Re: maybe - wären da nicht noch die"systemic risks"

verfasst von Ghandi, 27.12.2004, 18:26

-->>....wie das eben mit Regeln so ist, solange die Sonne scheint, hat keiner ein Problem mit den Regeln. - Was solche Regeln werten sind, zeigt sich dann in einer Situation, in der es um´s Überleben geht. Dort heiligt dann plötzlich der Zweck die Mittel, und es ist jedes Mittel recht, denn Feind nieder zu machen.
>Ein paar"Notstandsgesetze" und zack sind die Regeln eben anders.
>Gruss
>Thomas
>

Hallo Thomas,

dein Szenario ist durchaus möglich.

Andererseits ist unser Finanzsystem derart ´high-leveraged´, dass un-
vorhersehbare Ereignisse abrupt einen finanziellen"Tsunami" auslösen
könnten, der evtl. schon deshalb nicht mehr beherrschbar wäre, weil er
kraft seiner schieren Dimension mit einem rapiden Vertrauensverlust
der Marktteilnehmer einher gehen würde.

A.Greenspan deutet in seiner Rede vom 24.2.04 so eine Variante mit
Bezug auf die beiden GSEs an. (Nachfolgend Auszüge)

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The GSEs' special advantage arises because, despite the explicit statement on the prospectus to GSE debentures that they are not backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, most investors have apparently concluded that during a crisis the federal government will prevent the GSEs from defaulting on their debt. An implicit guarantee is thus created not by the Congress but by the willingness of investors to accept a lower rate of interest on GSE debt than they would otherwise require in the absence of federal sponsorship.

Because Fannie and Freddie can borrow at a subsidized rate, they have been able to pay higher prices to originators for their mortgages than can potential competitors and to gradually but inexorably take over the market for conforming mortgages. This process has provided Fannie and Freddie with a powerful vehicle and incentive for achieving extremely rapid growth of their balance sheets. The resultant scale gives Fannie and Freddie additional advantages that potential private-sector competitors cannot overcome. Importantly, the scale itself has reinforced investors' perceptions that, in the event of a crisis involving Fannie and Freddie, policymakers would have little
alternative than to have the taxpayers explicitly stand behind the GSE debt. This view is widespread in the marketplace despite the privatization of Fannie and Freddie and their control by private shareholders, because these institutions continue to have government missions, a line of credit with the Treasury, and other government benefits, which confer upon them a special status in the eyes of many investors.

The part of Fannie's and Freddie's purchases from mortgage originators that they do not fund themselves, but instead securitize, guarantee, and sell into the market, is a somewhat different business. The value of the guarantee is a function of the expectation that Fannie and Freddie will not be allowed to fail. While the rate of return reflects the implicit subsidy, a smaller amount of Fannie's and Freddie's overall profit comes from securitizing and selling mortgage-backed securities (MBS)....

The Federal Reserve is concerned about the growth and the scale of the GSEs' mortgage portfolios, which concentrate interest rate and prepayment risks at these two institutions. Unlike many well-capitalized savings and loans and commercial banks, Fannie and Freddie have chosen not to manage that risk by holding greater capital. Instead, they have chosen heightened leverage, which raises interest rate risk but enables them to multiply the profitability of subsidized debt in direct proportion to their degree of leverage. Without the expectation of government support in a crisis, such leverage would not be possible without a significantly higher cost of
debt.

As always, concerns about systemic risk are appropriately focused on large, highly leveraged financial institutions such as the GSEs that play substantial roles in the functioning of financial markets. I should emphasize that Fannie and Freddie, to date, appear to have managed these risks well and that we see nothing on the immediate horizon that is likely to create a systemic problem. But to fend off possible future systemic difficulties, which we assess as likely if GSE expansion continues unabated, preventive actions are required sooner rather than later….

Interest rate risk associated with fixed-rate mortgages, unless supported by substantial capital, however, can be of even greater concern than the credit risk. Interest rate volatility combined with the ability of homeowners to prepay their mortgages without penalty means that the cash flows associated with the holding of mortgage debt directly or through mortgage-backed securities are highly uncertain, even if the probability of default is low....

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gesamter Thread:

• Intensivkurs für jeden der behauptet daß die Gesamteinnahmen des Staates - Euklid, 27.12.2004, 11:22
  • Re: Gesamteinnahmen fallen deutlich - dottore, 27.12.2004, 14:57
    • Dottore sie liegen einfach falsch. - x Thomas, 27.12.2004, 16:10
      • Re: Dottore sie liegen einfach falsch. - CRASH_GURU, 27.12.2004, 16:18
        • Re: Dottore sie liegen einfach falsch. - x Thomas, 27.12.2004, 16:51
          • Re: maybe - wären da nicht noch die"systemic risks" - Ghandi, 27.12.2004, 18:26
      • Re: Das tut mir leid für ihn - dottore, 27.12.2004, 19:02
        • Re: Das tut mir leid für ihn - x Thomas, 27.12.2004, 20:08
          • Re: Das tut mir leid für ihn - dottore, 29.12.2004, 14:45
            • Re: Das tut mir leid für ihn - Euklid, 29.12.2004, 18:39
              • Re: Das tut mir leid für ihn - dottore, 29.12.2004, 20:02
        • dottore meint wohl 550135 Axel Springer AG VINK.NAMENS-AKTIEN (o.Text) - LenzHannover, 28.12.2004, 01:21
      • Re: Dottore sie liegen einfach falsch. - Burning_Heart, 27.12.2004, 19:22
    • Re: Gesamteinnahmen fallen deutlich - Euklid, 27.12.2004, 18:07