Heute kam folgenede Analyse von stratfor.com (sehr emfehlenswert):

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Russian Reforms: All Shock and No Therapy

Summary

Presidential economic advisor Andrei Illarionov, an economic
ultraliberal, stated July 15 that Russia's economic competitiveness
had decreased by 30 percent since the beginning of the year,
partially due to rising inflation, according to Segovnaya. Analysts
are estimating Russia's year-end inflation could be as high as 35
percent, almost double the 18 percent upon which Russia's budget
was founded. Wrangles between the administration and the Duma are
significantly reducing the probability of economic growth. The
result will be a stagnant economy beset by inflation.

Analysis

Russian economists are sounding warning bells. According to
Segovnaya, presidential advisor Andrei Illarionov claimed that
Russia's economic competitiveness had decreased by 30 percent since
the beginning of the year. Inflation too, is a problem. In the
first six months of the year inflation jumped 9.33 percent -
tripling in the past two months alone. This inflation burst is
directly linked to many of the reform policies of Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov.

The reform efforts are half of a two part plan, the other half
being foreign investment. Neither effort will succeed without the
other. Foreigners won't invest in a corrupted economy, and painful
reforms will only hurt the public if that investment fails to
materialize. In the coming months, it is unlikely the reforms will
achieve their goal. Instead, inflation will continue to strengthen,
weakening the already tenuous economic hold of the Russian
population.

Most observers are parroting Putin's June 3 statement faulting
increases in Russia's money supply for the inflation. While the
money supply undoubtedly plays a role, the Kremlin's reforms -
which have directly raised prices - are the true culprit. As the
official argument goes, federal law requires exporters to sell 75
percent of their hard currency earnings to the Central Bank in
exchange for rubles. The immediate result is an increase in the
amount of money in the Russian economy. With more money in
circulation, producers can charge more for their limited number of
goods. The result is demand-pull inflation.

Several of Putin's policies reinforce this demand-pull inflation.
Putin has committed his government to paying up all wage arrears,
and the Duma and Federation Council have already agreed to more
than triple the minimum wage percent over the next 12 months. On
July 10 Putin raised the average pension by one-sixth, the third
raise this year, and set the stage for further increases in 2001.
Like the Central Bank's policy on appropriating hard currency,
these moves increase the amount of cash in the economy without
raising productivity: more demand-pull inflation.

But Russia's Central Bank statistics indicate the money supply has
not kept up with the hype. Exports for the first five months of the
year totaled $39.3 billion, or 1.1 trillion rubles. That means 840
billion rubles should have entered the money supply. However,
according to the Russian Central Bank, from January to June the
money supply only increased by 161 billion rubles.

So if the official line is at best only partly correct, what is
actually causing the inflation? Over the past several months the
Putin/Kasyanov administration has scrapped various subsidies and
enacted broad taxes. The results are increased costs for the basic
consumables in Russian society: Electricity prices have soared 55
percent, natural gas 15 percent to 20 percent, vodka 40 percent and
telephone lines 15 percent. This is cost-push inflation, and it
directly affects all Russians.
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Russia has few tools to deal with its inflation. Russia could use
some of its 48.6 billion ruble budget surplus to pay off some of
the government's debt to the Central Bank. This would both improve
Russia's internal debt and mop up a few billion excess rubles,
partially offsetting the demand-pull inflation.

But the only thing that can alleviate cost-push inflation is
stable, broad-based economic growth. Petroleum sales don't count.
The only way Russia can achieve that growth is by increasing worker
productivity. That requires strong managerial skills, new
technology and abundant capital - three things that Russia lacks,
but foreigners have. Simply put, Russia needs foreign investment.

That investment remains elusive. The 1998 ruble crash, combined
with endemic corruption, burned most foreign investors. To lure
those investors back, Putin is implementing two types of reform:
legal and economic.

Under Putin's firm hand, Russia has already taken the first legal
reforms: getting the government out of business, getting business
out of the government and strengthening the rule of law - albeit
through the implementation of a police state. Putin is knocking the
oligarchs down to size as well. The latest target is Anatoly
Chubais, former privatization minister and Yeltsin chief of staff
and currently head of Unified Energy Systems, Russia's electricity
monopoly.

On the economic front, Putin is revamping the tax system and
dismantling price controls. Yet, the economic reforms must be
approved and implemented quickly in order to work without
triggering hyperinflation.

It is difficult to understate the obstacles to progress. While
currently on the run, the oligarchs still control vast tracts of
the economy. Russian culture, traumatized by decades of communism
and previous rounds of shock therapy, lacks the ingrained civic
responsibility - not to mention corruption-free law enforcers -
needed to ground an advanced economy. And regional governors, along
with corrupt government bureaucrats at all levels, are fighting
tooth-and-nail to slow or deflect almost the entire Putin/Kasyanov
reform package."

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