supported by increasingly uneconomic enterprises"):
>"In its third-quarter outlook report, the FDIC added Seattle and four other cities to its list of metropolitan areas at risk for overbuilding commercial property, primarily office space."
>"The agency cares about overbuilding because much of the money for real-estate development is provided by banks and other institutions whose deposits are FDIC-insured. If too much space is built in a given market, rents can stagnate or fall, developers have trouble paying back loans, and banks start to totter..."
>- Seattle Times, Sep 27 2000
>Comment: They care about banks tottering because of the risk of a cascading Herstatt effect...
>"The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. has added five cities -- Denver; Fort Worth; Jacksonville, Fla.; Sacramento, Calif.; and Seattle -- to its list of metropolitan areas identified as at risk of overbuilding of commercial properties."
>"Overbuilding is one of the yellow caution lights in the economy and the (banking) industry that we are watching closely, and it is a caution light that is flashing more brightly" than before, FDIC Chairwoman Donna Tanoue said Tuesday."
>- Houston Chronicle, Sep 26 2000
>Seattle Times: FDIC concerned Seattle might build up to a fall [Sep 27]
>Houston Chronicle: FDIC adds five cities to its overbuilding list [Sep 26]
>"Federal regulators say the nation's banks are in trouble, pointing to an easing of lending standards and declining earnings amid a strong economy as obvious warning signs. For Donna Tanoue, head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., some"yellow caution lights... are flashing brighter" than previously..."
>... problem loans by nationally chartered banks to U.S. businesses have more than doubled in two years..."
>Chicago Sun-Times [September 22, 2000]


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gesamter Thread:

• Wer weiß was zum Herstatt-Fall '74? Was war damals genau los? - Tobias, 05.01.2001, 16:03
  • Re: Wer weiß was zum Herstatt-Fall '74? Was war damals genau los? - dottore, 05.01.2001, 16:15
    • Sprach das"wandelne Wirschaftslexikon" dottore. Respekt, respekt!! ;-) owT,Gruß - ufi, 05.01.2001, 16:19
    • Zusatzfragen - Tobias, 05.01.2001, 16:50
      • Re: Zusatzfragen - so vielleicht? - dottore, 05.01.2001, 21:33
        • Alles klar + keine Sorge wg. Tassen - alles Hartplastik! (owT) - Tobias, 05.01.2001, 22:02