>Is J.P. Morgan Chase too big to bail?
>>
>> By John Crudele
>> New York Post
>> February 7, 2002
>>
>> Is J.P. Morgan Chase too big to bail?
>>
>> Last week I posed the more common question: Was the
>> bank too big to fail, or allowed to fail by the government?
>>
>> It's a logical question, since J.P. Morgan Chase has had
>> a string of bad luck recently, including involvement with
>> Enron. The bank says its luck hasn't been as bad as it
>> looks, and I'll get to that in a minute. But J.P. Morgan
>> chief exec William Harrison admitted publicly yesterday
>> that the bank had assumed too much risk in dealings
>> with Enron.
>>
>> But I saved potentially the most ominous and admittedly
>> most confusing of J.P. Morgan Chase's bets for last --
>> derivatives. Lot and lots and lots of derivatives. Enough
>> derivative exposure, in fact, to dwarf the entire gross
>> domestic product of the United States.
>>
>> What are derivatives? They are investments -- gambles,
>> really, like those made by Enron -- on things that are
>>"derived" from other investments. The dollar, interest
>> rate spreads, stocks, livestock -- you name it, because
>> your guess will be as good as anyone else's outside
>> of J.P. Morgan.
>>
>> J.P. Morgan declined a request to discuss its massive
>> derivative position even as it was defending its streak
>> of bad luck.
>>
>> Just how massive is Morgan's derivative gamble? Get
>> this -- it has a potential, or notional, value of $29
>> trillion. That is in addition to net credit exposure
>> of $94.7 billion. Trillions in derivatives. As in
>> three times the nation's entire annual gross domestic
>> product.
>>
>> Here is another comparison to consider: Citigroup,
>> another giant bank, only has $9 trillion in derivative
>> exposure. Says Jim Grant of Grant's Interest Rate
>> Observer:"So dominant is Morgan Chase in the
>> derivatives market that its exposures look like
>> typographical errors."
>>
>> Adds bank analyst Charles Peabody of Ventana
>> Capital,"It's an incredible figure and it's very
>> dangerous. There's no exit."
>>
>> On the bright side, J.P. Morgan Chase's derivative
>> position has been growing steadily for years, so far
>> without an apparent mishap. But, then again, the
>> country and the banking industry hasn't been through
>> a recession in recent years. As for its bad luck in
>> loans to companies like Kmart, Global Crossing,
>> Enron et al., as well as Argentina, J.P. Morgan
>> Chase says that its losses on commercial loans
>> are equal to less than 1 percent of its total portfolio.
>> And it promises that it isn't hiding any losses off the
>> balance sheet -- like PNC Bank is accused of doing.
>>
>> And apparently taking one from the Ken Lay quote
>> book, J.P. Morgan Chase says I'm relying too much
>> on a small group of bank industry analysts in my
>> critique.
>>
>> I hope the bank is right, because J.P. Morgan Chase's
>> dabbling in derivatives makes it too big for even the
>> Federal Reserve to bail out.
>>
>> -END-

Die Leute sind doch verdammt zäh bis sie einsehen ins Gold zugehen oder brauchen wir noch einen Anschlag;-)

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29.000.000.000.000,00

Woher stammt diese Zahl? Wo ist sie ausgewiesen? Wie hoch ist das Eigen- oder Kernkapital der Bank? Wird die Fed JPM innerhalb einer Stunde übernehmen?

Egal, ob es 1000 Milliarden Dollar mehr oder weniger sind: Daß JPM blitzartig untergehen wird, sagt der gesunde Menschenverstand. Verstand hilft dem Derivatemonster nicht weiter - LTCM wurde schließlich auch von mehreren Nobelpreisträgern verwaltet.

M.E. wird der Kollaps von JPM ein Fanal für die Welt-Finanzmärkte und den Untergang der USA einleiten.


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gehen.

Siehe ELSA, Schneider usw.

Gruß

ufi

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Zu den Derivaten haben die aber auch entsprechende Gegenpositionen. Sie werden also nicht mit der kompletten Summe ausfallen, sondern nur mit einem Bruchteil davon. Wie wir wissen, gibt es keinen totalen Hedge ohne sich der Gewinnchancen zu berauben. Morgan kann als auf keinen Fall überall Gegengeschäfte haben. Angenommen nur 1% der obigen Summe ist"nackt", dann wären das 290 Mrd. $ und die sollten für eine große Pleite wirklich reichen.....

Ahoi!

J.

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Habe mir eben den Geschäftsbericht 2000 angesehen (2001 noch nicht verfügbar). Derivate sind dort nur konsolidiert und saldiert aufgeführt - kein Mensch kann die Risiken so erkennen. Aber die 29 Billionen sind vielleicht auch aus der Luft gegriffen. Deswegen nochmal die Frage nach der Quelle!

Ich zitiere aus den Erläuterungen zur Bilanz:
"JPMorgan Chase uses derivatives as an end user to hedge exposures, modify the interest rate characteristics of related balance sheet instruments or meet longer-term investment objectives. These derivatives are not included in Trading Assets and Liabilities.

Derivatives used as hedges must be effective at reducing the risk associated with the exposure being hedged. Each derivative must be designated as a hedge at the beginning of the contract and must be highly correlated with the underlying hedged item for the life of the contract.

Swaps used to modify the interest rate characteristics of nontrading-related balance sheet instruments must be linked to the related asset or liability, with the term of the swap generally equal to those of the related asset or liability, at the beginning and throughout the life of the contract. Unrealized gains and losses are deferred on these derivative contracts.

Derivatives used to hedge or modify the interest rate characteristics of AFS securities are carried at fair value; unrealized gains and losses on these derivatives are recorded in Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income (Loss) within Stockholders’ Equity.

The interest component associated with derivatives used as hedges or to modify the interest rate characteristics of assets and liabilities is recognized over the contract’s life in Net Interest Income.

Cash margin requirements associated with futures contracts and option premiums for contracts used as hedges are recorded in Other Assets or Other Liabilities.

When a contract is settled or terminated, the cumulative change in the fair value is recorded as an adjustment to the carrying value of the underlying asset or liability and amortized into income over the asset’s or liability’s expected remaining life. If the underlying hedged instrument is sold, JPMorgan Chase immediately recognizes the cumulative change in the derivative’s value in the component of earnings relating to the underlying instrument."



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