Al-Quaida

verfasst von R.Deutsch, 16.09.2001, 10:47

FOSUS.COM


October 20, 2000
Suicide terrorism: a global threat

Jane' s Intelligence Review: Traditionally viewed as a problem affecting the Middle East and
South Asia, the threat posed by suicide terrorism is spreading around the globe. Rohan
Gunaratna assesses the nature of the threat, preventive and reactive security measures,
and examines future trends.

THE ENHANCED international and domestic threat of suicide terrorism from terrorist
groups in the Middle East and South Asia was the focus of the First International
Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism, held in Israel between 21­23 February 2000.
The conference brought together some 80 police, military, intelligence and security
specialists to share their national experiences, and was prompted by the growing need for
governments to identify the threat and co-operate at strategic and tactical levels to disrupt
suicide terrorism.

The threat

Suicide terrorism is the readiness to sacrifice one's life in the process of destroying or
attempting to destroy a target to advance a political goal. The aim of the psychologically and
physically war-trained terrorist is to die while destroying the enemy target.

In the 1980s suicide terrorism was witnessed in Lebanon, Kuwait and Sri Lanka. In the
1990s it had spread to Israel, India, Panama, Algeria, Pakistan, Argentina, Croatia, Turkey,
Tanzania and Kenya. With enhanced migration of terrorist groups from conflict-ridden
countries, the formation of extensive international terrorist infrastructures and the increased
reach of terrorist groups in the post Cold War period, suicide terrorism is likely to affect
Western Europe and North America in the foreseeable future.

There are now 10 religious and secular terrorist groups that are capable of using suicide
terrorism as a tactic against their governments and/or foreign governments. They are: the
Islam Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad of the Israeli
occupied territories; Hizbullah of Lebanon; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and Gamaya
Islamiya (Islamic Group - IG) of Egypt; the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria; Barbar
Khalsa International (BKI) of India; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri
Lanka; the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) of Turkey; and the Osama bin Laden network (Al
Quaida) of Afghanistan.

There were also four pro-Syrian, Lebanese and Syrian political parties engaged in suicide
terrorism in the 1980s, but they are currently inactive in the terrorist front. These groups
staged around 25 suicide attacks in Lebanon. As more than one group claimed some of
the attacks, perhaps to diffuse the threat to the group, it is difficult to identify the group
responsible. The groups engaged in suicide operations in Lebanon alongside Hizbullah
were the Natzersit Socialist Party of Syria; the Syrian Nationalist Party; the Lebanese
Communist Party; and the Baath Party of Lebanon.

There are two types of suicide operations: battlefield and off the battlefield. In battlefield
operations, suicide bombers are integrated into the attacking groups. Most
off-the-battlefield operations have involved single suicide bombers. In the case of the LTTE
and Hamas, there have been multiple suicide bombers. The targets have been static and
mobile, against infrastructure and humans. Suicide bombers have destroyed military,
political, economic and cultural infrastructure. They have committed terrorist attacks by
killing civilians in buses, crowded places and in buildings. Suicide bombers have also
assassinated political and military VIPs.

Key characteristics

Examination of suicide terrorism across a range of groups has revealed that terrorist
groups use suicide bombers when they are both strong and weak. In terms of military and
economic power, Hizbullah and the LTTE lead the list of suicide operations. In terms of
numbers, the LTTE has conducted the largest volume of suicide operations, followed by
Hizbullah, Hamas and the PKK. In terms of range, only some of the groups have operated
beyond their territories.

As well as abortive attempts to conduct suicide operations in Israel, Hizbullah has
successfully conducted suicide operations in Argentina. The LTTE has conducted one
suicide operation in India. It is the only group to have killed two world leaders - the former
prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and the president of Sri Lanka, Ranasinghe
Premadasa - using male and female suicide bombers.

The Egyptian groups have conducted suicide operations in Croatia against a police station
and in Pakistan against the Egyptian embassy. Al-Quaida used at least one Egyptian
suicide bomber in the 1998 East African embassy bombings. All the other active groups
have conducted suicide operations within their own territory. The PKK has threatened to
conduct suicide operations in Germany where there is a large Kurdish diaspora.

All the suicide terrorist groups have support infrastructures in Europe and in North America.
Leaders and members of these groups are known to travel to the West, and key activists
live either in Europe or in North America distributing propaganda, raising funds, and in
some instances procuring weapons and shipping them to the various theatres of conflict.

Suicide-capable groups differ in form, size, orientation, goal and support. A review of the key
characteristics of the 10 suicide-capable groups reveals that any group can acquire suicide
bomb technology and engage in suicide terrorism:

· Al Quaida is a mix of several associate groups that are internationally dispersed. From
Afghanistan, Bin Laden provides the overall direction to the organisation. Al Quaida efforts
are primarily directed against the USA ('Great Satan') and Israel ('Little Satan'), and their
allies. More recently, Al Quaida has directed its efforts against India on the issue of
Kashmir, a territory disputed between India and Pakistan. The USA has directed its
resources to disrupting Al Quaida support operations in the USA, especially after the 1998
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

· The Indian counter insurgency specialist, K P S Gill, broke the backbone of the Sikh
insurgents in Punjab, northern India. BKI is fighting for an independent 'Khalistan' in the
predominantly Sikh state of Punjab. It has a small presence in the target country - India - but
enjoys a significant presence in the diaspora - UK and Canada. In January 2000, when BKI
was planning to conduct its second suicide operation, the Indian security forces
apprehended the bomber.

· The GIA has staged only one suicide operation as part of its fight to establish an Islamic
state in Algeria.

· Hizbullah, responsible for suicide bombing the US Marine Corps barracks and the
headquarters of the French paratroopers in Lebanon in 1983, is fighting to oust the Israelis
from southern Lebanon. Hizbullah is supported by Iran, a steadfast state sponsor. Today,
Hizbullah is also a political party.

· Hamas and PIJ, operating in Gaza and West Bank, have vowed to destroy the 'Zionist state
of Israel'. Currently, Hamas and PIJ are controlled by the Palestinian Authority under its
President, Yasser Arafat. Shin Bet (the Israeli security agency) and the Mossad (the Israeli
external intelligence agency) have regulated the efficacy of these two groups by removing
their key operatives and military leaders.

In a deep-penetration operation, Shin Bet agents placed a micro explosive device in the
mobile phone of the Hamas suicide bomb maker, Yahiya Aiyyash, killing him. Due to the
efficiency of the countermeasures adopted by Israeli police, military, intelligence and
security organisations, the number of fatalities and casualties caused by Hamas, the PIJ
and Hizbullah bombing has steadfastly declined. Towards the last few bombings, the
explosions only killed the bomber. Although Hamas is likely to retain a military capability,
the group will probably join the political mainstream in the foreseeable future. The PIJ
became weak after the Mossad assassinated Shikaki, its military and political commander
in Malta.

· The two Egyptian groups - IG and EIJ - are fighting to establish an Islamic state in Egypt.
The leader of the EIJ, Dr Ayman Al-Thawaheri, lives in Afghanistan and works closely with
Bin Laden.

· Until the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK fought for an independent
Kurdistan in southeastern Turkey. Today, the PKK is demanding autonomy and equal
cultural rights.

· The LTTE is fighting for an independent Tamil state in northeastern Sri Lanka. As the
quality of targets chosen by the LTTE is high, it has a sophisticated training programme that
lasts for about a year. As well as training the bomber, the LTTE research unit tests the
effects of explosives on dogs and goats to ensure that the attack is successful. The list of
Sri Lankan VIPs killed in suicide attacks includes one president, one presidential
candidate, the State Minister of Defence, the Navy Chief and various area commanders. No
country has lost so many leaders in such a short period of time as Sri Lanka has to the
LTTE suicide bombers.

Motivation

Some of suicide groups are motivated by religion, religious/ethnic nationalism, or ethnic
nationalism. Al Quaida's religious philosophy transcends territorial borders. Hamas, the
PIJ and Hizbullah are primarily religious groups, but they are also driven by
ethno-nationalism. BKI is the only non-Islamic religious group. While the LTTE and the PKK
are driven by ethno-nationalism, the PKK is also infused with Marxist-Leninist ideology. As
such, the motivation of Hamas, the PIJ and Hizbullah suicide bombers is primarily Islam.
The motivation of the LTTE and the PKK suicide bombers is mainly Tamil and Kurdish
nationalism respectively.

Dependent on the political environment and potential and actual donors, a new ideological
orientation can be built into a group. With the end of the Cold War, most groups are
abandoning Marxist, Leninist and Maoist ideologies and embracing ethno-nationalist
and/or religious ideologies.

There are some constraints that affect the deployment of female suicide bombers. An
examination of the groups driven by religious ideology reveals that Islam has constrained
the use of women suicide bombers. Nevertheless, about five of the suicide operations in
Lebanon were women. Although the PIJ once planned to use a woman to suicide bomb the
Israeli prime minister's residence in Jerusalem, the operation was thwarted. About 30% of
the suicide operations in Sri Lanka have been conducted by women.

A higher percentage of women have featured in off-the-battlefield suicide operations, which
requires infiltration, invisibility and deception. A woman staged the suicide operation that
killed Rajiv Gandhi in India. Most suicide operations in Turkey are by women. For many
reasons, women are the preferred choice of secular groups when it comes to infiltration
and strike missions. First, women are less suspicious. Second, in the conservative
societies of the Middle East and South Asia, there is a hesitation to body search a woman.
Third, women can wear a suicide device beneath her clothes and appear pregnant.

Modus Operandi

The organisation of suicide operations is extremely secretive. The success of the mission
depends on a number of elements: level of secrecy; thorough reconnaissance; and
thorough rehearsals. Secrecy enables the preservation of the element of surprise, critical
for the success of most operations.


Thorough reconnaissance enables the group to plan, often by building a scale model of the
target. Thorough rehearsals allow the bomber to gain stealth and speed. There are other
elements, such as getting the bomber to the target zone and then to the target itself. The
bomber is usually supported by an operational cell, responsible for providing
accommodation, transport food, clothing and security to the bomber until he/she reaches
the target. Resident agents help generate intelligence for the operation, from target
reconnaissance to surveillance. The cell members confirm the intelligence. Often,
immediately before the attack, the bomber conducts the final reconnaissance.

As a comprehensive knowledge of the target is essential for the success of a suicide
operation, terrorist groups depend on building solid agent-handling networks. Some
security and intelligence agencies have succeeded in penetrating the agent-handling
network of various terrorist groups. In some cases, the only form of defence is to penetrate
the terrorist group itself. This is because bombers penetrate governments or societies as
sleepers and gradually gain acceptance as a trusted member. Thus the bomber can reach
and destroy a valuable target - human or infrastructure.

In such cases, even the presence of a few hundred bodyguards or guards assigned to
protect sensitive installations cannot serve as a counter measure. As such, penetration of
the terrorist group is the first line of defence. The last line of defence is hardening the
vulnerable and likely targets.

There are six types of suicide improvised explosive devices (IEDs). These are: the
human-borne suicide IED, also known as the suicide bodysuit; the vehicle-borne suicide
IED; the motorcycle-borne suicide IED; naval craft-borne suicide IED; scuba diver-borne
suicide IED; and aerial- (microlight, glider, mini-helicopter) borne suicide IED. All these
categories have been used in South Asia and the Middle East.

The largest number of suicide IEDs used has been the suicide bodysuit. As terrorists are
cost conscious, there have been only a few cases of bombers using aerial-borne suicide
IEDs. Yet these are the most difficult to thwart. Their small size makes them hard to detect
on radar, but the range of a light aircraft is limited, weather sensitive and lacks accuracy.

The traditional concept of security is based on deterrence, where the terrorist is either killed
or captured. The success of a suicide terrorist operation is dependent on the death of the
terrorist. The suicide terrorist is not worried about capture, interrogation (including torture),
trial, imprisonment and the accompanying humiliation.

Furthermore, in suicide attacks, there is no need to provide an escape route, or for the
extraction of the attacker/attacking force. The group does not have to concern itself with
developing an escape plan, often the most difficult phase of an operation. Therefore, a
suicide terrorist could enter a high security zone and accomplish his/her mission without
worrying about escape or evasion. The certain death of the attacker enables the group to
undertake high quality operations while protecting the organisation and its cadres. As every
prisoner has a point of breaking under psychological or physical pressure, the certain
death of the attacker or attackers prevent the captor extracting information.

Likely developments

The development of counter measures has led to a decline in the number of suicide
attacks. In Israel, several rings of security prevent the suicide bomber from reaching the
intended target. In response, groups try out novel methods of infiltration. In this game of 'cat
and mouse', one side can learn from the other in an attempt to 'checkmate' the opponent.
While most groups can improvise, only a few are innovative.

To detect persons carrying explosives, security authorities have used sniffer dogs, with a
maximum attention span of 30 minutes. One terrorist group has hired the services of a dog
handler from France to monitor the ability of sniffer dogs. It is likely that this group will
develop a suicide body suit with a repellent to evade the attention of sniffer dogs. With these
developments, it is likely that the role of the sniffer dog will diminish with time and more
innovative mechanisms will be necessary to detect the bomber.

The suicide body suit has evolved to improve concealment and is becoming increasingly
small. Initially, the device was a square block of explosives worn in the chest and the belly
area. Gradually, the device evolved into a heart shaped block of explosives placed just
above the navel. As body searchers for suicide devices are usually conducted around the
abdomen, a group is also developing breast bombs.


Most suicide body suits have no/little electronics, making it difficult for security agencies to
develop counter-technologies to detect these devices. A suicide body suit can be made
from commercial items. With the exception of the malleable plastic explosives and
detonator, all the other components can be purchased from a tailor shop (stretch denim)
and an auto shop (steel ball bearings, wires, batteries and switches). Furthermore, when a
device is sophisticated it becomes difficult to operate, as well as fixing it when it fails to
function. Suicide devices will thus remain simple.

However, there are likely to be variations of suicide devices. Terrorists tend to select from a
repertoire of tactics. This is to retain an element of surprise and to evade the attention of
security authorities directed at countering a standard set of tactics.

State responses

Terrorist groups learn from one another. Unlike in the 1970s and the 1980s, post-Cold War
groups share resources intelligence, technology, expertise and personnel.

However, due to the need to preserve counter-technologies or political rivalry, there is either
a lack of co-operation or no co-operation at all between affected countries. For instance, the
British do not share counter remote-control bomb technologies against the Provisional IRA
(PIRA) with their US counterparts. This is, primarily due to suspicion of access or infiltration
of the US military and security industries by PIRA activists and supporters. Similarly, there is
no co-operation between Israel and Sri Lanka, the most affected countries. During the Cold
War, Indian pressure, and subsequently, the Sri Lankan Muslim lobby led to a rupture of
Israeli-Sri Lankan ties that included Israeli technical co-operation in training Sri Lankan
bomb technicians.

An example of how a lack of co-operation between the VIP security divisions of India and Sri
Lanka affected security was the failure of the Sri Lankan Presidential Security Division to
estimate the kill radius of the suicide device. In India, over 18m is maintained between the
political VIP and the public. The distance between the LTTE female suicide bomber and
President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunge, who was partially blinded by an
explosion in December 1999, was less than 12m.

Other than co-operation at strategic and tactical levels between VIP security divisions, the
lack of research into the technical capability of terrorist groups has gravely weakened the
ability of security divisions to protect their VIPs.

Strategic and tactical countermeasures can be used against suicide operations. They
could be preventive and reactive. Preventive measures range from propaganda directed
against potential suicide bombers, to infiltrating the suicide organisations of terrorist
groups. Reactive measures range from the hardening of targets, to using dummy cars to
protect VIPs. Yet security agencies agree that suicide terrorism is hard to fight. The US
secret service argues that if an assassin is willing to die, it is impossible to protect the
president. Nonetheless, affected governments have tried to protect their VIPs and critical
infrastructure.

A growing threat

The threat of suicide terrorism is likely to spread with time. As many second-generation
operations have been conducted away from the theatre of war, it is likely that suicide
terrorism will affect Western Europe and North America in the future.

Terrorist groups are increasingly providing intensive training to their bombers, with the
intention of increasing their endurance. For instance, the suicide bomber who destroyed
the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998 had been resident in Kenya for four years. He had
married in Kenya and lived in the capital before carrying out the suicide operation. Similarly,
the suicide bomber who assassinated President Premadasa of Sri Lanka had lived in the
capital, Colombo, for three years before carrying out the attack.

Terrorist groups are setting a dangerous trend of using suicide bombers to destroy targets
far away from their theatres of war. Many groups are likely to use suicide bombers to
infiltrate target countries and conduct suicide attacks against Western VIPs and critical
infrastructure in the foreseeable future.

Dr Rohan Gunaratna is a specialits on insurgency.

NUMBER OF SUICIDE ATTACKS BETWEEN 1980­2000

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri
Lanka and in India
168
Hizbullah and pro-Syrian groups in Lebanon,
Kuwait and Argentina
52
Hamas in Israel
22
The Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) in Turkey
15
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Israel
8
Al Quaida in East Africa
2
The Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in Croatia
1
The Islamic Group (IG) in Pakistan
1
Barbar Khalsa International (BKI) in India
1
The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in Algeria
1





The symbol of the feared Black Tigers, the élite
suicide organisation of the Sri Lankan Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE has been
responsible for the largest number of suicide
bombing operations. All pictures R Gunaratna





A jacket containing plastic explosives with two pull
cords - one to arm the device, the other to detonate
it. Such a device would be worn under the outer
garments of the suicide bomber.




Suicide bomber Dhanu with a sandlewood garland
minutes before attacking former Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi. She is wearing an explosive
device beneath her dress, intended to kill her and
her target.




A policeman examines two denim belt bombs with
steel ball bearings em

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