- Hat die FED ein Interesse an stabilen Finanzmärkten, will Sie die Talfahrt - Aldibroker, 30.01.2001, 20:56
- Er will sicherlich keinen neuerlichen Gipfelsturm, dann wird's nämlich gefährl.. - YIHI, 30.01.2001, 21:02
- Was ist denn nun gefährlich, das die Märkte fallen oder ein 1/x wieder aufholen? (owT) - Aldibroker, 30.01.2001, 21:05
- Re:... gefährlich für wen? - jagg, 30.01.2001, 21:14
- Re:... gefährlich für wen? - dottore, 30.01.2001, 22:23
- Re:... gefährlich für wen? - jagg, 30.01.2001, 23:25
- GS und Komptenz - 1 - jagg, 31.01.2001, 18:34
- Greenspan und Establishment - jagg, 31.01.2001, 18:35
- Greenspan und Establishment, Nachtrag - jagg, 31.01.2001, 18:46
- Greenspan und Komptenz - 2 - jagg, 31.01.2001, 18:37
- Diskussion der GS Rede an December 5, 1996 - jagg, 31.01.2001, 18:42
- Greenspan und"Macht" - jagg, 31.01.2001, 18:52
- Re:... gefährlich für wen? - jagg, 30.01.2001, 23:25
- Re:... gefährlich für wen? - dottore, 30.01.2001, 22:23
- Re:... gefährlich für wen? - jagg, 30.01.2001, 21:14
- Was ist denn nun gefährlich, das die Märkte fallen oder ein 1/x wieder aufholen? (owT) - Aldibroker, 30.01.2001, 21:05
- Re: Hat die FED ein Interesse an stabilen Finanzmärkten, will Sie die Talfahrt - JüKü, 30.01.2001, 21:28
- Worum geht es? (owT) - Aldibroker, 30.01.2001, 21:37
- darum was er kann und das was passieren wird. nervensäge (owT) - puppetmaster, 30.01.2001, 21:59
- Entschuldige, suche nur Antworten und will mich weiterentwicklen, nehme - Aldibroker, 30.01.2001, 22:07
- 'nervensäge' ist aber kein schöner Ausdruck!! (owT) - ufi, 31.01.2001, 12:50
- darum was er kann und das was passieren wird. nervensäge (owT) - puppetmaster, 30.01.2001, 21:59
- Worum geht es? (owT) - Aldibroker, 30.01.2001, 21:37
- Er will sicherlich keinen neuerlichen Gipfelsturm, dann wird's nämlich gefährl.. - YIHI, 30.01.2001, 21:02
Greenspan und Establishment
Zitiert aus 2tfme13 von Vern Lyon,
http://www.aros.net/~vlyon/ bzw.
ftp://ftp.aros.net/pub/users/vlyon/2tfme12.txt
...
Leo Melamed, who was chairman of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
at the time, in his Escape to the Futures (1996) relates how
just before midnight on the day of the Stock Market crash on
October 19, 1987 he received many phone calls from Washington
politicians and officials. One of these calls was from Fed
chairman Alan Greenspan. Later reflecting on this Washington
attention Melamed understood it to mean that the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange had attained respectability and was
considered a major player on the American financial scene.
Melamed describes his conversation with Greenspan as follows:
With sweating hands, I returned Greenspan's call first. We had
known each other many years, ever since he supported my plans
to introduce Treasury bill futures in 1976. He knew I had great
admiration for him because just before hid Fed appointment as
chairman, I had invited him to sit as a director of the Merc.
Alas, he had bigger things in mind. during the course of
October 19, on more than one occasion, I silently thanked the
Lord that he was in charge at the Fed rather than a director at
the CME. I had little doubt that someone of lesser competence
might not have been up to the challenge at this critical moment
in our nation's history. Greenspan's voice was calm, conveying
to me the impression that things would be all right. His first
question, however, revealed the true danger of the situation.
"Will you open tomorrow morning?" he asked, both of us
understanding that this was the most crucial question [p. 359].
Whether the Merc could open depended on whether at this hectic
time the variation margin from the losers, in this case the
longs, would be deposited with the Merc's clearinghouse to pay
the shorts in time for the nest mornings scheduled opening. If
not the Merc could not open, and that would have been a
frightening event to the world's financial community. So what the
calm Mr. Greenspan was implying is that he would do what he
could, which being the chairman of a very profitable institution,
amounted to plenty, to ensure that the Merc would be able to
open.
There are many reason's why the Merc's accounts would not be
settled in time. Everything from massive bankruptcies to over
loaded wire transfer facilities. This last possibility can be
used to illustrate how knowledge of futures market practice can
shed light on economic theory -- specifically the quantity
theory.
...
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