Gerade neulich haben wir diesen Kontext hier diskutiert, gerade eben bin ich auf genaue Zahlen gestoßen (Quelle: http://www.prudentbear.com/international.htm)

The foregoing study by Bridgewater Associates breaks down the extent of this foreign ownership in the following manner:



Foreigners own a record 38% of the US treasury market, and if you take out the treasuries held by the Fed, foreigners own 44% of the liquid treasury market.

Foreigners own a record 20% of the US corporate bond market.

Foreigners own 8% of the US equity market. Including direct investment foreigners own l4% of US corporations



Foreign ownership of US assets per se is not the problem. The threat comes from the fact that this foreign ownership overlays an economy rife with debt and, hence, highly vulnerable to financial dislocation should this foreign capital withdraw precipitously. We have already seen the effects of the sudden withdrawal of short-term capital in economies prone to financial fragility during 1997/98: Thailand and Korea immediately spring to mind. But in one respect the US is far more vulnerable than these Asian economies, which at least had the virtue of high levels of private household savings to fall back on. In the US, by contrast, household savings are virtually non-existent (indeed, they are negative, as of the most recent figures for July). Indeed, the ratio of debt relative to income for both the household and corporate sectors is at an all-time high. By way of comparison, these ratios are well above the levels that led to the widespread banking and savings and loan crises a mere decade ago. The net debt issuance of US private households and corporations taken in aggregate is now nearly 6 per cent of national income, according to a recent study by Andrew Smithers---a historically unprecedented level. Wynn Godley of the Jerome Levy Institute has pointed out that when a private sector deficit of this magnitude has been attained elsewhere in the G-10, it has invariably led to financial crisis, recession, or both. The parallels with the Asian nations circa 1997 are both ominous and instructive. As Bridgewater notes, “If foreign sentiment does ever turn they have a boatload of US assets that could be sold. These holdings are so big, and so much larger than US assets abroad that they are a long-term risk to US financial markets.” A precipitous withdrawal of foreign capital risks setting in motion a deflationary dynamic in which debt defaults intensify, thereby accelerating an even greater contraction in economic activity.



Thus far, there is little evidence as yet to suggest that such a turn in foreign sentiment is imminent. Indeed, judging from the positive reception accorded to the recent announcement that Freddie Mac, the US mortgage lender, will issue at least 20 billion of euro-denominated bonds into the European debt market each year, the love affair with all things American appears to be continuing apace in Europe. To be sure, the bonds are denominated in euros (although the proceeds are almost certain to be immediately swapped back into dollars), but they would hardly be snapped up so eagerly if European investors seriously thought that the current state of affairs in the US financial system was unsound and unsustainable (particularly from a company whose balance sheet growth over the past 3 years is so vividly representative of the unalloyed expansion of credit that has done so much to sustain the boom). It is interesting to us, however, that Freddie Mac (in the words of one of its underwriters for this deal) “recognizes its need to diversify its funding away from depending on the US dollar market.” Does this imply Freddie Mac’s belief that the Government Service Enterprises (GSE’s) are near the saturation point with respect to funding access in the US capital markets?

Beste Grüße
Der Diplomand


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