Re: Gesucht: Text zu: Fakten, die für eine harte Landung in den USA sprechen

verfasst von André, 23.01.2001, 17:34

Sehr gute Zusammenfassung trauriger Wahrheiten.
André
P.S. Fehlt am Ende etwas Text?
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
>>Hallo,
>>Ich suche einen möglichst knallharten Text zur Wirtschaftssituation in den USA, hat da jemand letztens was aktuelles gesehen?
>>ciao!
>>SchlauFuchs
>
> The Privateer
> 2001 Volume Late January Issue Number 416
>
> GLOBAL REPORT
>
> IT HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN
>
> At the moment, the Greenspan Fed is"re-liquefying" the U.S.
> financial system at breakneck speed. This can be seen from
> the fact that the U.S. M-3 money stock has increased by
> $US 112 Billion in three weeks!
> The Investment Company Institute reported that over the
> same period, U.S. Money Market Funds reported increases in
> fund assets of $US 67.6 Billion, the biggest rate of money
> inflows seen in three years. From Trim Tabs came a report
> that $US 15 Billion has flowed into equity funds.
> It Always Begins With Currencies:
> Globally, the most important thing to constantly keep an eye
> on is currencies. They often break trends and reverse
> direction long before stock markets follow. The U.S. Dollar
> has now fallen by 17% against the Euro since November
> 2000. Just about the only currency the U.S. Dollar has not
> fallen against is the Yen.
> What comes next is the reaction of the stock market. U.S.
> corporate chiefs are now looking at imports (not including oil)
> becoming more expensive. After that, having to pay these
> higher costs, they will look to raise prices and then they will
> look at massive cost cuts to save money fast.
> And all of this will inevitably lead to an earnings crash.
> The process is already underway, but so far, the cheer squad
> from Wall Street has managed to keep most people
> (especially Americans) in the U.S. market. Europeans have
> seen their currency recover, and are now looking hard at the
> prospects of future U.S. earnings and not seeing any. They
> have begun to sell out of the U.S. stock markets, but not in
> any great volumes - yet.
> Giving Credit Where Due:
> The Privateer will certainly give credit to Mr Greenspan - for
> being the cause and prime mover behind the biggest credit expansion in history. The facts are
> these. Between the beginning of 1995 and the end of June 2000, the U.S. financial system
> increased its debts by $US 4.15 TRILLION. U.S. corporate and private consumer debts increased
> by $US 4.75 TRILLION. In sum, the"private" sector of the U.S. economy increased its debts by
> $US 8.9 TRILLION in 5.5 years.
> $US 8.9 TRILLION is almost nine MILLION million Dollars. The U.S. Federal government admits to
> funded debts of about $US 5.7 TRILLION, accumulated over about 210 years. Now, you can see
> where the inflation is REALLY coming from. U.S. stock markets have already fallen. The U.S. Dollar
> is next.
> The State Of The U.S. Markets:
> Back in March 2000, U.S. stock markets stood at a valuation of 181% of U.S. GDP. That can be
> compared with where they stood in 1990, which was a valuation of 60% of U.S. GDP. The ratio of
> the value of U.S. markets to the U.S. GDP had therefore tripled over a decade. It is this huge
> valuation overshoot that Mr Greenspan is now attempting to sustain.
> The Wiltshire Index, which is the widest in the U.S., has fallen by 20%. As an aside, spare a small
> thought for foreign (specifically European) investors. They have just taken a double hit. The
> Dollar has fallen against their currencies and the Euro. Then there is the added pain of a 20% fall
> in the Wiltshire Index. If you are an American investor, spare more than a small thought. You can
> rest assured that all these foreigners are now standing ready to sell into any rallies.
> That means that the Greenspan"re-liquefication" push may lure many Americans to either
> re-enter the U.S. markets or (more likely) add to their portfolios, but these American will be
> buying shares that the foreigners are now primed to sell. Once that first rotation from foreign
> hands into American hands is over, the U.S. stock market stands primed for its next downswing.
> The harder Greenspan pushes his"re-liquefication", the easier he makes it for foreign holders of
> U.S. shares to hand them to Americans. They can do it without breaking the U.S. stock markets
> on the downside. That has two effects. First: As foreign holders sell out of their shares, they will
> seriously consider selling out of the U.S. Dollar too.
> To the extent that happens, it will put the U.S. currency under pressure and add to the already
> established downside momentum. Second: If a renewed demand for shares by Americans is met
> by selling by foreigners, then U.S. markets will not rally to any great extent. If this happens, the
> point will be reached where the American holders lose patience and sell out. Some will, most
> won't. The historical norm is that domestic shareholders hold on ALL the way down.
> Always keep this in mind. A stock market valuation of 181% of GDP is not only"unusual", it is
> unprecedented. To scale back to the levels of 1990 (60% of GDP) would not be the equivalent of
> a"soft" landing (the 1990 recession was a mild one) or even a"hard" one, it would be the
> equivalent of a crash.. To scale back this ratio would take a 66% fall in U.S. stock markets from
> their March 2000 levels. Even the Nasdaq hasn't fallen that far yet. And the Dow has hardly
> moved at all.
> Behind The U.S. Debts Lies Money:
> Between 1995 and the end of 2000, the U.S. Federal Reserve Inflated the quantity of the U.S.
> M-3 money stock by 55%! That is what"inflation" IS! It is always and only a monetary event.
> The effects of inflation, and they are many, result from this increase in the stock of money. Price
> moves, including the prices of shares, are certainly a result of inflation, but it is the effect of
> inflation upon valuations which are often the most dangerous. When an asset increases in
> valuation, the potential amount that can be borrowed against that asset also increases. Asset
> valuation increases allows money to be borrowed at much faster and more reckless speeds than
> do mere decreases in interest rates.
> This inflation effect upon collateral seeds the ground for more loans. If, as is the case in many
> parts of the U.S., real estate prices are climbing fast, that is an increase in collateral. Home
> owners usually decide to"liquify" part of their increased collateral by re-financing their
> mortgages. Then, they have more money to spend. For years now, this money has been going
> into consumer goods, and shares.
> In ten years, the ratio between U.S. stock market valuations and U.S. GDP tripled. Since mid
> 1995, consumer and corporate debt has increased almost $US 9 TRILLION and U.S. M-3 is up
> 55%. The result is a GIGANTIC increase in debt, domestic and foreign. A credit expansion is a
> DEBT expansion.
> The U.S. Dollar - Versus - The Debts:
> Greenspan is caught in a cleft stick of his own making. If he again lowers interest rates to enable
> the huge internal debts to be more easily carried, he risks the U.S. Dollar. If he doesn't, he risks a
> debt crash.
> Watch The U.S. Banks:
> The U.S. banking sector is a close copy of the Japanese banking sector, circa 1989/90. The
> Japanese used the same means to create the same thing - a bubble. Japanese real estate prices
> had exploded and the Japanese stock market had soared. In the second half of 1989, the Bank of
> Japan raised rates, and waited. They didn't have to wait long. The huge over-valuation of land
> and shares continued until the end of 1989 while the economy was already slowing. In 1990,
> valuations broke and the slide was unstoppable. The Bank of Japan chased the slump all the way
> down with interest rates which fell to 0.0%.
> But it was too late. The Japanese stock market had irretrievably crashed. Worse, the land
> valuations which had been the collateral foundation for enormous bank loans crashed. Suddenly,
> Japan's banks stood with massive loans outstanding and next to no collateral underpinning these
> loans. They did not stand with the capital in reserve to deal with any of this. In fact, they were
> all just plain flat broke.
> This was the Japanese sequence. It is just starting to happen for the U.S. commercial banks,
> mainly in the area of commercial loans. What has not yet been seen in the U.S. are some really
> BIG commercial loan failures. When these start to surface, then the way is cleared for a U.S.
> repeat of the entire Japanese sequence laid out in the above paragraph. There is one last thing
> to mention in this regard, and it is a huge difference. The difference is SAVINGS. Even at the
> height of their"boom" at the end of the 1980s, the Japanese were huge savers. They still are. It
> has been this huge savings pool that has saved Japan, so far. In the case of the U.S., there are
> NO private savings at all. The U.S."savings rate" is MINUS 0.8%.
> The Approaching Danger Of A U.S. Hyper-Inflation:
> The Japanese have managed to hang on for a decade, sustaining their internal economy with one
> HUGE budget deficit after another. The Japanese government could do this because the Japanese
> public had left them a huge pool of private savings to draw on. But this process of ever ongoing
> budget deficits (the present one is 10% of GDP) has taken government debts to 130-140% of
> Japanese GDP. The key here is that U.S. authorities have NO such private savings to draw upon.
> They are not there. That only leaves one drastic alternative to a future HUGE debt write-off and
> that is - a massive U.S. cash money inflation - a real increase in the quantity of cash U.S. Dollars
> or near cash U.S. Dollars. Without any genuine savings, that would be the only way to"cover"
> the fast approaching bad debts.
> This is the"Latin American" (or"banana republic") solution. Latin America has been using this
>"solution" since the late 1970s, when Arab"Oil Dollars" were being recycled there by U.S. banks.
> This caused the usual credit expansion there, followed by a share and land boom. That was
> followed in turn by a crash in shares and then land, which tore the heart out of the collateral
> behind the U.S. banks' loans. The U.S. banks were bailed out by the IMF. The Latin American
> nations resorted to the old method of simply printing the currency to cover, forcing interest rates
> through the roof and leaving the currencies worthless. After that, they launched"new" currencies
> and promised to do better the next time around.
> Comparative Score Cards:
> In the U.S., the Nasdaq is now merely"over-valued", the rest of the market is still hugely"over
> valued". The U.S. real estate bubble is starting to fray at the edges in some places. External
> deficits on trade and current account are accelerating, increasing the net external debt of $US
> 2.2 TRILLION by an annual rate of close to $US 500 Billion. All of this is what the Latin American
> nations have been facing for decades.
> A Pre-Made Accident Waiting To Happen:
> The sudden break and the fast fall of the U.S. Dollar which began in late Nov. 2000 was the first
> item in what will be a historical sequence. The Greenspan panic rate cuts of Jan. 3, 2001 were
> the second. Now, the world is waiting for more rate cuts to come from the Fed in a fast fire
> sequence. The"hope" here is that one of the cuts in the sequence will act to underpin the entire
> U.S. financial system and its economy. What nobody seems to be sure of is which one of these
> cuts will act to"save" the U.S. financial system.
> Understanding The Problem:
> The whole world of finance also stood and waited as the Bank of Japan chased the Japanese
> economy downstairs with rate cuts all the way down to ZERO. It didn't"work", and expecting it
> to"work" now in the U.S. is to entirely misunderstand the real nature of the economic problem.
> By its nature, a credit expansion ALWAYS leads to ever larger and more numerous
> mal-investments. None of these show themselves to be mal-investments until the wave of
> artificial credit starts to ebb away. In the U.S. case, all the mal- investments have already been
> made. They are HERE. And being here, there are no means between here and hell with which to
> make them into viable economic investments. A re- start of the U.S. credit expansion will NOT do
> it. Even a short-lived rerun of the U.S. credit expansion will only cause other sectors of the U.S.
> economy to add to their already outstanding mal-investments or start other and new mal-
> investments in other areas. Mal-investments are like building bridges in all the wrong places.
> These bridges can be engineering marvels and things of artistic beauty, but if people find they
> don't want to go where the bridges lead, they are useless. That is true even if it costs these
> people nothing or next to nothing (due to the credit expansion and lower interest rates) to pay
> to cross them.
> If the credit expansion dries up, then the people using the bridge have to pay out of their own
> pockets. Most of them will not cross the bridge at all or will find a cheaper alternative way to get
> to where they wanted to go so. The bridge is a mal-investment - it stands empty. To suddenly
> discover these empty bridges and then to recommend more of the policy that brought them into
> existence in the first place is to vehemently insist upon building bridges everywhere - to no
> economic purpose.
> The simple and fundamental economic fact is that once a credit expansion has run its course,
> people by their millions decide to return to the economic choices open to them when paid for by
> their own earnings, not their earnings PLUS their borrowings. If many of these people have taken
> losses, either on their share investments (as in Japan) or upon the values of their houses (though
> the loans against them haven't fallen) then there is no hope this side of hell that such people will
> suddenly become big spenders when lower interest rates on new loans are dangled before them.
> Even at near ZERO rates of interest, just like the ones in Japan, the powers-that-be simply
> cannot get the internal economy going again, because the consumer won't spend. They will
> certainly take advantage of the lower interest rates, but they will use them to re-finance their
> existing loans. That will cut the lenders earnings to ZERO - just like the rates.
> Waiting For The American Consumer:
> At this point in the global economic saga, the world is waiting for the American consumer. But if
> enough Americans decide that they won't play the borrow-and-spend game anymore, then it is
> not only the U.S. economy that is in Japanese territory, so is the entire world. It has been these
> American consumers, through their buying of imports, who have sustained most of the Asian
> economies. It is only Europe which stands in a different global position because only 2% of its
> output goes to the U.S.A.. Asia will be"toast" if U.S. imports decline badly. The 15 European
> Union nations will cope.
> The global problem is that the U.S. credit expansion has caused the economic equivalent of the
> rest of the world building false economic bridges everywhere, but especially to the U.S. These
> mal-investments were made because a large part of the U.S. credit expansion flowed overseas to
> buy imports. The U.S. trade and current account deficit inundated the world with a huge outflow
> of borrowed U.S. Dollars.
> The REAL U.S. Economy:
> The REAL U.S. economy makes real physical economic goods. It has been getting hammered since
> June 2000. The index of manufacturing activity fell sharply in the fourth quarter of 2000. Output
> has now been below 50 for three months in a row. U.S. export orders have been declining for
> three straight months. This is a very fast contraction and it is clearly accelerating. The
> production index has fallen from 49.6 % in November to just 42.4 % in December. Anything below
> 50 is very real contraction.
> Worse, U.S. corporate prices of inputs have risen from 56.6 in November to 61.0 in December.
> Worst of all are the input cost increases is energy. Here are just a few examples. Jet fuel has
> climbed in price by 59.6% from Nov 1999 to Nov 2000; diesel is up by 53.7%, natural gas by
> 51%, propane by 45.5%. The only two energy areas not showing huge price increases (yet) are
> electricity for consumers and commerce which have climbed over the above time frame by
> respectively 2.6% and 2.9%. But these figures do not yet reflect the current electricity crisis in
> California. Overall, over the this past period, U.S. corporate energy costs have climbed by an
> average of 20%. Consumer prices will react later.
> A Mighty Credit Crunch:
> U.S. corporations can no longer go to Wall Street and sell some more shares. That avenue is
> closed for raising more money. Corporate bonds are VERY hard to sell. The banks have taken their
>"welcome mats" for corporate borrowers and hidden them in the basement. Inside, in the back
> rooms, U.S. banks are counting up the fast climbing number of business and corporate loans that
> are going sour. Over at the junk market for corporate paper, speculative bond yields were 9.4%
> higher than matching U.S. Treasury paper. Junk bonds issued by IT outfits, like competitive local
> exchanges, are now carrying yields of up to 33% (that is NOT a"misprint"). The sum of all this is
> that U.S. businesses cannot get any money.
> It Took Intervention To Get To Here:
> Interventionism is the disease of governments. It is the obnoxious and deadly dangerous idea
> that people in the government can - through their complex manipulations of interest rates, money
> quantities, rules and regulations which are constantly changing, and all the rest. - achieve more
> than a proper free market held together by clear property rights and sound money and credit.
> When the sum of all the accumulated interventions inside the U.S. economy is beginning to show
> up clearly - a great danger is arriving - fast!
> The"stage" has been set for decades, but it has taken the fantastic credit expansion of
> 1995-2000 to reach the present point. Now, the REAL crunch is on. And the most certain thing
> Americans and the rest of the world can count upon is that to"cure" all these
> government-caused economic problems, even MORE interventions will be resorted to! As analysed
> earlier in this section, these problems, once caused, exist in physical reality. They are the
> mal-investments, the bridges which lead nowhere and which no one wants to cross anymore.
> Fundamentally, that is why no amount of additional government intervention can make these
> mal-investments economically viable.
> The Next Danger:
> That danger arrives on January 20. Knowing that the U.S. economy is in dire straits, the new
> Bush Administration is almost certain to try to act to"save" the economic situation. Their only
> means with which to do that is MORE government interventions in the U.S. financial system and
> economy.
> This is the fundamental problem with Interventionism. All nations have indulged in it. But only one
> nation, the U.S., has yet to pay the price for it. The"cure" for old interventions has always been
>"new" interventions - on top of the old ones. As long as the U.S. was seen to be"booming", the
>"cure" was seen to be working. When the U.S. is seen to have stopped"booming", the crisis of
> intervention is at hand.
>
> INSIDE THE UNITED STATES
>
> STEPPING INTO THE PRE-MADE WRECKAGE
> When President Bush steps into the Oval Office, he will also be stepping into the greatest
> economic mess any President has stepped into since President Hoover. Only one central
> economic fact is needed to both validate and justify this statement. Here it is: Between 1925
> and 1929, the (Benjamin) Strong Fed inflated the U.S. stock of money by 10%. Between 1995
> and 2000, the Greenspan Fed inflated the U.S. stock of money by 55%. All economic historians
> know what happened in 1929, but it takes valid economic theory - such as the Austrian Theory
> of the Trade Cycle - to look into what will happen now.
> Obviously, based upon the 10% inflation of the '20s money stock and the 55% inflation of the
> '90s money stock, the problem now is at least 5 times bigger than the monetary mistakes made in
> the lead up to 1929. As to the massive mal- investments made in the U.S.A. and especially in
> Japan and across Asia, there is really very little that can be done. A lot of these plants and their
> equipment will have to be shut down. After that has regrettably been done, new investments
> must be made in new plant and equipment that actually do have an economically valid consumer
> demand behind it - and not borrowings.
> That means that a"transitional" RECESSION is required.
> A transitional recession is one where, as mal-investments are written off and new investments
> entered into, the economy goes through a period of transitional unemployment and lowered living
> standards and the financial system goes through a period of writing-off the bad loans.
> Governments, standing before this otherwise normal economic event, can in principle do only two
> things. They can cut government expenditures to the bone and lower taxes to match. This will
> free up the cash flows of private individuals and all the affected businesses and enable them to
> SAVE. They can then use the savings to pay down most of the outstanding loans, and then
> stand with the means in hand to make new and valid investments.
> The other thing a government has to do is to set interest rates free. Under no circumstances
> must any attempt be made by a government to hold interest rates lower than where a free
> market in SAVED and lendable funds would have placed them. It is high interest rates that
> attract savings, not low ones. Along with setting interest rates free, a government must
> deregulate - FULLY.
> If the above economic principles are adhered to, the U.S. economy could work itself into the
> clear in three to five years. If they were adhered to in Asia, then Asia could emerge from the
> wreckage too.
> It Won't Happen!
> None of the above will happen, or it will happen to a woefully insufficient degree. This is because
> American politicians are by now too scared of the illusions in the minds of the American public
> which they themselves have so vigorously fostered over the last eight years. These illusions are
> fundamentally based upon the idea that endless borrowing was and is the yellow brick road to
> endless wealth.
> When politicians stand forward and promise"prosperity", they have to"create" it. But there never
> has been a stock of consumable goods and new plant and equipment (capital) in some well
> hidden warehouses behind the Treasury. Politicians, in fact and in reality, CANNOT create either
> wealth or prosperity.
> Having already"bought the basic premise", President Bush is regrettably certain to act with great
> vigour to maintain"prosperity", which in economic reality will mean that he will try to keep viable
> all the many mal-investments that now clutter up the U.S. economy. That is simply to act in
> utter defiance of the economic facts. More money, created either directly or through lower
> interest rates, won't make unviable investments viable. Nonetheless, Mr Bush is certain to try
> even more intervention and money creation.
>
> INSIDE JAPAN
>
> THE ACCELERATING DESCENT OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY
> Overview:
> For close to ten long years, Japan's political powers-that-be have tried, in vain, to sustain the
> mal-investments which Japan made during the boom of the late 1980s. Japan's fundamental
> economic problem is that it never attempted to get rid of these mal-investments, it simply tried
> to perpetuate them. Most of them are still here, cluttered with huge corporate debts.
> These unviable corporate debts are the nightmare of Japan's commercial banks. After all, they
> made all these loans back in the booming 1980s. When Japan's real estate values crashed,
> Japan's banks stared at the collapse of the collateral foundation underpinning an even larger
> amount of loans. Now, after ten long years, Japan's economy is again sliding backwards towards
> a new recession, this time led by a decline in exports to the, so far, insatiable U.S. economy.
> Again, the currency is leading events. Japan's Yen is now falling fast against the U.S. Dollar and
> even faster against the EU's Euro. Japan's program clearly is to let the Yen fall as fast, or faster,
> than Japan's exports to the U.S.A. are falling, all this done in an attempt to sustain the only part
> of Japan's industry that is functioning - exports.
> The Effect Upon The Rest Of Asia:
> But as Japan's Yen falls against the U.S. Dollar, all the rest of the Asian economies will
> increasingly see their exports to the U.S.A. decline. It cannot be long before most of these
> smaller economies also start their own currencies downwards! And then, a race will be on and the
>"winner" will be the nation which can make its currency fall farthest against the U.S. Dollar. The
> problem is that these falling currencies will again cause a huge capital flight, just like the one
> that happened during the crisis of 1997-99.
> At some point in this old sequence of competitive currency devaluations, China will have to act.
> If it does not do so, it will lose an ever larger part of its share in the export market to the U.S.
> economy. But, once China devalues, the rest of Asia will be thrown for a loop. This is because
> the last time that China did, in early 1998, the Asian Crisis escalated into a global financial crisis.
> The First Asia Crisis Re-Visited:
> When the first Asia Crisis exploded across the world's headlines at the beginning of 1998, the
> central thing never made mention of was that all these Asian economies stood with huge
> mountains of foreign exchange reserves. It ought to have been the most natural thing in the
> world for these nations to use part of their reserves to defend their currencies and re- liquify
> their financial systems. But they did not do so. Instead, the IMF and World Bank stormed in with
> multi- billion bail-out packages. The end result was that few, if any, of these vast holdings of
> foreign exchange reserves were thrown on the market. And that leads straight to the question:
> What are the"foreign exchange reserves" held by the Asian nations?
> They are hundreds of Billions of U.S. Dollars worth of U.S. TREASURY DEBT PAPER.
> Obviously, if huge amounts of U.S. Treasury debt paper had been sold, the U.S. bond market
> would have fallen, and that means that U.S. market rates of interest would have climbed. When
> all the U.S. Dollars acquired from such sales were also sold, the U.


<center>

<HR>

</center>

Thread gesperrt

 

gesamter Thread:

• Gesucht: Text zu: Fakten, die für eine harte Landung in den USA sprechen - SchlauFuchs, 23.01.2001, 13:32
  • Re: Gesucht: Text zu: Fakten, die für eine harte Landung in den USA sprechen - R.Deutsch, 23.01.2001, 13:56
    • Fakten für eine harte Landung in den USA - genau das hab ich gesucht. - SchlauFuchs, 23.01.2001, 14:55
      • Nur zu... - Bodo, 23.01.2001, 17:43
      • Re: Fakten für eine harte Landung in den USA - tofir, 23.01.2001, 17:46
        • Re: Fakten für eine harte Landung in den USA - SchlauFuchs, 23.01.2001, 17:57
        • Re: Danke, tofir, für den Super Link, unbedingt lesen (insbes. zu Japan!) oT - Baldur der Ketzer, 23.01.2001, 18:30
    • Re: Gesucht: Text zu: Fakten, die für eine harte Landung in den USA sprechen - André, 23.01.2001, 17:34
  • Re: Gesucht: Text zu: Fakten, die für eine harte Landung in den USA sprechen - JüKü, 23.01.2001, 14:08
    • Fakten, die für eine harte Landung in den USA sprechen - Danke JüKü - SchlauFuchs, 23.01.2001, 14:57
  • Re: Gesucht: Text zu: Fakten: harte Landung in den USA - interessanter Link! - André, 23.01.2001, 22:15