-->>So bleiben beide drauf und das Publikum kann zugucken, wie der ganze Schlitten in den Graben kracht.
>Gruß!
Hallo Dottore,
Dein Einwand wurde bereits von entsprechender Stelle vorhergesehen. Fed-Gouverneur beschrieb in seiner Rede in Japan vom 31.Mai (Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke Before the Japan Society of Monetary Economics, Tokyo, Japan May 31, 2003 Some Thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan) die Möglichkeit einer interessanten Umbuchungsaktion, die die Bank of Japan in Kooperation mit dem Finanzministerium (MoF) durchführen kann.
Die Kosten des Swaps wurden allerdings nicht diskutiert. Das MoF muß ja, um eine zum ursprünglichen Zustand kongruente Fristenstruktur seiner Verbindlichkeiten wiederherszutellen, nach und nach zu ungünstigeren Konditionen umschulden.
Allerdings könnte man diese Wiederherstellung der alten Fristenstruktur zeitlich über etliche Jahre strecken und somit auch die inflative Wirkung dieser Maßnahme.
Anbei der relevante Textauszug aus Bernankes Rede.
Besten Gruß vom Scheich
In short, one could make an economic case that the balance sheet of the central bank should be of marginal relevance at best to the determination of monetary policy. Rather than engage in what would probably be a heated and unproductive debate over the issue, however, I would propose instead that the Japanese government just fix the problem, thereby eliminating this concern from the BOJ's list of worries. There are many essentially costless ways to fix it. I am intrigued by a simple proposal that I understand has been suggested by the Japanese Business Federation, the Nippon Keidanren. Under this proposal the Ministry of Finance would convert the fixed interest rates of the Japanese government bonds held by the Bank of Japan into floating interest rates. This"bond conversion"--actually, a fixed-floating interest rate swap--would protect the capital position of the Bank of Japan from increases in long-term interest rates and remove much of the balance sheet risk associated with open-market operations in government securities. Moreover, the budgetary implications of this proposal would be essentially zero, since any increase in interest payments to the BOJ by the MOF arising from the bond conversion would be offset by an almost equal increase in the BOJ's payouts to the national treasury.6 The budgetary neutrality of the proposal is of course a consequence of the fact that, as a matter of arithmetic, any capital gains or losses in the value of government securities held by the BOJ are precisely offset by opposite changes in the net worth of the issuer of those securities, the government treasury.
Although the MOF could insulate, without budgetary cost, the BOJ's balance sheet from interest-rate risk on its holdings of government bonds, a similar program offered by the MOF to private-sector holders of bonds, such as commercial banks, would not be costless from the MOF's point of view, if inflation and interest rates were subsequently to rise.7 However, if the MOF entered into the proposed swap agreement with the BOJ, new purchases of government bonds from the private sector by the Bank of Japan would be costless to the national treasury. Thus, conditional on the swap arrangement being in force, open-market purchases of government bonds by the BOJ would combine an expansionary monetary policy with a reduction of interest-rate risk in the banking system at no budgetary cost.8 The simple step of immunizing the BOJ's balance sheet thus opens a number of interesting policy options.
The bond conversion (or interest-rate swap) just described is all that would be needed to protect the BOJ's balance sheet against any side effects from operations in government bonds. Incidentally, the approach could be extended to insulate the BOJ's balance sheet against potentially adverse effects of other types of asset purchases that the government might want to encourage. For example, to facilitate expanded purchases of asset-backed commercial paper, the government might agree, on request of the BOJ, to exchange government debt of the same maturity for the commercial paper. The net effect would be that the fiscal authority would assume the credit risk flowing from the nonstandard monetary policy action, as seems appropriate.
What should the Bank of Japan give up in exchange for the Ministry of Finance's removing a significant amount of risk from the BOJ's balance sheet? One option would be for the Bank to use its increased ability to bear risk to undertake new policy actions that would entail accepting other types of risk onto its balance sheet. Today I will argue for a different approach and suggest that the Bank of Japan cooperate temporarily with the government to create an environment of combined monetary and fiscal ease to end deflation and help restart economic growth in Japan. To do this, the BOJ might have to scrap rules that it has set for itself--for example, its informal rule that the quantity of long-term government bonds on its balance sheet must be kept below the outstanding balance of banknotes issued.
<ul> ~ Quelle</ul>
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