- @weissgarnix: Ne Bank hat ne Bilanz zu machen... mkT - igelei, 04.11.2007, 02:24
- Re: @weissgarnix: Ne Bank hat ne Bilanz zu machen... mkT - webmax, 04.11.2007, 03:12
- Hier noch ein Artikel über die Bilanzierungsregeln im Amiland nach 15/11 (mTuL) - DT, 04.11.2007, 03:20
- Re: Level 3 als Henker? Oder der Ãœbergang zum Buchhalten nach gusto - dottore, 04.11.2007, 13:24
- Schreibe doch mal Joe Ackermann, - LenzHannover, 04.11.2007, 11:55
- @igelei: besser den Ball flachhalten - Ne Bank hat ne Bilanz zu machen... mkT - weissgarnix, 04.11.2007, 13:01
- Re: @igelei: besser den Ball flachhalten - Ne Bank hat ne Bilanz zu machen... mkT - igelei, 04.11.2007, 13:29
- Re: @igelei: sehe ich ähnlich - webmax, 04.11.2007, 14:51
- Re: @igelei: besser den Ball flachhalten - Ne Bank hat ne Bilanz zu machen... mkT - igelei, 04.11.2007, 13:29
- Re: @weissgarnix: Ne Bank hat ne Bilanz zu machen... mkT - Dimi, 04.11.2007, 14:11
- Re: @weissgarnix: Ne Bank hat ne Lesen u n d verstehen - webmax, 04.11.2007, 15:17
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - Dimi, 04.11.2007, 15:53
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - webmax, 04.11.2007, 16:45
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - Dimi, 04.11.2007, 16:55
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen. nur kurz - webmax, 04.11.2007, 17:07
- Re: DeuBa bleibt große Klasse und strongest buy possible - Trithemius, 04.11.2007, 17:22
- Re: DeuBa bleibt große Klasse und strongest buy possible - webmax, 05.11.2007, 20:47
- Re: Ackermanns Aussage - Dimi, 04.11.2007, 18:03
- Re: DeuBa bleibt große Klasse und strongest buy possible - Trithemius, 04.11.2007, 17:22
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - webmax, 04.11.2007, 17:29
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - weissgarnix, 04.11.2007, 17:46
- Re: Eben, eben - es MÜSSEN marktgängige Sicherheiten sein - dottore, 04.11.2007, 18:00
- Re: Eben, eben - es MÜSSEN marktgängige Sicherheiten sein - weissgarnix, 04.11.2007, 18:10
- Re: Jede Menge zum 'Fair Value' - und nun? - dottore, 04.11.2007, 18:24
- Bilanzierung / Bewertung IFRS (IAS 39) - Tulpenblase, 04.11.2007, 18:47
- Re: Jede Menge zum 'Fair Value' - und nun? - weissgarnix, 04.11.2007, 19:28
- Re: Jede Menge zum 'Fair Value' - und nun? - dottore, 04.11.2007, 18:24
- Re: Eben, eben - es MÜSSEN marktgängige Sicherheiten sein - weissgarnix, 04.11.2007, 18:10
- Re: Eben, eben - es MÜSSEN marktgängige Sicherheiten sein - dottore, 04.11.2007, 18:00
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - weissgarnix, 04.11.2007, 17:46
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen. nur kurz - webmax, 04.11.2007, 17:07
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - Dimi, 04.11.2007, 16:55
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - webmax, 04.11.2007, 16:45
- Re: Lesen u n d verstehen - eben - Dimi, 04.11.2007, 15:53
- Re: @weissgarnix: Ne Bank hat ne Lesen u n d verstehen - webmax, 04.11.2007, 15:17
Re: Level 3 als Henker? Oder der Ãœbergang zum Buchhalten nach gusto
-->Hi DT,
zunächst auch von mir besten Dank für die saubere Arbeit.
Die (neue) Regel 157 war schon mal kurz angesprochen worden:
Hier bitte, unterer Kasten
Die entsprechende Aufsichtsbehörde wollte das Datum hinausschieben, fiel aber in der Abstimmung schlussendlich mit 3:4 Stimmen hinten runter. Also ab 15. November wird's ernst.
Allerdings hat Level 3 de facto sämtlich Bilanzierungsregeln außer Kraft gesetzt; die betreffenden Adressen können zur"freien" Bewertung übergehen ("managements own assumption"), auch wenn noch so etwas wie der"geschätzte künftige cash-flow" eine Rolle spielen soll(te).
Was Hutchinson schreibt ("Level 3 storm about to hit Wall Street")
ist völlig korrekt. Dabei haben es mir diese Passagen angetan:
The real secret of the difference [zwischen ML und GS] is likely to be in the details of their accounting, and in particular in the murky world, shortly to be revealed, of their"Level 3" asset portfolios.
At the other extreme Level 3 assets have only unobservable inputs to measure value and are thus valued by reference to the banks' own models.
In an extreme situation therefore, Goldman's entire existence rests on the value of its Level 3 assets. [Wird dann eben entsprechend weggebügelt].
There has been no rush to disclose Level 3 assets in advance of the first quarter in which it becomes compulsory, probably that ending in February or March 2008. Figures that have been disclosed show Lehman with $22 billion in Level 3 assets, 100% of capital, Bear Stearns with $20 billion, 155% of capital, and J P Morgan Chase with about $60 billion, 50% of capital.
However those figures are almost certainly low; the border between Level 2 and Level 3 is a fuzzy one and it is unquestionably in the interest of banks to classify as many of their assets as possible as Level 2, where analysts won't worry about them, rather than Level 3, where analyst concern is likely.
Given that we have had five good years on Wall Street, years in which nobody has known the amount of Level 3 assets on banks' balance sheets, and no significant media waves have been made questioning their valuation methodologies, it would not be surprising if many banks' Level 3 assets had become seriously overstated, even without any downturn having occurred.
Defenders of Goldman Sachs and the rest of Wall Street will insist that less than 27% of their Level 3 assets are represented by subprime mortgages yet that is hardly the point. Subprime mortgages, estimated to cause losses of $400-500 billion to the market as a whole, though only a fraction of that to Wall Street, have been only the first of the Level 3 asset disasters to surface. There is huge potential for further losses among assets whose value has never been solidly based.
Zu der Aufzählung kann ich nur anmerken:
# Mortgages other than subprime mortgages... As house prices decline, debt to equity ratios increase, and for mortgages with an original loan-to-value ratio of 90% or more, quickly pass the 100% at which a mortgage becomes uncovered. If the value of conventional mortgages decline many securities related to them, currently classed as Level 1 or 2 assets, will become unmarketable and descend into Level 3.
So wird's wohl kommen.
# Securitized credit card obligations... and its default rate is likely to soar as the full effects of the home mortgage market's crack-up spread to the credit card area.
Auch anzunehmen, jedenfalls nach dem, was ich drüben hören konnte.
# Leveraged buyout bridge loans... As the value of underlying assets declines and the cash flow fails to match debt payments, the deterioration in credit quality of these loans will accelerate.
Dito.
# Asset backed commercial paper... It is likely that as credit conditions deteriorate, the assets underlying ABCP vehicles will increasingly find themselves on bank balance sheets, where they will prove to be almost completely unmarketable.
Dann aben rein in Level 3 und zu 100 % auspreisen.
# Complex derivatives contracts... after all, Goldman's Level 3 assets increased by a third during the quarter. It's not much good shorting to match a long position you don't like if your hedging shorts prove to be impossible to close out.
Tja, und dann?
# Credit Default Swaps, the global outstanding value of which in June 2007 was $2.4 trillion [2.400 Mrd USD], according to the Bank for International Settlements. These are a relatively new instrument, the efficacy of which has not been tested in a downturn. It appears likely that the value in banks' books of their Level 3 credit derivatives contracts bears no relation whatever to reality.
The capital underlying Wall Street, at the top, is not all that large... it appears almost inevitable that in a bear market in which liquidity dries up and investors become skeptical, Wall Street's capital will be wiped out.
Also muss Dow 20.000 her - koste es, was es wolle.
Given the size of the overall figures involved and the excessive earnings that Wall Street's participants have enjoyed over the last decade, a taxpayer-funded bailout of Wall Street's titans would seem politically impossible, however loud the lobbyists scream for it.
Dafür sind die nächsten US-Wahlen ganz gut, zumal sie immer näher rücken.
Nochmals Dank + Gruß!
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