>By James Turk  
>The Freemarket Gold & Money Report  
>This past December in my essay"The Smoking Gun" I  
>provided proof that the U.S. Treasury Department's  
>Exchange Stabilization Fund was intervening in the gold  
>market. From publicly available reports prepared by the  
>Federal Reserve, I established that the weight of gold  
>held as a component of the U.S. Reserve Assets has been  
>changing, and that these changes -- some of which are  
>of significant size -- result from activity by the ESF.  
>These Federal Reserve reports conclusively demonstrate  
>that the ESF has been intervening in the gold market  
>since at least 1996.  
>Though these Federal Reserve reports make clear that  
>the ESF is involved in the gold market up to its  
>"earmarks," a lot of people remain skeptical. I don't  
>know why that is. It is worth noting that many of the  
>most obstinate skeptics who deny U.S. government  
>involvement in the gold market live overseas and have  
>little if any experience or understanding of the way  
>the U.S. government really works. Even Americans find  
>it difficult to accept that the U.S. government  
>intervenes in the gold market. Ironically, though,  
>they readily admit that the government intervenes in  
>the debt markets, foreign currency markets, and,  
>according to a growing number of people, even in the  
>U.S. stock market. It is therefore most baffling that  
>they do not concede the ESF's involvement in the gold  
>market.  
>Maybe people are skeptical because they haven't  
>bothered to take the time to read the Federal Reserve  
>reports for themselves. Maybe it's because it's easier  
>to accept the word of some government bureaucrat who  
>denies ESF involvement in the gold market than it is to  
>seek out and look for the truth. Maybe they don't want  
>to believe that the U.S. government is lying to them  
>when Treasury Department official after Treasury  
>Department official denies any involvement by the ESF  
>in the gold market.  
>I don't know.  
>Or maybe it's because they think that government  
>officials work for the American people -- and not for  
>vested interests -- in their deliberative sessions  
>behind closed doors.  
>Wouldn't it be refreshing if we could peek behind those  
>closed doors to see what really is being said?  
>Very little emerges from behind closed doors, and the  
>minutes and transcripts of closed-door sessions that do  
>make it into the public domain contain redactions that  
>blank out the"good parts" -- the revealing statements.  
>But what if someone forgot to redact one of those"good  
>parts? Too fantastic to be true?  
>Well, sit down, take a deep breath, and carefully read  
>what follows.  
>* * *  
>A few weeks ago Reg Howe contacted me and asked my view  
>on something he had discovered. He wanted a second  
>opinion on this discovery, just as I contacted him for  
>a second opinion after I came across the Federal  
>Reserve reports showing the ESF's gold-related  
>activity.  
>When I read what Reg showed me, I was stunned. But at  
>the same time it was clear to me what I was reading and  
>what had happened.  
>A transcript of a meeting of the Federal Reserve Open  
>Market Committee has been released for which somebody  
>forgot to get his red pen out. Someone forgot to redact  
>some very revealing words about the ESF and its  
>activity with gold. Here's what was said.  
>* * *  
>http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/Transcripts/transcripts_1995.htm  
>[See the transcript from the January 31, 1995, meeting.]  
>MR. MATTINGLY. It's pretty clear that these ESF  
>operations are authorized. I don't think there is a  
>legal problem in terms of the authority. The [ESF]  
>statute is very broadly worded in terms of words like  
>"credit" -- it has covered things like the gold swaps  
>-- and it confers broad authority.  
>* * *  
>Please read the above statement again, and maybe even a  
>third and fourth time.  
>This statement, which I can only assume was  
>inadvertently not redacted by the FOMC Secretariat,  
>confirms what we already know but what the U.S.  
>government has all along refused to admit -- that the  
>ESF is involved in the gold market. In fact, the  
>authority of the ESF is so broad that"it has covered  
>things like the gold swaps."  
>In other words, the authority of the ESF is so broad it  
>has even been used to authorize"gold swaps."  
>Before exploring the above quote, some background  
>information is necessary.  
>The proceedings of each FOMC meeting are taped. These  
>tapes are transcribed, and the Federal Reserve releases  
>these transcripts after five years. Thus, the  
>transcripts from the 1995 meetings were released this  
>year, and, having now read through them, I can say they  
>contain a treasure trove of material, even though there  
>are many redactions.  
>The important point is that these transcripts are not  
>only informative but are an accurate record of what is  
>going on behind closed doors.  
>Here is what the Federal Reserve itself says about the  
>FOMC transcripts:  
>* * *  
>http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/Transcripts/  
>Beginning with the 1994 meetings, the FOMC Secretariat  
>produced the transcripts shortly after each meeting  
>from an audio recording of the proceedings, lightly  
>editing the peakers' original words, where necessary,  
>to facilitate the reader's understanding. Meeting  
>participants were then given an opportunity within the  
>next several weeks to review the transcript for  
>accuracy.  
>For the meetings preceding 1994, the transcripts were  
>produced from the original, raw transcripts in the FOMC  
>Secretariat's files. These records have also been  
>lightly edited by the Secretariat to facilitate the  
>reader's understanding. In addition, where one or more  
>words were missed or garbled in the transcription, the  
>notation"unintelligible" has been inserted. In some  
>instances, words have been added in brackets to  
>complete a speaker's apparent thought or to correct an  
>obvious transcription error or misstatement.  
>Nonetheless, for the pre-1994 transcripts, errors  
>undoubtedly remain. The raw transcripts were not fully  
>edited for accuracy at the time they were prepared  
>because they were intended only as an aid to the  
>Secretariat in preparing meeting minutes. The edited  
>pre-1994 transcripts have not been reviewed by present  
>or past members of the committee.  
>* * *  
>In other words, the 1995 transcripts are accurate.  
>There are no disclaimers for them, like those made for  
>the pre-1994 transcripts. Therefore, the above quote by  
>Mr. Mattingly about the ESF and gold is accurate.  
>And who is Mr. Mattingly? Virgil Mattingly is general  
>counsel of the Federal Reserve, its chief legal  
>adviser.  
>That Mattingly's remark passed without comment by  
>anyone in the FOMC meeting implies that everyone knew  
>exactly what he was referring to. In other words, to  
>explain ESF authority, his example was purposefully  
>chosen. It was one to which the Federal Reserve  
>governors could all relate because it was something  
>they saw happen during their watch.  
>In my imagination I can see them sitting around the big  
>FOMC conference table nodding their heads in agreement  
>when Mattingly used this example of the gold swaps to  
>explain how broad the ESF's authority is.  >  
>Recognize too that though he is talking in the past  
>tense, it doesn't necessarily mean that the swaps had  
>already happened. They may still be happening because  
>he may be referring to the authority that approved the  
>gold swaps and presumably the swap lines, but not  
>necessarily the date of the actual swaps themselves.  
>So that this quote of Mattingly is not taken out of  
>context, let me provide background information. Also, I  
>invite you to read the full 145-page transcript of this  
>Jan. 31, 1995, FOMC meeting if you would like to  
>confirm both the accuracy of the above quote and the  
>background information I am about to provide. By  
>reading the entire transcript you will also see how  
>frequently material was redacted.  
>Mattingly's comments were made in a discussion by the  
>FOMC on the rapidly deteriorating financial situation  
>in Mexico. Crisis conditions had been prevailing since  
>the peso began tumbling the month before -- that is,  
>December 1994. You will recall that the Clinton  
>administration back then had proposed that Congress  
>provide a $40 billion package of government guarantees  
>to bail out those who had loaned money to Mexico, and  
>that Congress had rejected this proposal. So the  
>administration was scrambling to come up with a way to  
>get the money thought necessary to"fix" the problem.  
>Unable to tap the Treasury directly because of the  
>rebuff by Congress, the administration turned to the  
>ESF.  
>Because the Federal Reserve was to be part of the  
>proposed bailout, the Federal Open Market Committee was  
>reviewing what role the Federal Reserve would play in  
>conjunction with the ESF. A proposal was on the table  
>for the FOMC's consideration. A Mr. Fix-it who seems to  
>be the go-between for the Treasury and the Fed was  
>presenting the proposal.  
>His name is Ted Truman. And he was responding to  
>various FOMC members who were questioning whether the  
>ESF had the legal authority to do what was being  
>proposed. Hence, the Federal Reserve's legal counsel,  
>Virgil Mattingly, responded, using the"gold swaps" as  
>an example of just how broad the ESFªs authority  
>actually is.  
>To give you a flavor of the full discussion underway in  
>the FOMC meeting, here is an excerpt from the  
>transcript.  
>* * * 
>MR. MELZER. What ability do the Treasury or the ESF  
>have to take us out of an obligation [i.e., repay the  
>Federal Reserve] if funds are not appropriated by  
>Congress? Do they have the ability just to say, we  
>committed to this and we are going to pay the Fed off?  
>MR. TRUMAN. Yes, they could.  
>MR. MELZER. But if they can do that, why can't they  
>just advance it themselves?  
>MR. TRUMAN. They could, but I think they feel that it  
>would be useful to their objectives to have a lot of  
>people.... [Apparently the rest of his comments are  
>redacted.]  
>* * * 
>The discussion continues on this point, but touches  
>upon the relationship between the ESF and the Treasury.  
>These comments also establish that the ESF does not use  
>"appropriated funds," meaning that the ESF is  
>answerable only to the secretary of the treasury and  
>the president. All actions of the ESF are beyond  
>congressional authority.  
>* * *  
>CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Could I just formally respond to  
>Governor Lindsey? There is a question here of whether  
>or not the amount the United States Treasury gives us  
>has to be appropriated funds, which I think is really  
>where our examination of the issue has to be. In  
>examining the takeout, we ought to make certain that we  
>talk to them with respect to the question of what  
>happens if they do not get the appropriated funds.  
>MR. TRUMAN. Mr. Chairman, the Exchange Stabilization  
>Fund does not have appropriated funds.  
>CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. Are we going to be getting a  
>takeout from the Exchange Stabilization Fund?  
>MR. TRUMAN. I think that is what is in the program.  
>CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. OK.  
>SPEAKER (?). That is not the same as the Treasury.  
>MR. TRUMAN. Even if we didn't, the precedent in the  
>1960s -- I think there was a question then about  
>whether the Treasury could engage in foreign exchange  
>operations outside of the ESF -- was the use of Roosa  
>bonds in the 1960s. The Treasury floated Roosa bonds to  
>obtain foreign currencies and used some of those  
>currencies to take us out. That did not involve  
>appropriated funds. That was treated as a debt- 
>management operation.  
>* * *  
>The above passage confirms what we already know, but  
>many people refuse to admit. The ESF is a slush fund  
>beyond congressional oversight. It can be used to"get  
>around" most anything (that is, it can skirt normal  
>governmental procedures). No wonder so many people want  
>to do away with the ESF. There is no room for it in our  
>democratic process. It is not subject to the normal  
>checks and balances carefully crafted by the Founding  
>Fathers that have proven over time to be so essential  
>for limiting the power of the federal government.  
>The ESF is the antithesis of the American foundation of  
>representative government because it subjects a free  
>people to an unconstitutional governmental force. Still  
>not convinced? Here are some more excerpts:  
>* * *  
>MR. LINDSEY. My second question has to do with our  
>credibility. I don't know what questions to ask, and I  
>hope you will help me out in that regard. I have this  
>document in front of me, which includes a page entitled  
>"What is the Exchange Stabilization Fund?" The document  
>came from Treasury International Affairs. I gather it  
>was written by them. I have written enough of these to  
>know what you do, and that is to tell your point of  
>view. Paragraph 3, not to mention the dots indicating  
>an omission in Paragraph 2, got me a little nervous.  
>Paragraph 3 says these holdings in the ESF are used to  
>enter into swap arrangements with foreign governments,  
>to finance exchange market intervention, to provide  
>short-term bridge finance, etc., and all these things  
>are great. So, basically Paragraph 3 is establishing  
>that this is not unprecedented. My question would be:  
>Do we do all these nice things if it's not in support  
>of the dollar? Is this unprecedented with regard to the  
>fact that we are supporting another currency?  
>MR. TRUMAN. The language before the dots is....  
>MR. LINDSEY. I am talking about the third paragraph. I  
>will go to the second paragraph in a second. I'm sorry.  
>I am running a little out of order. It is saying the  
>ESF has done all these things.  
>MR. TRUMAN. The legislation governing the objectives of  
>the ESF was changed, I think for the most part in the  
>mid-to-late-1970s. The changes included the language  
>that the government of the United States and the  
>International Monetary Fund have the obligation to  
>promote orderly exchange rate arrangements leading to a  
>stable system of exchange rates. That was interpreted  
>to include making loans to Bolivia in helping it  
>maintain a system of stable exchange rates.  
>MR. LINDSEY. So that has happened before?  
>MR. TRUMAN. Yes. They have made loans to or financial  
>arrangements with at least 31 countries around the  
>world over the last 50 years.  
>MR. LINDSEY. I think we all will be asked questions  
>about this. Can you read this paper and tell me that  
>there is not something missing that I should know  
>about, meaning that this is not only the truth but the  
>whole truth?  
>MR. TRUMAN. I can only say that Treasury lawyers have  
>looked into the question of whether these operations  
>are legal under this broad authorization of what they  
>can do and what the purpose is....  
>MR. MATTINGLY. If I can help out?  
>MR. LINDSEY. Yes.  
>MR. MATTINGLY. It's pretty clear that these ESF  
>operations are authorized. I don't think there is a  
>legal problem in terms of the authority. The statute is  
>very broadly worded in terms of words like"credit" --  
>it has covered things like the gold swaps -- and it  
>confers broad authority. Counsel at the White House  
>called the Treasury's General Counsel today and asked  
>"Are you sure?" And the Treasury's General Counsel  
>said,"I am sure." Everyone is satisfied that a legal  
>issue is not involved, if that helps.  
>MR. LINDSEY. Is there anything missing on this page?  
>MR. MATTINGLY. No, there is not. If you look at the  
>last paragraph, for example, that is part of the  
>statute.  
>MR. LINDSEY. About notifying Congress in writing in  
>advance?  
>MR. MATTINGLY. The statute says that with the  
>permission of the president they can make loans.  
>[MORE]  
>There you have it. The ESF doesn't have to notify  
>Congress about anything in advance. It is under the  
>sole authority of the secretary of the treasury and the  
>president, and they can do"gold swaps" without any  
>congressional approval, which brings up an important  
>point I made in"The Smoking Gun."  
>I had noted a curious pattern in the correspondence  
>emanating from the Treasury Department. The secretary  
>of the Treasury never answered any questioning letters  
>concerning the ESF, even if they were written directly  
>to him. Rather, one of his assistants invariably  
>responded. I therefore wondered whether the Treasury  
>Department chain of command was being relied upon just  
>as President Nixon had tried to rely upon the White  
>House chain of command in an attempt to avoid being  
>sucked into the vortex of a growing Watergate scandal.  
>I even asked in"The Smoking Gun":"Did Secretary  
>Summers' knowledge of the goings-on in the secretive  
>ESF explain why his underlings, and not him, were  
>writing the letters denying U.S. government involvement  
>within the gold market?"  
>The above excerpts from the FOMC transcript clearly  
>establish that my question needs answering.  
>It is becoming clear as more and more evidence emerges  
>that the secretary of the treasury does not answer  
>questions concerning the ESF because he, but not his  
>underlings, knows to what extent the ESF is engaged in  
>gold-related activity. His underlings can say that the  
>ESF is not involved in the gold market because, as far  
>as they know, what they say is true.  
>However, we now have proof that the ESF is indeed  
>involved in the gold market. So the secretary of the  
>treasury does not respond to letters asking questions  
>about the ESF and its activity in the gold market. He  
>canªt answer them truthfully without spilling the  
>beans. He obviously knows everything about what really  
>is going on within the ESF, in contrast to his  
>underlings. Or at least most underlings because it  
>appears that one of them is in there up to his elbows  
>washing ESF laundry. His name is Ted Truman.  
>>From the FOMC transcripts it is quite apparent that  
>Truman has a special role. Though recorded in the  
>attendee list in the FOMC transcripts under the  
>featureless title of"economist," he has a role that is  
>anything but ordinary. The transcripts reveal that he  
>clearly speaks for the Treasury Department in FOMC  
>meetings and is very knowledgeable about the ESF. The  
>insight displayed by him in the FOMC minutes makes it  
>clear that he is not just fully informed about the ESF  
>and its operations, but that he probably is also  
>intimately involved in ESF decision making.  
>Consequently, the following excerpt is particularly  
>intriguing.  
>* * *  
>MR. PARRY. What is the size of the ESF?  
>MR. TRUMAN. The usable funds in the ESF today, counting  
>the foreign exchange as usable, amount to roughly $25  
>billion.  
>MR. PARRY. Can you say how it is broken down?  
>MR. TRUMAN. About $5 billion is invested in Treasury  
>securities and the balance is roughly equally divided  
>between marks and yen. I think they have slightly more  
>yen than marks.  
>MR. PARRY. Thank you.  
>MR. BOEHNE. Is any of it obligated in any way beyond  
>what we are talking about with Mexico?  
>MR. TRUMAN. It is obligated only in the sense that they  
>have one other swap arrangement with the Bundesbank.  
>* * *  
>Wouldn't it be interesting to know what this swap  
>arrangement with the Bundesbank entailed? What is the  
>nature of this swap? Is it a dollar/deutschemark swap  
>facility? Or is something else being swapped, like gold  
>perhaps?  
>Gold being swapped with the Bundesbank? It's an  
>outrageous thought.  
>Or is it?  
>I have already established that the ESF is very much  
>involved with gold. The only thing I haven't  
>established is with whom the ESF has those gold swaps  
>that Virgil Mattingly was talking about.  
>Let's put 1 and 1 together here to see if we can come  
>up with an answer.  
>According to Mattingly, the ESF has authorized gold  
>swaps, presumably in the recent past (circa 1995).  
>According to Ted Truman, the only outstanding swap  
>facility of the ESF (circa 1995) other than the one  
>established for Mexico is the ESF's facility with the  
>Bundesbank.  
>Therefore, the ESF has a gold swap facility with the  
>Bundesbank.  
>It's an interesting proposition, and one that fits well  
>with another newly discovered fact. Some very  
>interesting sleuthing by Mike Bolser, who has been  
>assisting Reg Howe in his lawsuit against the Bank for  
>International Settlements, has revealed that the  
>Treasury has made a small but very significant  
>accounting change.  
>Mike noticed that the Treasury Department has changed  
>the designation of nearly 1,700 tonnes of inventoried  
>gold at the U.S. Mintªs facility in West Point, N.Y.,  
>which is approximately 21 percent of the total U.S.  
>gold reserve, from"Gold Bullion Reserve" to"Custodial  
>Gold."  
>The August 2000 Status Report on U.S. Treasury-Owned  
>Gold stored at West Point has a designation of"Gold  
>Bullion Reserve."  
>(See http://207.87.26.43/gold/00-08.html)  
>But the September 2000 and subsequent status reports  
>inexplicably designate this same gold that is stored at  
>the U.S. Mint at West Point as"Custodial Gold."  
>See http://207.87.26.43/gold/00-09.html  
>This change was made without explanation, so rather  
>than let the matter remain unexplained, Mike diligently  
>contacted the Treasury asking what seemingly are two  
>uncomplicated questions. Would the Treasury please  
>explain why they made this change, and what does this  
>change in designation mean with respect to the  
>ownership status of the gold at West Point?  
>They are simple questions, but perhaps they touch too  
>close to a nerve. Not surprisingly, the Treasury so far  
>has not responded to Mike.  
>I have some views on what Mike discovered, and why the  
>Treasury is so quiet about it. I think this change in  
>asset classification is related to the ESF gold swaps.  
>Hereªs my thinking.  
>The change Mike spotted possibly occurred as a result  
>of accountants looking at the financial statements of  
>the U.S. Mint being prepared for its annual report  
>ending fiscal year 2000. Note that the previous  
>director of the Mint (Phillip Diehl) resigned in early  
>2000, so this was the first annual report signed by the  
>new director (Jay Johnson).  
>If there is one thing that government bureaucrats do  
>well, they take great pains to call things by their  
>right name. To do otherwise would put their job in  
>jeopardy if something under their responsibility came  
>under congressional scrutiny, and it was subsequently  
>determined that the name assigned to something was  
>incorrect or misleading.  
>Therefore, this change in the descriptive label for  
>nearly 1,700 tonnes of gold at West Point from"Gold  
>Bullion Reserve" to"Custodial Gold" was purposeful. It  
>happened for a reason. This conclusion is all the more  
>plausible because the Treasury did not change the  
>classification from"Gold Bullion Reserve" to  
>"Custodial Gold" to describe the gold stored in Fort  
>Knox or at the U.S. Mint at Denver. Maybe new U.S. Mint  
>Director Johnson saw something he didn't like. What  
>could that have been?  
>I have already put 1 and 1 together to establish that  
>the ESF has"gold swaps" with the Bundesbank. It  
>therefore does not require much conjecture to add one  
>supposition to the equation by concluding that the gold  
>at West Point has been swapped with gold owned by the  
>Bundesbank, thereby necessitating its reclassification  
>from"Gold Bullion Reserve" to"Custodial Gold." Here's  
>what I think has happened.  
>The Treasury Department wanted to make gold available  
>to some bullion banks. This statement is based on my  
>premise that several of the big banks have gold books  
>that are hopelessly imbalanced. By having borrowed  
>short and loaned long, these banks have in their quest  
>for profits imprudently fallen into the alluring but  
>usually fatal banker's deathtrap -- a mismatched loan  
>book. But what's worse for these banks, it is even more  
>difficult and treacherous to try extricating themselves  
>from this particular deathtrap because they haven't  
>mismatched their loan book of dollars, which we all  
>know can be created by the Federal Reserve out of thin  
>air if dollars are needed to bail out banks from a  
>deathtrap predicament.  
>Instead, these banks have mismatched their gold book.  
>And no one -- not even the Federal Reserve -- can  
>create gold out of thin air.  
>So given this reality about the nature of gold, the  
>Treasury Department had to turn elsewhere to find the  
>gold necessary 1) to keep these banks from defaulting  
>on their bullion obligations arising from their  
>mismatched gold books in an environment where metal had  
>become increasingly difficult to come by, and/or 2) to  
>keep the gold price low so that the likelihood of  
>default by the banks would be lessened, even though  
>metal would remain tight because fabrication year after  
>year was exceeding newly mined supply.  
>Rather than accept the bitter pill that certain banks  
>were about to default on their bullion obligations, the  
>Treasury Department looked for alternatives and found  
>one -- they put their hand into the till, until  
>recently known as the Gold Bullion Reserve at West  
>Point. They swapped this gold with the Bundesbank.  
>I'll explain how they did it, but let's first consider  
>the practical aspects of this transaction.  
>In all likelihood these particular bullion banks needed  
>gold in Europe, where their obligations were originally  
>established. There is very little gold lending in New  
>York. It is a practical problem to ship the gold out of  
>West Point without raising the alarm of government  
>auditors. It is costly too. Also, it is likely that  
>some of the gold in West Point is coin-melt from the  
>1933 gold confiscation. Even if it could be smuggled  
>out of the West Point vault into the market without  
>raising suspicions, the alarm bells would go off at the  
>refiner and soon thereafter in the market because  
>everyone knows that only the U.S. government has coin- 
>melt bars.  
>The appearance of coin-melt bars in the market would  
>immediately raise suspicions that the U.S. Gold Reserve  
>was being dishoarded, an outcome that the Treasury  
>Department would obviously take steps to avoid in  
>concocting its scheme because the U.S. Gold Reserve  
>cannot be depleted without congressional approval.  
>So one is faced with the practical considerations of  
>overcoming these hurdles, but the answer is relatively  
>simple.  
>The Treasury has gold at West Point. The Bundesbank has  
>gold in Europe. The Treasury cannot directly do a deal  
>with the Bundesbank because, unlike the ESF, the  
>Treasury is subject to congressional oversight. So  
>instead the secretary of the treasury and the president  
>decide to use the ESF to set up a swap line for gold  
>with the Bundesbank.  
>By so doing, the gold in the Bundesbank's vault in  
>Europe becomes ESF gold, to do with as they please --  
>that is, the ESF lends this metal to bail out certain  
>bullion banks. And the Bundesbank now owns the gold at  
>West Point, which as a result was purposefully  
>reclassified from Gold Bullion Reserve to Custodial  
>Gold because the Treasury no longer owns this gold,  
>having swapped it out through the ESF in exchange for  
>gold in Europe owned by the Bundesbank.  
>Case closed. The mystery of the abnormally low gold  
>price is solved. The ESF did it.  
>The abnormally low gold price is the result of the  
>proof that the ESF is deeply involved in the gold  
>market. The ESF is involved in some 1,700 tonnes worth,  
>because that is the weight of gold stored in West  
>Point, which was probably being swapped at the rate of  
>a few hundred tonnes per year from circa 1995 through  
>2000.  
>There are two other tidbits that I would like to share  
>with you that add even more validity to this  
>supposition.  
>First, a couple of months ago I was analyzing the 1998  
>and 1999 balance sheets of the ESF. As a former banker,  
>I know a little bit about accounting, including where  
>to find the big holes through which the proverbial  
>truck can be driven. And I found one that could suggest  
>that in these two years 975 tonnes of gold came into  
>the market from the ESF.  
>After reaching this conclusion, I wanted to test it. So  
>I called a top gold market expert whose supply/demand  
>analyses are second to none and who believes that gold  
>from the U.S. reserves has been coming into the market  
>for several years.  
>Without telling him about my analysis of the ESF  
>balance sheet, I asked him how much gold he thought  
>came out of the Treasury/ESF in 1998 and 1999 in total.  
>His response was 1,000 tonnes, a mere 25 tonnesª  
>difference from what I had deduced from the ESF  
>financial statements. When I told him that we had  
>reached the same conclusion from different sources, he  
>chuckled but was not in the least bit surprised, being  
>so convinced that the Treasury/ESF has been a major  
>source of metal for years.  
>I have thoroughly reviewed his supply/demand numbers  
>since 1994 and have determined that as much as 2,000  
>tonnes of gold from the U.S. gold reserve may have  
>entered the market in order to make the gold price as  
>low as it is, which leads me to the second tidbit that  
>I would like to share with you. It is just as  
>intriguing.  
>This same individual told me several months ago about  
>some astonishing intelligence he had learned from a  
>source in Europe. He told me that the Bundesbankªs gold  
>vault was empty, which seemed so preposterous that I  
>found it hard to believe. He also admitted that this  
>news startled him and that he did not have an adequate  
 
 
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