-->weil's so schön ist; Ausschnitt aus Doug Nolands Credit Bubble Bulletin
vom 6.MĂ€rz
(immerhin hat es fast 300 Jahre gedauert, bis ihn jm. getoppt hat! )
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After a week like this one, we will look to history for insight. We will begin with a few pertinent quotes.
âThere are good reasons to think that the nature of money is not yet rightly understood.â John Law 1720 (with the collapse of the Mississippi Bubble)
âIrredeemable paper money has almost invariably proved a curse to the country employing it.â Irving Fisher 1911
âThere is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.â John Maynard Keynes 1920
âSince the time when President Richard Nixon broke the final tenuous link between the dollar and gold in 1971, no major currency, for the first time in history, has any connection to a commodity. Every currency is now a fiat currencyâŠâ Milton Friedman 1991
We very much believe that, if you have a debased currency, that you will have a debased economy. The difficulty is in defining what part of our liquidity structure is truly money. Alan Greenspan 2000
As we have stated previously, we are of the strong opinion that the current monetary system has completely run amuck and this breakdown is responsible for fueling historic pricing distortions in US asset markets and devastating imbalances to the US economy. The reckless monetary policy of benign neglect for the stability of the US financial system that is now the hallmark of the Greenspan Federal Reserve should be recognized as nothing but an unmitigated disaster. Indeed, since the break from gold backing in the early 1970âs, and the through the process of haphazard financial deregulation since that time, our policymakers have been engaged in the greatest monetary experiment since John Lawâs fateful introduction of paper money to France in the early 1700âs. It is our view that Greenspan has now lost complete control of this âexperiment,â just as John Law did. Wall Street has assumed the reins of money and credit creation - the lunatics now run the asylum. With this in mind, it is our view that by revisiting some of the issues related to John Lawâs failed attempt to create a paper money monetary regime considerable pertinent insight is provided into todayâs extraordinary experiment in electronic money.
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics puts it this way: âJohn Law of Lauriston has been regarded by some observers as a monetary crank, by others as a precursor of modern schemes of managed money and Keynesian full-employment policies. He was the originator of the Mississippi Bubble, perhaps the greatest speculative bubble of all time.â
The essence of John Lawâs theory was that the regulation of the money supply through bank issuance of paper money could simultaneously stimulate trade and economic activity while also maintaining general price stability. That by increasing the quantity of money, great economic wealth could be unleashed and wondrous prosperity created. In theory, skilled authorities would regulate the issuance of paper money, increasing its quantity to foster desired economic growth, as well as contracting its supply to temper overheating and maintain stable prices. That is, that the supply of paper money would be regulated precisely to meet the demands of real commerce. In short, John Law believed in both the power of the âmoney spigotâ and the ability to properly manage it.
Quoting John Law: âThis paper money will not fall in value as silver money has fallen or may fallâŠBut the commission giving out what sums are demanded, and taking back what sums are offered to be returned; this paper money will keep its value, and there will always be as much money as there is occasion or employment for, and no more.â
In John Lawâs view, it was the goal to foster the creation of money supply to accommodate demands for increased trade. Additional money would match an increase in commerce and the value of money would be held constant. In several respects, Lawâs monetary regime was much more sophisticated than that of the contemporary Federal Reserve. Certainly, from his writings on monetary theory, it is clear that he possessed a deeper understanding of money than todayâs economists. If he were alive today, he would look askance at a system where unfettered money creation is left to its own devices, apparently as long as the governmentâs basket of goods and services does not demonstrate in aggregate notable prices increases. The apologists refer to this as the âPrice Rule.â We view the notion of a âPrice Ruleâ with considerable derision as history has many examples of disastrous booms and busts where money and credit excess fed asset bubbles while leaving general consumer prices unaffected - the US in the 1920âs and Japan in the 1980âs as clear examples.
As for John Lawsâ theories, there proved to be some very serious flaws. For one, it was premised on the authoritiesâ willingness at times to withdraw money to protect against circulation beyond the needs of trade. Booms are, after all, both powerful and extremely seductive to bankers, businessmen, investors, speculators and central bankers. âAuthoritiesâ during Lawâs bubble were as reluctant to end the party, as the Federal Reserve and Treasury have been to end the Greenspan bubble. Certainly, after what has transpired throughout the current boom, we will never trust the Keynesian view that government policy will temper the upside of business cycles. In Lawâs monetary system, the issuance of bank notes came to increasingly overwhelm the needs of actual commerce, profoundly disturbing pricing mechanisms, particularly with regard to a rampant inflation in stock prices. Increased money supply stoked stock prices and an historic stock market mania ensued. As the monetary system and economy came to be dominated by lending secured by inflating asset prices, the âauthoritiesâ efforts were increasingly directed at sustaining the bubble with frenetic money issuance and market manipulations. Today, very similar dynamics fuel an even greater mania.
John Lawâs monetary theory also assumed, quoting the late economist Douglas Vickers, âthat businessmenâs demands for currency for trade purposes could be regarded as independent of the actions of the monetary authorities.â Importantly, as it was during the Law regime, as well as Greenspanâs, there is, in fact, a very tight interrelationship between businessesâ demand for money and the willingness of the monetary authority to accommodate heightened money issuance. Or, said another way: âIf money is âeasy,â demand for money will be augmented, fostering a strong proclivity of self-feeding money supply and business borrowing excess.â For too many years over liquefied financial markets have fostered excessive borrowings with misdirected business spending and a regrettable misallocation of resources. Today, it is quite likely that the Fed would like to maintain money and credit growth for business but restrict it for financial speculation. Unfortunately, the overwhelming business of our country has become financial speculation.
Interestingly, real estate played a key role in John Lawâs monetary regime. Quoting the great French economist Charles Rist, one of âLawâs ideas deserves our attentionâŠthat of securing money on land. It is an idea which recurs periodically among currency cranks.â To stimulate trade, Law proposed to create additional money by allowing landowners to mortgage their property. It was Lawâs and previous theorists contention that the unique stability of land values provided ideal security for âpaperâ money. Why deal with the limited supply and price variations of gold and silver when there is an enormous asset of land values to capture?
The momentous flaw in this analysis, however, was that by monetizing land values, the additional money supply created only works to distort pricing relationships, certainly inciting inflation in land prices and disequilibrium in prices generally. As additional money is issued, rising land prices provide greater collateral for additional borrowings, hence money creation. As such, monetary systems secured by land assets would potentially accommodate virtually unlimited monetary expansion and asset inflation. In what should be obvious today, certainly after hundreds of years of history, such systems are inherently unstable. In this regard, Lawâs monetary system was patently conducive to creating an asset bubble. Not only could speculators borrow against land, they could also use stock issues as collateral. And as stock prices rose, additional collateral was available to borrow against, used extensively to purchase additional stock. For several years, Lawâs system functioned marvelously as a terrific commercial boom emerged in France after decades of depression. Over time, however, with stock prices having risen steadily, a wild speculative fervor took hold and became the focal point of the boom and Lawâs monetary experiment. Importantly, Lawâs monetary regime had inadequate safeguards against over-issuance of money. As rampant money supply expansion and a self-feeding stock market advance stoked public confidence, Law completely lost control of his monetary system to the bubble mania. Indeed, it took only a brief period for egregious money and credit issuance combined with a spectacular stock market bubble to completely destroy his system.
As Vickers stated, âIn the first place, the essence of Lawâs scheme was his proposal for the monetization of certain existing assets.â We strongly argue that the monetization of existing assets, largely real estate and stocks, is the essence of the Greenspan boom. This prosperity is not about productivity, but about unprecedented asset inflation. It is furthermore our strong contention that a monetary system dominated by asset monetization, in conjunction with Federal Reserve policy accommodating unlimited money supply expansion, is an absolute recipe for disaster. In fact, it is a senseless replay of John Lawâs fiasco.
Clearly, inflated prices of real estate and stock certificates have fueled rampant money and credit excesses. This monetization is unmistakable in recent margin debt data. During the four months between October 1998 and January 2000, margin debt increased $61 billion, or 34%. We are told that a significant component of this unprecedented margin debt expansion is related to company insiders monetizing stock gains. As for real estate, recent data from Freddie Mac also confirm our belief of a massive monetization of housing inflation. According to Freddie Mac, during âthe fourth quarter of 1999, 77% of refinances resulted in new mortgages at least 5% higher than the original mortgagesâŠthis contrasts with 45% in the fourth quarter of 1998.â This report also disclosed that âthe growth in the value of housing, on a national average, to be about 25.4% over the past 5 years.â
Clearly augmented by an additional $300 billion of broad money supply growth during the final four months of 1999, the US stock market entered a Mississippi Bubble-style hyperinflation. Since October lows, the Russell 2000 has surged 47%, NASDAQ 87%, the Morgan Stanley High Tech index 85%, The Street.com Internet index 93%, the NASDAQ Telecommunications index 96%, the Philadelphia Semiconductor index 154% and the AMEX Biotech index 220%. A full-fledged mania has been allowed to develop and is now an uncontrollable monster. This is a tragedy that should never have happened. If Greenspan actually believed he could control this situation with gradual insignificant increases in interest rates, add this to his growing list of miscalculations. If he thought he could manage financial system liquidity to ensure both stable credit and equity markets, he must now recognize that the liquidity necessary to keep the credit bubble intact guarantees excessive liquidity for stock market speculation. If Greenspan thought he could use tempered liquidity to manage a âsoft landingâ for the stock market bubble, he should now understand that the preponderance of even reduced liquidity will find its way directly to the speculative sectors of the marketplace at the expense of many solid companies and the financial system and economy generally. If Greenspan thought there was an equity bubble and fragile financial system in 1994, what must he think today? It is impossible to know what he is thinking, but we are quite sure economic historians will see Greenspan as the greatest inflationist. In this respect, he is second to none, not even to John Law.
Doug Noland
March 6, 2000
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